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 ABSTRACT 
 
Taxis are a widely used and heavily regulated area of public transport in England and 
Wales, but one which has been neglected by law academics and researchers. The 
original contribution to knowledge provided by this study is the finding that 
effectiveness of regulation of the trade relies upon local authority regulators creating 
and implementing their own system of ‘law’ outside the legislative framework and the 
trade acquiescing in that regime. Taking a qualitative-based empirical approach, this 
study critically assesses the taxi licensing regime through the views, attitudes and 
beliefs of those involved in the day-to-day application of the law. Many aspects of 
taxi regulation involve the exercise of local authority discretion, but the current 
system grants discretion in areas which ought to be confined by rules and often that 
discretion is exercised improperly. Whilst some degree of local administration of the 
system is desirable, many elements of taxi regulation would benefit from national 
standards to ensure consistency and uniformity. Although the study found a number 
of important exceptions to these general conclusions, on the whole the most effective 
methods of regulation were found to be those which operated beyond the legal 
framework and in which the trade acquiesced.    
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The Effectiveness of Local Government Regulation of the Taxi Trade 
 
CHAPTER 1: LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
 
1) Introduction and background 
 
   According to the Department for Transport, some 700 million journeys are made by 
taxi and private hire vehicle annually throughout England and Wales;
1
 the equivalent 
of almost one journey every month for every man, woman and child in the country. 
Most members of the public are at least occasional users of taxi services. People who 
use taxis are drawn from all social groups, with low-income young women being one 
of the largest user groups.
2
  
 
   Taxis form a vital part of the public transport system, although this is not 
universally acknowledged to be the case. Much of the existing literature and research 
on public transport in the United Kingdom tends either to exclude taxis from its 
consideration altogether
3
 or, whilst acknowledging that taxis do form part of public 
transport, overlooks them to focus solely on buses and trains.
4
 Yet taxis should be 
                                                 
1
 Department for Transport, ‘Transport for you’ <http://www.dft.gov.uk/transportforyou/access/taxis/ 
backgroundinformation> accessed 18 October 2010. This represents an increase of some 7.7 per cent 
from the 650 million in 2006. 
2
 Department for Transport, ‘Taxi and Private Hire Vehicle Licensing: Best Practice Guidance’ 
(London, October 2010) [6]. 
3
 For example, K Button, ‘Privatisation and Deregulation: Its Implications for Negative Transport 
Externalities’ (1994) 28(1) Annals of Regional Science 125; Department for Transport, ‘Policy 
Guidance and Research on Local Transport Act 2008’ (9th February 2009).   
4
 For example, R Balcombe (ed), The Demand for Public Transport: A Practical Guide (TRL Ltd, Rep 
No 593, London 2004).   
 2 
considered an integral part of the public transport system. Indeed, taxis are the longest 
surviving form of transport available to the public. The origins of carriages available 
for hire by the public can be traced back to the early years of the 17
th
 Century, when 
they stood in stables or yards of the principal inns,
5
 thereby predating other forms of 
public transport by at least 200 years. However, the classification of taxis as public 
transport is not just historical. The Transport Act 1985 defines ‘public passenger 
transport services’ as, ‘all those services on which members of the public rely on 
getting from place to place, when not relying on private facilities of their own’.6 Many 
members of the public, particularly those who are vulnerable by reason of age, 
gender, disability or inebriation, rely on taxis for their transport needs.
7
 
 
   Concerns about the need to regulate the taxi trade surface only occasionally, and 
they are usually in response to some notorious incident or particularly tragic event 
involving taxi vehicles or drivers. Examples of such occurrences include the 
imprisonment of John Worboys, a London taxi driver convicted of a series of sexual 
assaults on female passengers,
8
 and, more recently, the case of Christopher Halliwell, 
a Swindon taxi driver convicted of the murder of a female passenger.
9
 Although such 
incidents are rare, when they happen they often lead to calls for stricter regulation of 
taxi services, such as those to limit drivers’ working hours following the death of 
Gary Glymond
10
 or for modifications to vehicles after the death of Razan Begum in 
                                                 
5
 HC Moore, Omnibuses and Cabs: Their Origin and History (Chapman & Hall, London 1902). 
6
 Transport Act 1985, s 63(10)(a). 
7
 IBIS World, ‘Taxi Operation in the UK’ (Industry Report Number H49.320, January 2012) 12. 
8
 BBC News, ‘Cab driver jailed for sex attacks’ (21st April 2009) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
england-london-7931975> accessed 22nd April 2009. 
9
 S Morris, ‘Taxi Driver Jailed for Sian O’Callaghan Murder’ Guardian (London 20 October 2012) 6. 
10BBC News, ‘Call to limit taxi drivers’ hours’ (16th August 2009) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
england-london-8203775> accessed 1st September 2009. Gary Glymond died from injuries sustained 
after being hit by a taxi, the driver of which had been driving for more than 13 hours prior to the 
accident.    
 3 
Birmingham in 2009.
11
 Perennial stories in both national and local press concerning 
assaults on passengers,
12
 the problems of unlicensed taxis,
13
 or taxis being removed 
from the roads because they are unroadworthy,
14
 add to the general impression that 
lack of effective regulation undermines the safety of the taxi using public. 
 
   And yet taxis and those who drive them are very strictly regulated, far more so than 
their counterparts in the bus and train industries. Regulation of the taxi trade is almost 
as old as the trade itself and encompasses all aspects of the service provided by taxis. 
Taxis are different from the other modes of public transport because they have always 
operated as independent private business enterprises; regulated by the state, but never 
state owned or subsidized.  
 
   Despite their widespread use and importance to the public transport industry, the 
regulation of taxis has generally been overlooked. The literature on the taxi trade has 
largely been limited to historical accounts of the development of the industry
15
 and 
analysis of certain aspects of the trade from personal memoirs and observations of 
former drivers.
16
 There is a significant body of work relating to economic regulation 
of the trade, but this is written by economists and focuses on the economic effects of 
what is termed the ‘de-regulation’ of the industry, primarily in the United States’ 
                                                 
11
 Birmingham Mail, ‘Birmingham Coroner Calls for New Taxi Restraints for Wheelchairs’ 
(Birmingham 8 July 2009). Razan Begum died from injuries sustained when the wheelchair in which 
she was seated, and which had not been properly secured, moved during a taxi journey. 
12
Lancaster Guardian, ‘Taxi driver found guilty of rape’ (Lancaster 26 November 2010) 5. 
13
 T Kirk, ‘Warning after sexual attacks by unlicensed taxi drivers double in a year’ Enfield 
Independent (London 27 September 2010). 
14
 J Davenport, ‘Raid on illegal minicabs ends in 25 arrests’ London Evening Standard (London 23 
February 2009).  
15
 G Gilbert and RE Samuels, The Taxicab: An Urban Transportation Survivor (University of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 1982).  
16
 JV Maresca, My Flag Is Down (EP Dutton, New York 1945); F Davis, ‘The Cabdriver and His Fare: 
Facets of a Fleeting Relationship’ (1959) 65(2) American Journal of Sociology 158. 
 4 
market.
17
 Although some of these existing studies are empirically based, the approach 
taken is largely quantitative, with no qualitative analysis of the wider regulation of the 
market. Beyond this literature, there are no empirical research findings showing how 
or why the taxi trade is regulated or what regulation achieves. According to Toner, the 
lack of formal empirical work is due to the required evidence not being readily 
available.
18
 The evidence may not be easy to access, but it is available. As part of this 
study, I obtain and analyse some of the empirical data as an original contribution to 
knowledge in this under-researched area. 
 
   In this thesis, I consider the following questions. First, how are taxis regulated? In 
this first chapter, I describe the historical development of regulation of the taxi trade 
and the current legislative framework upon which it is based. I then consider the 
criticisms and limitations of this framework, from which I identify the research 
questions to be addressed in the rest of the thesis. Second, what is regulation trying to 
achieve? This involves an analysis of what is meant by regulation, and why is it 
necessary to regulate the taxi trade? This, in turn, enables me to examine the specific 
aims of taxi regulation, which forms part of the discussion in Chapter 2. In the rest of 
Chapter 2, I examine the theoretical bases underpinning the research questions. Third, 
how are the statutory framework and the theoretical models of regulation applied in 
practice? As a prelude to answering this question, in Chapter 3 I outline the 
methodology of the study. In chapters 4 to 7, I analyse the empirical findings of the 
research on the different aspects of regulation and how these connect to the legislative 
                                                 
17
 Classic articles include PR Verkuil, ‘The Economic Regulation of Taxicabs’ (1970) 24 Rutgers Law 
Review 672; RD Eckert, ‘The Los Angeles Taxi Monopoly: An Economic Inquiry’ (1970) 43 South 
California Law Review 407; EW Kitch et al, ‘The Regulation of Taxicabs in Chicago’ (1971) 14 
Journal of Law and Economics 285. The leading literature and the issues surrounding ‘de-regulation’ 
are reviewed in Chapter 2. 
18
 JP Toner, ‘The Welfare Effects of Taxicab Regulation in English Towns’ (2010) 40(3) Economic 
Analysis and Policy 299, 300. 
 5 
and theoretical models outlined in earlier chapters. Finally, in chapter 8, I consider 
whether regulation of the trade achieves what it sets out to achieve. In this concluding 
chapter, I also reflect on the practical implications of the study and some suggested 
areas for further research. 
 
2) Scope of the Research 
 
   In this research, I focus on the taxi, formally more correct hackney carriage, trade. 
Although the terms ‘taxi’, ‘hackney carriage’, ‘cab’, ‘mini-cab’, and ‘black-cab’ are 
used interchangeably in common parlance to mean a vehicle which can be hired by 
the public, so far as the law is concerned there are only three types of such vehicle: 
hackney carriages, London cabs and private hire vehicles. 
 
Hackney carriages are defined as: 
  
Every wheeled carriage, whatever may be its form or construction, used in 
standing or plying for hire in any street…and every carriage standing upon any 
street…having thereon any numbered plate required…to be fixed upon a 
hackney carriage, or having thereon any plate resembling or intended to 
resemble any such plate as aforesaid.
19
 
 
   These vehicles operate from a rank or stand, may be ‘hailed’ in the street, and 
require no prior booking. The essence of a hackney carriage is its ability to stand or 
ply for hire in the street, regardless of the form or appearance of the vehicle. The 
phrase ‘plying for hire’ has acquired something of a technical meaning, but essentially 
refers to being actively available for immediate hire by the public.
20
 London cabs are 
                                                 
19
 Town Police Clauses Act 1847, s 38. 
20
 Eldridge v British Airports Authority [1970] 2 QB 387, 396 (Donaldson J). 
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a specialized form of hackney carriage which operate within the metropolitan police 
district and City of London only.
21
 Private hire vehicles are defined by a process of 
elimination as being neither of the other forms of transport, but  
 
…a motor vehicle constructed or adapted to seat fewer than nine passengers, 
other than a hackney carriage or public service vehicle or a London cab or 
tramcar, which is provided for hire with the services of a driver for the 
purpose of carrying passengers.
22
  
 
Such a vehicle must be booked by the hirer thorough a licensed operator.
23
 
  
I have focussed on the hackney carriage trade for four main reasons. Hackney 
carriages are the original form of public transport, they have a longstanding legislative 
history, they have their own self-contained regulatory regime, and they are, so far as 
the law is concerned, the only true form of ‘taxi’. Although most members of the 
public do not distinguish between hackney carriages and private hire vehicles, 
technically private hire vehicles are not taxis and do not form part of the public 
transport system.
24
   
 
  Hackney carriages are regulated in all aspects of their operation, including entry into 
the market, qualitative regulation of both vehicles and drivers, and fares. Private hire 
vehicles are subject to qualitative regulation of the vehicles, drivers and operators 
only. There is, therefore, greater scope for investigating the nature of regulation of the 
taxi trade by concentrating on hackney carriages. Furthermore, the inclusion of 
private hire vehicles may lead to duplication of work and confusion. Whilst I 
                                                 
21
 Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869, s 2 and s 4 
22
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s 80(1). 
23
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s 46, s 55 and s 80(1). 
24
 Transport Act 1980, s 64(3). 
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acknowledge that there are many areas of qualitative regulation which are common to 
both types of vehicle, focussing on hackney carriages will reduce the work necessary 
to explore the issues of regulation. This will enable areas of similarity or difference to 
be highlighted where this will be instructive, rather than to repeat provisions which 
are similar and then point out the areas of difference.  
 
   In addition, the research focuses on the regulation of hackney carriages in England 
and Wales outside London. Historically the regulation of hackney carriages began in 
London, and the capital has always had its own regulatory regime detached from the 
rest of the country. That regime is currently set out in the Metropolitan Public 
Carriage Act 1869 and applies to London cabs only. Because London was the first 
city to regulate taxi services, and has always had the largest concentration of both 
taxis and taxi users, it has always been regarded as something of a ‘special case’ 
deserving of its own regulatory regime.
25
 The regulation of taxis had been in existence 
for many years, and had undergone many changes, before any form of regulation was 
introduced in the provinces. However, the number of licensed hackney carriages in 
the remainder of England and Wales is numerically greater than in London (52,000 
compared with 21,800)
26
 and the regulatory regime covers a wider geographical area, 
involving a total of 315 local authorities.
27
 For this reason, I focus the research on the 
                                                 
25
 Law Commission, Reforming the Law of Taxi and Private Hire Services (Law Com CP No 203, 
2012) [2.5] and [14.5]. The Law Commission, whilst acknowledging that there are strong arguments 
for keeping London as a separate regime, have invited views on whether a reformed regulatory 
framework for the rest of the country should be applied to the capital also. The arguments raised by this 
issue are beyond the scope of this research.   
26
 Department for Transport, ‘Transport Statistics Great Britain 2009’ (London 2009). These figures 
represent the position as at April 2008. 
27
 Office for National Statistics, ‘Geography of Local Authorities in Great Britain’ <http://www. 
statistics.gov.uk/geography/counties> accessed 18th October 2010. This total represents metropolitan 
district councils, unitary authorities, non-metropolitan district councils and Welsh councils. 
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remainder of England and Wales,
28
 in order to produce a wider divergence of views 
on how the regulatory powers are, and ought to be, used. I acknowledge that there are 
overlapping themes and issues, and I refer to other regimes where this would be 
instructive. 
 
3) Historical Background and Legislative Framework  
 
  Hackney carriages first became available for hire in a public street in 1634, when 
one Captain Baily set four hackney coaches to stand for public hire at the Maypole in 
the Strand in London.
29
 The service proved so lucrative that within a year the King 
found it necessary to issue a Royal Proclamation forbidding the ‘multitude and 
promiscuous use of coaches’ within London and Westminster.30 This first attempt to 
regulate the use of hackney carriages was prompted by complaints that they caused 
congestion and damage in the streets, and by petitions from the Company of 
Watermen, the incumbent suppliers of publicly hired transport, who feared the new 
mode of travel would deprive them of their livelihoods.
31
 However, the absence of a 
police force or any other official regulator meant that this edict was impossible to 
enforce.
32
 A system of licensing for hackney carriages was first introduced in 1654, 
when Parliament imposed a limit of 400 on the number of carriages in London. 
                                                 
28
 The City of Plymouth has had its own regulatory regime for both hackney carriages and private hire 
vehicles by virtue of private Acts, the Plymouth City Council Acts 1975 and 1987, but the hackney 
carriage regime is essentially the same as for the rest of England and Wales. Plymouth is therefore 
included within the scope of the research.  
29
 Moore (n 5) 36; WT Jackman, The Development of Transportation in Modern England (2
nd
 edn, F 
Cass and Co, London 1962) 112. 
30
 ‘A Proclamation for the Restraint of Excessive Carriages to the Destruction of the High Wayes’ (1st 
November 1635) Proclamations, II Chronological Series, Charles II [1625-1649]. Hired carriages 
were permitted so long as they were to travel at least three miles out of London, Westminster, ‘or the 
suburbs thereof’.  
31
 AE Pratt, A History of Inland Transport and Communication in England (Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trübner and Co, London 1912). 
32
 Gilbert and Samuels (n 15) 14-15. 
 9 
Responsibility for the granting and regulation of licences was placed in the hands of 
the Court of Aldermen.
33
 These legislative provisions, however, were limited in their 
geographical scope in that they only applied to hackney carriages operating within the 
City of London. In the rest of England and Wales, the taxi trade remained unregulated 
for almost another 200 years. Nonetheless, the issues raised by these early attempts at 
regulation, as will be seen, still resonate across the whole country today.    
 
   The current regulatory framework for England and Wales is based on two main 
statutory provisions; the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (the 1847 Act) and the Local 
Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (the 1976 Act). The modern system 
of taxi regulation only began in 1985 with two major amendments to the main Acts, 
introduced by the Transport Act 1985.  
 
   The 1847 Act was the first attempt to regulate the hackney carriage trade outside the 
City of London. The Act is modelled on the London regulatory regime, in that control 
of the taxi trade is to be achieved by a system of licences. The licensing authority is 
provided with the power to grant licences in respect of the hackney carriage itself
34
 
(the vehicle licence) and a separate licence for the driver
35
 (the driver’s licence). In 
order to operate legitimately both licences must be held simultaneously at the time the 
vehicle is standing or plying for hire or is being driven, whether hired or not.
36
 The 
statutory framework also employs a separate, but linked, regulatory technique in 
respect of fares by fixing a maximum price. I consider the use of this mechanism in its 
                                                 
33
 ‘An Ordinance for the Regulation of Hackney Coachmen in London and the places adjacent’ in CH 
Frith and RS Rait (eds), Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 1642-1660 (HMSO, London 1911) 
922-924.  
34
 Town Police Clauses Act 1847, s 37. 
35
 ibid s 46.  
36
 Hawkins v Edwards [1901] 2KB 169; Yates v Gates [1970] 1 All ER 754.  
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context of fare regulation. In common with all licensing regimes, regulation of the 
taxi trade operates as what has been termed a ‘command and control’ type system,37 
with the licensing requirements enforced by criminal sanctions for operating without 
the relevant licences.
38
 
 
   The legislation structures control over the trade in the following ways: by delegating 
responsibility for regulation to an identified regulator; controlling entry to the trade; 
imposing post-entry controls over the quality of service; fare regulation; and the 
granting of enforcement powers. I consider how each of these is used in turn.   
 
a) Identity of the regulator 
 
   The licensing authority responsible for the application and enforcement of the 
regulatory regime is the local unitary, district or borough council in England, or its 
equivalent in Wales. The 1847 Act originally placed responsibility for the regulation 
of hackney carriages in the hands of local improvement commissioners. Such a step 
was not unusual at the time, and should be seen in its historical context. The Act was 
passed only 12 years after the creation of local councils in their recognizable modern 
form under the Municipal Corporations Act 1835. Prior to this date, local municipal 
functions were frequently performed by special ad hoc bodies, such as commissioners 
or local boards.
39
 The corporations which existed before 1835 were viewed as being 
beset by twin evils of corruption and inefficiency,
40
 and even after the 1835 Act, ‘it 
was impossible by the stroke of a pen to get rid of the deep rooted mistrust of 
                                                 
37
 AI Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994) 79. 
38
 Town Police Clauses Act 1847, s 45 and s 47. 
39
 J Redlich and FW Hirst, The History of Local Government in England (B Keith-Lucas (ed), 
Macmillan, London 1958) 125. 
40
 PP Craig, Administrative Law (6
th
 edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008) 62. 
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municipal authorities’.41  This mistrust continued for many years, leaving many 
administrative functions still in the hands of local commissioners. This situation 
changed with the passing of the Public Health Act 1875, which brought the provisions 
of the 1847 Act under the responsibility of the urban district councils, in their capacity 
as the newly formed ‘sanitary authorities’.42 The inclusion of taxi licensing would 
appear to have been almost coincidental, as it clearly has little to do with public health 
as such. The Public Health Act 1875 removed the commissioners’ role altogether. 
From this point onwards, taxi regulation was the responsibility of the local authority.  
 
   However, initial control over the trade was weak, largely because the regime 
operated on an ‘opt-in’ basis. Local councils which wished to regulate taxi services in 
their area had either to pass a local ‘Special’ Act to apply the 1847 Act or, more 
commonly, pass a resolution to adopt the provisions of the legislative scheme of both 
Acts.
43
 This was an important consideration, as there was no ‘default’ position of 
central government control. If the local council did not adopt the regulatory powers, 
there was no control at all over the conduct or standards of taxi drivers or their 
vehicles. Prior to 1985, out of the 360 district councils which then existed, 70 
controlled taxis in only part of their area and a further 60 councils did not licence taxis 
at all.
44
 
 
   This difficulty was remedied by the coming into force of section 15 of the Transport 
Act 1985. This section made responsibility for taxi licensing compulsory for all local 
authorities with effect from the 1
st
 January 1987. This was a radical change to the 
                                                 
41
 Redlich and Hirst (n 39) 137. 
42
 Public Health Act 1875, s 171(4) 
43
 Town Police Clauses Act 1847, s 2; Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s 45. 
44
 HC Deb 21
st
 May 1985, vol 79 col 946 (Michael Spicer MP, Transport Minister).  
 12 
system, and may be seen as the introduction of the modern system of regulation of the 
taxi trade. All local councils are now compelled to take responsibility for the licensing 
of taxis throughout their area. 
 
b) Control of entry to the trade 
 
   The provisions introduced by the 1847 legislation impose only loose control over 
both vehicles and drivers. Market entry is controlled merely by the need to obtain a 
licence. The Act does not fix upper limits on the number of licences which can be 
issued. Historically, such quantitative restrictions were placed on the numbers of 
vehicles, drivers and horses.
45
 Although the maximum number of licences was 
gradually increased over the years, all such restrictions were removed from the 
London regime in 1831,
46
 never to be reinstated. Outside London, the original section 
37 of the 1847 Act provided that the licensing authority could licence ‘such number of 
hackney coaches or carriages…as they think fit’. This meant that regulators could 
exercise a discretion to limit market entry by imposing an upper limit on the number 
of vehicle licences that they would grant for their area. The 1976 Act left the position 
on quantitative regulation unchanged. This traditional position was changed by 
section 16 of the Transport Act 1985, thereby creating one of the most divisive and 
enduring controversies within the taxi trade today. 
 
   Section 16 amends Section 37 of the 1847 Act, but it is both the manner and effect 
of the amendment which are the causes of confusion and controversy. The amended 
version of section 37 now reads: 
                                                 
45
 Frith & Rait (n 33) 922. The initial limits imposed under the 1654 Ordinance were 200 coachmen, 
400 coaches and 600 horses.   
46
 London Hackney Carriage Act 1831, s 2. 
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 The commissioners may from time to time licence to ply for hire…hackney 
coaches or carriages…provided that the grant of a licence may be refused, for 
the purpose of limiting the number of hackney carriages in respect of which 
licences are granted, if, but only if, the person authorised to grant licences is 
satisfied that there is no significant demand for the services of hackney 
carriages (within the area to which the licence would apply) which is unmet. 
  
 Much criticism has been made about the wording of the new Section 37, particularly 
its use of double negatives. This makes the provision difficult to understand even by 
judges and legislators. The provision was variously described in the committee stage 
of the House of Lords as ‘quite incomprehensible’, ‘virtually unintelligible’, and both 
‘a masterpiece of obscurity’ and ‘awful claptrap’.47 
 
   The introduction of the amended version of section 37 has created a situation in 
which it is very difficult for local authorities to limit the number of taxi licences they 
grant.
48
 The discretion previously vested in licensing authorities to determine the 
number of hackney carriage licences is removed, except in the very limited 
circumstances prescribed by the legislation. In order to restrict numbers, local 
authorities have to be able to demonstrate that there is no significant unmet demand 
for hackney carriage services in their area. According to some interpretations of the 
statutory provisions, in the absence of evidence that there is no significant unmet 
demand, the local authority has no discretion at all; a licence has to be granted.
49
 The 
decision whether significant unmet demand exists is left to local authorities to 
interpret. Initially, councils were provided with only the vaguest of guidelines on what 
                                                 
47
 HL Deb 16
th
 July 1985, vol 466, cols 618-679 (Lord Renton col 628; Lord Denning col 629; Lord 
Peyton of Yeovil cols 630-631 respectively).  
48
 C Walker and I Cram, ‘Taxi Deregulation and the Courts’ (1991) 20 Anglo-American Law Review 
482.   
49
 R v Reading Borough Council ex p Egan [1990] RTR 399.  
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significant unmet demand meant,
50
 but it is now widely accepted that it has to be 
established on the basis of an expert survey.
51
 Central government has endorsed this 
position and indicated that councils can only base their assessment of significant 
unmet demand on such a survey carried out every three years.
52
 
 
   The 1847 Act gives no express power to control entry to the market on the basis of 
the quality of vehicles or drivers. The open wording of section 37 and section 46 of 
the Act suggests that any one who requests a vehicle or driver’s licence has to be 
granted one. So far as vehicle licences are concerned, this is in contrast to the position 
for private hire vehicles, which must be considered suitable, safe and comfortable for 
use as such a vehicle before a licence may be granted.
53
 It has been argued that, since 
the amendment to section 37 of the 1847 Act, local authorities do not have the power 
to control vehicle entry on the grounds of quality. This results in the possibility that an 
unroadworthy vehicle could be licensed as a hackney carriage. In R v Reading BC ex 
p Egan,
54
 Nolan J held that the effect of section 16 of the Transport Act 1985 was that 
councils had no discretion other than to grant a licence if there was no significant 
unmet demand.
55
 However, in Ghafoor v Wakefield MBC,
56
 Webster J held that the 
words ‘for the purpose of limiting the number of hackney carriages’ contained in 
section 37 indicated that local authorities still retain discretion to refuse to grant a 
licence so long as the purpose of doing so is something other than limiting numbers.  
The practical effect of restricting entry by reference to quality standards is to limit the 
                                                 
50
 Department for Transport Circular 3/85. 
51
R(North Devon HCOA) v North Devon District Council [1999] EWHC 503 (Admin). 
52
 Department for Transport, ‘Best Practice Guidance’ (n 2) [49]. 
53
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s 48(1). 
54
 [1990] RTR 399. 
55
 Transport Act 1985, s 16. 
56
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numbers of hackney carriages ‘by the back door’.57 There can only be a finite number 
of vehicles that are able to meet the quality standards.
58
 The obvious conflict between 
these authorities remains unresolved. 
 
   Historically, the power to grant a licence to a driver was unqualified and open-
ended,
59
 and there is no express power to limit numbers of drivers in any 
circumstances. The wording of the London regime suggests that an applicant has a 
right to a licence unless a specific disqualification applies,
60
 but the provisions of the 
1847 Act are worded differently and are simply left open. Some licensing authorities 
took the view that to be granted a licence was a personal privilege not a right, and so 
believed they had unqualified discretion to grant or refuse a licence.
61
 It was never 
made clear upon what basis this discretion was to be exercised.  
 
   The 1976 Act introduced, for the first time, quality pre-conditions for the grant of a 
driver’s licence. Entry to the market is now limited to only those applicants who can 
satisfy the licensing authority that he or she is both a ‘fit and proper person’ to hold a 
licence and has held an ordinary driving licence for a minimum period of twelve 
months.
62
 Local authorities are directed to refuse an application for a driver’s licence 
‘unless they are satisfied’63 that the applicant meets these two conditions. This 
position may be contrasted with that of private hire drivers, where an application must 
                                                 
57
 Walker and Cram (n 48) 488. 
58
 As was successfully argued in R v Cambridge City Council ex p Buckshall (Cambridge Crown Court, 
January 1987), where the Crown Court struck down a requirement that all new applications for vehicle 
licenses had to be from wheelchair accessible vehicles as it was an attempt to cut down the numbers of 
new applicants. 
59
 Town Police Clauses Act 1847, s 46. 
60
 R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex p Holloway [1911] 2 KB 1131. 
61
 Banton v Davis (1891) 66 LT 192. 
62
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s 59. 
63
 ibid s 59(1)(a) 
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be granted to those applicants who meet the same statutory standard.
64
 There is no 
explanation why the power to grant a hackney carriage driver’s licence remains 
discretionary. 
 
   There is no statutory definition of the phrase ‘fit and proper person’. The only 
assistance available to councils in interpreting this requirement comes from the courts, 
and even that is of limited benefit. Lord Bingham described ‘fit and proper person’ as,  
 
a portmanteau expression, widely used in many contexts. It does not lend itself 
to semantic exegesis or paraphrase and takes its colour from the context in 
which it is used.
65
  
 
   More specifically in the context of taxi licensing, the same judge had said in an 
earlier case that applicants had to be  
 
safe drivers with good driving records and adequate experience, sober, 
mentally and physically fit, honest and not persons that would take advantage 
of their employment to abuse or assault passengers.
66
  
 
Strictly speaking this was an obiter observation, since McCool concerned an 
application for a private hire driver’s licence and the court was not attempting to 
define a ‘fit and proper person’. Nonetheless, the principle has come to be applied by 
licensing authorities in both hackney and private hire cases when it comes to making 
their assessment of whether applicants have satisfied this requirement. 
 
 
                                                 
64
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s 51(1). 
65
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 17 
c) Post-Entry Regulation 
 
   After licences have been granted, local authorities have powers to impose quality 
standards on both vehicles and drivers. Under the 1847 Act, these powers are weak 
and restricted, but much wider controls are provided for in the 1976 Act. 
 
   The 1847 Act attempts to regulate certain aspects of vehicle and driver quality by 
the creation of specific criminal offences. So, in the case of vehicles, there is an 
offence of failing to display a hackney plate.
67
 Offences which relate directly to driver 
misconduct include refusal to drive a passenger,
68
 driving whilst intoxicated, furious 
driving or ‘other wilful misconduct’ endangering life, limb or property.69 These 
somewhat crude efforts to impose quality standards through the criminal law are the 
only particular offences about the state of vehicles or the conduct of drivers provided 
by the 1847 Act.   
 
  However, under the 1847 Act, the licensing authority also has the power to regulate 
vehicles through local byelaws.
70
 Byelaws are a form of delegated legislation and, if 
validly promulgated, have the ‘force of law within the sphere of [their] legitimate 
operation.’71 The scope of any byelaws in relation to taxi vehicles is, however, limited 
by the statute to the manner of display of the vehicle’s licence number, regulation of 
                                                 
67
 Town Police Clauses Act 1847, s 52. ‘Plate’ refers to the wooden, metal or, more commonly 
nowadays, plastic sign issued to taxi owners to be affixed externally to the vehicle as a visible display 
that the vehicle is a licensed hackney carriage.   
68
 Town Police Clauses Act 1847, s 53. The Act provides that the offence is committed only if the 
refusal is ‘without reasonable excuse’. There is no authoritative guidance on what might be considered 
such an excuse, nor is it clear where the burden of proof lies to establish or disprove its existence. The 
only reported case on the section is Shepherd v Hack (1917) 117 LT 154, where opinion was divided 
on these points, which were obiter to the main issue in the case in any event.  
69
 Town Police Clauses Act 1847, s 61. 
70
 Town Police Clauses Act 1847, s 68. 
71
 Kruse v Johnson [1898] 2QB 91, 96 (Lord Russell CJ). 
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the numbers of persons to be carried, and the manner in which the vehicle is 
furnished.
72
 Quality standards relating to, for example, the structural and mechanical 
condition of the vehicle are not included within the range of the byelaws. The same 
legislative provision also includes powers to regulate ‘the conduct of proprietors and 
drivers’.73 There is nothing further specified in the legislation about how, or indeed 
why, the conduct of the proprietor, that is the legal owner or registered keeper of the 
vehicle,
74
 needs to be controlled. In the case of drivers, byelaws may stipulate how 
they are to conduct themselves generally, as well as making specific rules regarding 
the wearing of badges, drivers’ times of work, and the safe custody and return of 
customers’ property.75 As in the case of the specific offences, byelaws rely on the 
threat of criminal sanctions in the event of a breach.  
 
   The 1976 Act introduced, for the first time, an express power for local authorities to 
impose conditions upon any hackney vehicle licence granted by them. The only 
qualification to this provision is that the conditions must be considered ‘reasonably 
necessary’.76 The statutory wording begs the question ‘reasonably necessary for 
what?’, but the legislation does not answer this. There is specific provision that 
conditions may include a requirement that hackney carriages be of such design or 
appearance or bear such distinguishing marks as to clearly identify them as hackney 
carriages.
77
 However, this is a discretionary rather than a mandatory power. The 
ability to subject licence holders to conditions enables local authorities to regulate the 
quality of vehicles licensed as taxis. This represents a different approach to regulation 
                                                 
72
 Town Police Clauses Act 1847, s 68. 
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than simply relying upon the criminal law. No specific penalty is set for breach of a 
licence condition, but the licence holder may be exposed to administrative sanctions.
78
  
 
   Beyond the criminal and breach of byelaw offences mentioned above, there are no 
specified means of regulating the quality of service provided by a driver. In particular, 
there is no express power to attach conditions to the grant of a hackney carriage 
driver’s licence. In Wathan v Neath and Port Talbot CBC,79 the Court held that there 
is no implied power to do so either, and consequently any control that councils wish 
to exercise over the behaviour of taxi drivers can only be exercised under byelaws 
promulgated under the provisions of section 68 of the 1847 Act.
80
 
 
d) Fixing of fares 
 
   The 1847 Act permitted byelaws to be made in respect of the fixing and calculation 
of fares or rates of fares,
81
 but this power is superseded by a specific statutory scheme 
introduced by the 1976 Act.
82
 Control of fares has two stages; fare setting, which is 
carried out under the statutory powers, and the regulation of that set fare.  
 
The first stage is not strictly part of the licensing regime in itself, but is a form of 
price fixing, a separate method of regulation on its own.
83
 The statutory scheme 
provides a mechanism for the setting of fares involving publication and the 
opportunity for public consultation before the fare rates are fixed. There are no 
                                                 
78
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guidelines on the precise amount of the fares that can be set, and this is left to local 
authorities to determine. The fare set is a maximum fare, and the local authority has 
no control over the actual fare charged within that upper limit.  
 
   Once set, however, fares are regulated by the same instruments as other forms of 
post-entry regulation, namely criminal offences, byelaws or conditions attached to the 
vehicle licence. Specific offences relating to fares created by the 1847 Act include: 
charging more than the ‘legal’ fare;84 demanding payment above the ‘legal’ fare;85 
demanding more than the agreed fare (even if this is less than the ‘legal’ fare);86 and 
travelling a lesser distance for an agreed sum than would have been permitted by the 
‘legal’ fare.87 The 1976 Act added new criminal offences of overcharging for journeys 
travelling outside the licensed area,
88
 or when the hackney carriage is used to fulfil a 
private hire booking.
89
 A new offence of unnecessarily prolonging a journey by time 
or distance is also created by the 1976 Act.
90
 In all these offences, regulation of the 
fare depends upon the local authority having first fixed a ‘legal’ fare. Before the 
Transport Act 1985 introduced compulsory regulation of the trade, many authorities 
failed either to adopt the legislation or set a fare, and so the regulation of fares was 
largely weak and difficult to enforce. All councils are now responsible for setting 
fares throughout their area.   
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Regulation of fares is now inextricably linked with the licensing system. Local 
authority byelaws or vehicle licence conditions commonly require taxis to be fitted 
with taximeters in order to record accurately the ‘legal’ fare, although there is no 
statutory requirement for taxis to be equipped with meters.
91
 The courts have ruled 
that the real effect of a licence condition that all vehicles be fitted with taximeters is 
‘to impose a condition as to the fares that [can] be charged.’92   
   
e) Enforcement powers 
 
   Local authorities may prosecute for any contraventions of the taxi licensing regime 
which constitute a criminal offence.
93
 So a licence holder who commits any of the 
offences relating to vehicle standards, conduct of drivers or fare regulation mentioned 
in the preceding sub-sections, may face prosecution. Alternatively, or additionally, 
councils have the power to remove a licence administratively, either temporarily by 
way of suspension or permanently by revocation or refusal to renew.
94
  
 
   Once a licence is granted, there are only very limited powers under the 1847 Act to 
remove them. Licences for vehicles expire by effluxion of time. Vehicle licences are 
granted for just one year.
95
 There is no time limit on a driver’s licence under the 1847 
Act, but a statutory maximum limit of three years is created by the 1976 legislation.
96
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Licence holders have to apply to renew on expiry of the licence, subject to the 
statutory criteria for renewal.   
 
   The only ground upon which a vehicle or driver’s licence may be suspended or 
revoked under the 1847 Act is if the respective licence holder is convicted of two 
hackney carriage regulatory offences.
97
 This can be any two relevant offences, not 
necessarily the same offence twice.
98
 This power to withdraw a licence is directly 
linked to offences connected to the taxi trade rather than misconduct by the proprietor 
or driver away from the regulated activity. The power to remove a licence under the 
1847 Act is broadened by powers to suspend, revoke or refuse to renew a licence 
introduced by the 1976 Act. Under the later Act, the local authority may suspend or 
revoke or refuse to renew a vehicle licence where the vehicle is unfit for use as a 
hackney carriage or the driver is convicted of a taxi regulatory offence or the ‘catch 
all’ provision of ‘any other reasonable cause’.99 The driver conviction ground is 
difficult to justify, as it appears to overlook the fact that the vehicle licence is a 
separate licence and is issued to the vehicle, not the driver.
100
 So far as the ‘any other 
reasonable cause’ ground is concerned, there is no guidance in the Act on the meaning 
of this phrase. It is interpreted very widely by the courts to ‘cover anything and 
everything which might be regarded as a reasonable reason for depriving an operator 
of his vehicle licence.’101 The provision has been held to cover a proprietor charged 
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with, but not convicted of, a taxi related public order offence.
102
 Beyond this specific 
example, interpretation of this ground is left entirely to the local authority.   
 
   In the case of drivers, the 1976 Act empowers councils to suspend, revoke or refuse 
to renew a licence, where the driver is convicted of a single offence under the 
regulatory regime or for an offence involving violence, dishonesty or indecency. As 
with vehicle licences, there is also an ‘any other reasonable cause’ ground for 
removing a driver’s licence.103 There is no indication what this phrase means in the 
case of drivers either, but has been interpreted by the courts to cover a multitude of 
activities judged unacceptable in the eyes of the local authority. Specific examples of 
the application of this ground in the case of drivers include non-disclosure of penalty 
points on a driving licence,
104
 non-disclosure of a police caution,
105
 and being charged 
with a non-taxi related offence which, if proved, would call into question the 
suitability of the driver to hold a licence.
106
 This ground provides local authorities 
with very broad powers to remove a licence.   
 
   The local authority’s powers were strengthened further in 2007, when an 
amendment permitted revocation or suspension of a driver’s licence with immediate 
effect rather than the normal period of 21 days after service of the notice of revocation 
or suspension.
107
 This power may only be exercised where ‘it appears that the 
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interests of public safety require’ the immediate removal of the licence.108 The 
parameters of this provision, such as what might constitute ‘the interests of public 
safety’ or by what standard a threat to public safety is to be judged, have not yet been 
tested before the courts.  
 
4) The Research Questions 
 
   There are six criticisms that can be made of the current legislative framework for 
taxi regulation. Because of the lack of research in this area, the disapproval is mostly 
derived by analogy with other areas of regulation or comes from judicial opinions in 
case law or from regulators themselves. The legislation is criticized on the grounds of 
lack of clear legislative aim; excessive discretionary power; local control; lack of 
clear beneficiary; ineffective enforcement powers; and that it is too old. I discuss 
these criticisms and use them as the basis of the research questions.     
 
a) Lack of clear legislative aim  
 
   The aim of the legislation is by no means clear. There is nothing in the statutes 
which expressly states the legislative aim or objectives. This position can be 
contrasted with that under, for example, the Licensing Act 2003, where the statutory 
objectives are clearly set out in the Act.
109
 Of course, the taxi regulatory system is not 
alone in having no stated legislative aims. This is quite common in many areas of 
regulation. It is suggested that the absence of such a statement is not necessarily a 
disadvantage. Rowan-Robinson et al believe that an explicit statement of objectives 
                                                 
108
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might precipitate conflict by providing a measure against which to judge performance, 
and the lack of specific legislative goals may be made good by the issuing of policy 
guidance by central government.
110
 However, surely the whole point of having a 
clearly stated objective is to measure performance of the statute in achieving its aim. 
How can the effectiveness or otherwise of legislation be gauged without knowing 
what it is trying to achieve? In the area of taxi regulation, central government policy 
guidance has been largely conspicuous by its absence.
111
 
 
   The absence of such a statement appears not to give rise to much difficulty in 
practice. The courts consider that the general objective of an Act is often implicit in 
the legislation.
112
 However, inferring a clear legislative aim from the statutes is 
problematic in the case of taxis. There has never been an Act aimed solely at the taxi 
business. The 1847 Act is, as its name suggests, a ‘Clauses’ Act. Bailey points out 
that such acts were common in the middle of the nineteenth century in order to 
produce a ready made set of laws to prevent the passing of multiple local acts.
 113
 
Clauses acts were designed to serve local efficiency rather than to regulate particular 
activities.
114
 The 1976 Act, whilst introducing some important provisions relating to 
hackney carriages, is directed mainly at the regulation of private hire vehicles, which 
until then had been completely unregulated. Both the 1847 and 1976 Acts cover other 
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aspects of local authority regulation besides taxis.
115
 The 1985 amendments are 
contained within a statute designed to liberalize the bus market.
116
  
 
   The lack of a clear legislative aim means that a number of different goals can be 
presented as the true aim of regulation. So, the first research question is ‘what is the 
aim of taxi regulation?’ I attempt to answer this question in Chapter 2.     
 
b) Excessive discretionary power 
 
   The framework created by the legislation is couched in very broad discretionary 
terms, in that local authority regulators are able to make a choice about whether and 
how to exercise their statutory powers.
117
 The legislation uses the word ‘may’ in 
relation to the grant and removal of licences, and leaves vaguely worded judgments, 
such as ‘reasonably necessary’ or ‘fit and proper person’ in the context of quality 
standards, open to the interpretation of local authorities. There is little authoritative 
guidance for the regulators or the trade on how these provisions are to be interpreted 
or applied. 
 
   Whilst discretionary powers are said to have the advantage of flexibility, 
responsiveness to change and allow for the incremental formation of guidance, their 
use is criticised for failing to provide certainty, predictability and uniformity.
118
 It is 
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also said that those exercising public powers assume that discretion authorizes them to 
depart from legal rules for reasons of justice, practical necessity or expediency.
119
 At 
a pragmatic level, in the specific context of the taxi trade, the courts have stated that 
the exercise of the local authority’s discretion in such matters is, if used in good faith, 
‘largely unfettered and difficult to challenge.’120  
 
   And so the second research question is whether the exercise of discretionary powers 
by the local authority is used appropriately to achieve the regulatory aim. I try to 
answer this question in Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
c) Local control 
 
   The regime by which taxis are regulated is undeniably a ‘local’ system. Each local 
authority is made solely responsible for licensing taxis and controlling fares in its 
area. Loughlin suggests that the grant of broad discretionary power to local authorities 
can be viewed in one of two ways; either to enable councils to adapt centrally 
formulated services to specific local conditions and needs or for local representatives 
themselves to determine service levels, policies and priorities.
121
 In the case of taxi 
regulation, the latter view is clearly the correct one. In Stockton-on-Tees Borough 
Council v Fidler,
122
 Langstaff J said  
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the scheme is not one of national regulation, merely administered locally. If it 
were, there would be no room for different councils to adopt differing 
requirements of applicants for the relevant licences.
123
 
 
   Because the system is locally based, this produces ‘localism’ in the sense of local 
decision making being prioritized over other forms of governance.
124
 It has been said 
that localism is ‘inherent in the exercise of regulation in the taxi trade.’125 The 
advantage of local control over regulation by a central body is said to be that local 
councils are in a better position to judge local needs and make choices that meet local 
circumstances or fulfil local purposes than national government.
126
 However, local 
authority regulation creates concerns about the opportunity for political bias and 
influence in decision making and the lack of expertise of those taking decisions, 
particularly amongst the elected representatives.
127
 
 
   So the third research question is whether taxi regulation should remain under local 
authority control, or is there a case for a centralized national system. I try to answer 
this question also in Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
d) Lack of clear beneficiary   
 
   This point is connected to the three previous questions. As a result of the lack of 
legislative aim, the grant of discretionary power and the local nature of regulation, it 
is not clear who benefits from the regulatory system. Some writers suggest that all 
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regulation in general is for the benefit of the public.
128
 Others portray regulation of 
any industry as protecting the position of established firms against competition.
129
  
Another view is that regulators pursue their own interests in order to gain ascendancy 
over the regulated population.
130
 In relation to taxi regulation, it has been suggested 
that local authorities regard licensing as a ‘cash cow’131 and thereby seek to benefit 
financially from the regulatory scheme. 
 
   So the fourth research question is who benefits from regulation and what are the 
implications of this for achieving the regulatory aims? I look at these issues in 
Chapter 6. 
 
e) Limited enforcement powers. 
 
   The enforcement powers provided by the legislation still rely in a large part on the 
command and control style of regulation. Such systems have been criticized since the 
1980s as being deficient, because they are considered ineffective in comparison with 
other regulatory approaches, such as administrative action.
132
 Although the taxi 
legislation also provides for administrative enforcement through the power to remove 
licences, this method still relies to some extent on the power to coerce, through either 
actual or threatened withdrawal of a licence-holder’s livelihood.  
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   Enforcement of the legislation produces the fifth research question, which is 
whether the enforcement powers provided to regulators are used appropriately and are 
sufficient to achieve the regulatory aims? I attempt to answer this question in Chapter 
7.  
 
f) Legislation is too old   
 
   It has not gone unnoticed in governmental and judicial circles that the main statute 
governing taxis is now over 160 years old and entered the statute book in the days 
when hackney carriages were pulled by horses. As long ago as 1962, questions were 
raised in Parliament about whether the government intended to repeal the 1847 Act on 
the grounds that it was specifically aimed at horse drawn hackney carriages.
133
 At that 
time the government declined, stating that the provisions applied to all wheeled 
carriages irrespective of their means of propulsion.
134
 There have been a number of 
adverse comments by the judiciary about the system being an old regime and unsuited 
to modern practices. This too is not a recent phenomenon. Over 50 years ago it was 
commented that the advent of private hire businesses rendered the legislation out of 
touch with reality.
135
 More recently, in North Tyneside DC v Shanks, Latham LJ 
commented that the Act may look too restrictive in the light of modern 
communication systems.
136
 Other judges have commented that the trade has not kept 
pace with the demands of modern business practice.
137
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However, some members of the judiciary still view the legislation with some 
fondness. In R(Shanks) v Northumberland County Council, Foskett J said, 
 
I should be disappointed not to be able to record in one judgment during my 
judicial career the terms of an Act passed 165 years before the judgment is 
formulated that still has a relevance to contemporary everyday life.
138
 
 
   The main source of criticism about the age of the legislation is from those who are 
responsible for applying it on a day to day basis - the local authority licensing 
officers. During the course of the interviews that formed part of this study, the one 
common theme to emerge, in fact the only one upon which all the respondents agreed, 
was that the legislation was ‘too old’, ‘outdated’ and ‘in need of updating’.   
 
   It is certainly true that the draftsmen of the 1847 Act could not have envisaged the 
sort of wheeled vehicle regulated by their Act today. What worked well for horse 
drawn vehicles may not necessarily work as effectively in the current climate of 
digital technology and instant communication. On the other hand, I think it is quite 
remarkable that there has been so little litigation challenging the regulatory powers of 
the local authorities over the years. It could be argued that for a piece of legislation to 
survive so long, relatively unscathed, it must be working reasonably well. As the 
findings of this research indicate, any deficiencies that exist with the regulatory 
system are as a result of the way in which the legislation is interpreted and applied, 
not as a result of its age as such. Nonetheless, I consider the question whether 
modernizing the law to reflect current lifestyles and business practice, as suggested by 
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the Law Commission in their recent consultation paper,
139
 will make regulation more 
effective. I address this question in Chapter 8. 
 
   In this chapter, I have outlined the current legislative framework within which the 
taxi trade is regulated. The statutory scheme is undoubtedly old and in need of some 
modernization. How extensive any transformation of the existing system needs to be 
forms an important element of this study. I draw some conclusions on this point in the 
final chapter. The contemporary regime is subjected to a number of other criticisms of 
its efficacy, and I have discussed these in this chapter. These criticisms have formed 
the basis of the research questions which I endeavour to answer in subsequent 
chapters supported by the findings of the empirical part of the study. Ultimately, the 
measure of any regulatory regime is its effectiveness; does it achieve what it set out to 
achieve? The answer to this question in the context of local authority regulation of the 
taxi trade is the key ambition of this research. The first step in this undertaking, 
however, is to consider the nature of ‘regulation’. 
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CHAPTER 2: REGULATION - ITS THEORETICAL BASIS 
 
   There is a wide and diverse literature on the subject of regulation, and in this 
chapter I review some of the literature in order to gain an insight into the theoretical 
concept and nature of regulation. An understanding of the notion of regulation will 
help a clearer picture to emerge of the ideas which support the legislative framework 
outlined in Chapter 1. It is necessary to understand the theoretical underpinning of 
regulation as this sets the context of the study and provides a framework within which 
to measure the later empirical part of the research in subsequent chapters. Abstract 
conceptions of what regulation seeks to achieve and the methods by which it looks to 
do so will enable the findings of the study to be analysed to discover where theory and 
reality converge or diverge. This will then allow conclusions to be drawn on the 
effectiveness of the regulatory regime through an assessment of how real life 
measures up to the theoretical construct.   
      
   The chapter comprises six main sections. In the first section, I attempt to define 
‘regulation’ and explore the justifications offered for its existence. As ‘regulation’ is 
crucial to the whole study, it is important to understand the sense in which the word is 
used and why the concept is considered necessary. However, as the purpose of the 
research is not to define regulation, this section merely considers the concept in the 
abstract sufficiently to understand the discussion which follows. In section two, I 
explore how theoretical models of regulation relate specifically to the taxi trade. The 
main purpose of this section is to identify the aim or aims of taxi regulation, thereby 
answering the first research question. In the third section, I consider the question of 
the exercise of discretion. The section contains a review of some of the main views 
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about discretion and its exercise from the literature. This will form the background to 
subsequent chapters in which I analyse the use of discretion and in particular the 
questions about whether licensing officials should have discretionary powers at all 
and how they exercise them when they do have them. In section four, I discuss the 
arguments about localism. These arguments will later be use to examine the issue 
whether local regulation is more appropriate to the taxi trade than national or regional 
control. In section five, I consider some of the academic debates about the 
beneficiaries of regulation generally. This analysis will provide a model against which 
to gauge who benefits from taxi regulation. Finally, in section six, I examine the issue 
of enforcement of regulation. Without enforcement no amount of regulation will be 
effective. The theories of enforcement reviewed in section six, particularly notions of 
different styles of enforcement and effectiveness of enforcement methods, will be 
mapped onto the styles and measures used by local authorities to assess whether 
enforcement is effective in achieving the aim of regulation. 
 
1) What is ‘regulation’ and why is it needed? 
 
   Most people have a vague notion of what regulation is and what it entails, although 
producing a clear definition of ‘regulation’ is problematic. The word ‘regulation’ is 
said to carry a ‘bewildering variety of meanings’1 depending upon the context in 
which it is used, although it is generally agreed that ‘regulation’ involves an ongoing 
dynamic process rather than a static single outcome.
2
 The purpose of this section is to 
reach an appropriate definition of ‘regulation’, in the sense of the regulatory process 
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rather than a set of legal rules, which will be of value in understanding that term in the 
context of the taxi trade. 
 
   There have been many attempts to define ‘regulation’,3 but the most widely 
acknowledged definition is that provided by Selznick, who defined ‘regulation’ as, ‘a 
sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are 
valued by a community.’4 Although this widely cited definition has its limitations,5 it 
identifies the essential factors of regulation in the context of this research. A taxi 
service is an activity valued by the community at large, that service is subject to 
continued monitoring and control through a licensing system, and that control is 
exercised by a public agency, namely the local council. For the purposes of this thesis, 
therefore, ‘regulation’ can be taken to mean ‘the ongoing process of control exercised 
by a public authority over activities valued by the general public’. 
 
   Having established this working definition of the term ‘regulation’, the next 
question is why regulation is considered necessary. At its most fundamental, 
according to Tombs, regulation exists because its absence historically resulted in the 
wide scale production of ‘death, injury and illness, destruction and despoliation, not to 
mention systematic cheating, lying and stealing.’6 Although this is a somewhat 
apocalyptic view of a world without regulation, it does serve to illustrate that the 
question ‘why regulate at all?’ is an important one.  
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   According to Breyer, the justification for any regulatory intervention is an alleged 
inability of the market place to deal with particular structural problems.
7
 Much of the 
literature on this subject draws a distinction between economic and social regulation, 
with a greater concentration upon the economic. This distinction is attributed to 
Stigler, for whom regulation was largely a political process reflecting a shifting power 
relationship between a mixture of diverse interest groups. On this view, larger 
economic interests, such as multi-national companies, seek state regulation of their 
sphere of economic activity in order to protect their own market position.
8
 By the 
same token, where industries tend towards monopoly because the costs of production 
are prohibitive to more than one supplier, then economic regulation provides a 
substitute for competition.
9
 This type of regulation focuses on regulation of financial 
markets, prices and profits.
10
  
 
   On the other hand, social regulation centers on perceived market failures in respect 
of lack of information to consumers or ‘externalities’ adversely effecting individuals 
outside the market relationship. Indeed, one suggestion for the origins of state 
regulation of industry is that it arose from piecemeal attempts to grapple with 
individual social problems as they came up.
11
 This type of regulation tends to appear 
in the form of rules on health and safety, or environmental or consumer protection.
12
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   However, the distinction between economic and social regulation is not a clear-cut 
one. Economic regulatory techniques, such as price controls, affect social well-being 
in terms of the cost of goods and services, and attempts at social regulation, such as 
health and safety rules, affect market relations.
13
 When applied to the taxi trade, the 
line between economic and social regulation becomes similarly blurred. For example, 
quality standards can both regulate entry to the market and improve safety for the 
travelling public. Fixing maximum fares is an economic instrument, as it controls 
prices and potential profits, but can be seen as protection for the public against 
excessive or unreasonable charges. It is also suggested that economic regulation is the 
dominant form and will always overcome social regulation. Some writers, in the 
context of other forms of public transport, argue that regulation was initially 
introduced for social reasons, often linked to safety, but the systems subsequently 
became dominated by economic regulation, which ensured mainly benefit to the 
suppliers.
14
  
 
   It may not be necessary to consider regulation as divided along economic and social 
lines. Cranston, for example, argues that the distinction may be unnecessary, because 
both forms of regulation involve the use of similar coercive techniques.
15
 Other 
commentators consider that both economic and social justifications for regulation can 
be subsumed into one overarching justification of ‘the public interest’.16 Although this 
concept is difficult to define, it has become influential in shaping regulation generally 
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in recent years.
17
 However, for some commentators the idea that regulation serves the 
public interest is itself contentious.
18
 Regulation is described as an honest but 
functionally unsuccessful attempt to promote the public interest.
19
 
 
   Although ‘regulation’ is an elusive concept, it has been possible to reach at least a 
general working definition of regulation upon which to build the remainder of this 
study. Whilst the distinction between economic and social regulation and the notion 
of ‘the public interest’ are useful tools for analysis, they are somewhat general and 
abstract, and of limited assistance in determining the justification for regulating the 
taxi trade. In the next section, I consider how far such general theories can assist 
understanding of regulation of the taxi trade.  
 
2) Why regulate the taxi trade? 
 
   Seeking justification for regulating the taxi trade provides an insight into what it is 
that the regulators are trying to achieve by regulating. The absence of an explicit 
statement of aims confers very considerable discretion upon those responsible for 
enforcing regulation in interpreting the goals of the legislation. As a result a number 
of propositions are advanced for the aim of regulation. These ideas are drawn from 
the literature on the subject and from judicial or central government pronouncements, 
as well as from the local authorities themselves. In this sub-section, I examine five 
such possible aims by reference to the main areas of regulation; quantitative, 
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qualitative and fare. These aims are: congestion management; protection of the public; 
protect and promote the trade; increase competition; and provide effective means of 
control.    
 
a) Congestion management 
 
   From a historical perspective, the prevention of congestion and public disorder was 
seen as the initial aim of hackney carriage regulation. At the time of Charles I’s Royal 
Proclamation of 1635,
20
 the aim of regulation was said to be to prevent congestion of 
the streets by excessive numbers of hackney carriages. The introduction of the 
licensing system 19 years later was aimed at addressing the ‘many inconveniences 
[that] do daily arise by reason of the late increase and great irregularity of hackney 
coaches’.21 A number of sources suggest that these ‘many inconveniences’ were as a 
result of having too many hackney carriages available for hire in the streets, resulting 
in traffic congestion and public order concerns as drivers competed with each other 
for business.
22
  
 
  This was not a difficulty that was confined to London. There are some accounts 
relating that in the period leading up to the 1847 Act there were problems of 
overcrowding of the roads and misbehaviour by drivers in the provinces. There are 
historical reports of wheeled carts and hackney carriages crowding the highways, as 
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well as reports of incivility of drivers, in the South-West of England.
23
 It would 
appear that this may have been due, in part, to the licensing of hackney carriages in 
London. Proprietors and drivers who were not granted licences in London, or who 
objected to being regulated, moved their businesses to the surrounding towns, or even 
to the larger cities, to continue their trade free from the constraints of licensing.
24
 
There is evidence that by the 1830s all the larger provincial towns and cities had a 
substantial quota of hackney carriages.
25
  
 
   When the 1847 Act was passed, regulation was seen as a public order issue. So far 
as the courts were concerned, this was Parliament’s original intention and this 
remained the case for many years. In R v Weymouth BC ex p Teletax (Weymouth) Ltd, 
Lord Goddard CJ said 
 
 it also seems reasonably clear that what Parliament had in mind was that it 
was desirable that the commissioners should be able to control the number of 
carriages which plied for hire in a given area.
26
  
 
As the findings of my research show, there is some support amongst the regulators 
and the trade for the idea that prevention of congestion should still be the principal 
aim of regulation. However, in the view of some commentators, crowd control 
arguments are now seen as part of the debate surrounding economic regulation.
27
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b) Protection of the public   
 
   Button emphasises the point that the rationale behind the whole licensing regime is 
to provide the public with a service which is both accessible and safe, with public 
safety being paramount.
28
 Unlicensed and unregulated taxis pose problems for public 
safety because either the vehicle or the driver, or both, may be unsuitable and unsafe. 
This has been highlighted in studies from other countries
29
 but researched very little 
in the United Kingdom. However, the words ‘public safety’ only appear once in any 
relevant statute, and that was as recently as 2006.
30
 The notion that regulation of the 
trade is aimed at protection of the public derives largely from judicial interpretation of 
the legislation. This is particularly well illustrated in a series of cases which 
effectively imposed vicarious liability upon the owner of a hackney carriage for the 
tortious acts of the driver, even though in reality no relationship of master and servant 
existed between them.
31
    
 
   In Venables v Smith,
32
 Lord Cockburn CJ said: 
 
I think that the provisions of the Acts of Parliament alter what would 
otherwise be the relation of the proprietor and the driver, and for the protection 
of the public produced the result that…the relation of master and servant exists 
so far as to render the proprietor responsible for the acts of the driver.
33
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   What is interesting to note from this and other cases is that the courts consistently 
attribute the imposition of such liability to the statutory provisions themselves. There 
is no such express statement in the relevant Acts. The early cases were based on the 
Acts relating to London cabs, but an identical interpretation was placed on the 
relevant provisions of the 1847 Act in Bygraves v Dicker.
34
 Although section 63 of 
the 1847 Act gives magistrates the power to order the proprietor to pay compensation 
for damage done by the driver, the decision in Bygraves v Dicker went beyond this 
statutory provision by holding that sections 45 to 63 of the Act, read as a whole, 
created a relationship of master and servant. This protected the public, as it allowed an 
injured person to maintain an action in negligence against the proprietor.
35
 Similarly it 
was said in Hawkins v Edwards
36
 that ‘the general purview of the byelaw is to protect 
the public’,37 even where the strict interpretation of the provision might cause 
hardship to the owner of the carriage. The byelaw in question in this case was one 
promulgated under section 68 of the 1847 Act, prohibiting the obscuring of the 
licence plate whilst a hackney carriage was in use. 
 
   Although these cases demonstrate a wide and purposive judicial interpretation of the 
aim of the legislation, they do not specify precisely what the public is to be protected 
from. The rationale behind these decisions appears to be to enable members of the 
public, whether travelling passengers or third parties, to have some sort of redress in 
the event of their suffering injury, loss or damage as a result of the tortious actions of 
a hackney carriage driver. At the time these decisions were made, this would have 
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been an important safeguard, as the owner of the carriage was more likely to be a man 
of substance, and therefore able to meet any financial liability, than the driver, who 
was generally likely to be a ‘man of straw’. This protection is now less important in 
the days of compulsory insurance for owners and drivers.
38
 However, the cases 
illustrate that, in the view of the courts at least, the aim of the regulation is to provide 
some degree of protection against injury or loss caused by the operation of taxi 
businesses. 
 
   Some of the justifications offered for quantitative regulation of taxis are based on 
the argument that such restrictions improve the safety of passengers. It is contended 
that it is necessary to keep numbers of taxis within manageable limits; otherwise there 
is an increased likelihood that unroadworthy vehicles and unsuitable drivers will be 
more difficult to detect, and falling incomes will result in drivers working longer 
hours.
39
 It is also suggested that increased competition between vehicles as a result of 
removal of quantitative restrictions will lead to a decline in income for taxi drivers 
and proprietors resulting in dangerous driving practices and decreased vehicle 
maintenance.
40
 Opponents of quantitative restriction claim that allowing the market to 
determine the number of taxis available leads to increased supply. This means that 
vulnerable passengers will not be waiting for long periods at night for taxis to arrive, 
and so safety of the taxi using public will increase.
41
 Whilst they may take opposite 
views on the merits of quantitative regulation, at least the authors of these works 
agree on the aim of regulation. On the other hand, some commentators, such as 
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Siebert, consider that quantitative restrictions are nothing to do with public safety at 
all, and are only concerned with the economic effects of maintaining a limited 
supply.
42
 
 
   Whether quantitative regulation protects the public interest or not, there is 
agreement that quality standards which subject suppliers of goods and services to 
behavioural controls have always been the dominant form of social regulation.
43
 
Qualitative regulation is imposed upon both vehicles and drivers on the grounds that it 
protects the public. The justification for qualitative regulation is that in an unregulated 
market consumers would have no way of knowing, prior to hiring the taxi, which 
vehicles and drivers were safe, which could result in potential attacks upon customers 
and increased traffic accidents.
44
    
 
   However, if the aim of qualitative regulation is the protection of the public, then 
quality standards need go no further than ensuring that the driver did not assault or 
defraud the customer or that the vehicle survived the journey intact. As Richardson et 
al point out, once regulation through quality standards is established, in practice 
regulators attempt to improve upon those standards by extending their scope beyond 
mere safety requirements.
45
 As I illustrate in this study, it is common for taxi 
regulators to impose standards which are not directly related to public safety. For 
example, some councils require drivers to be polite, of smart appearance, 
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knowledgeable, and drive responsibly. Similarly, vehicles are expected to be clean, 
comfortable and suitable for the customer’s needs.46  
 
   The main rationale for regulating fares is said to be to protect the public against 
unscrupulous drivers taking financial advantage of the customers’ relative ignorance 
of the price of the service.
47
 The nature of the hackney carriage trade is such that 
potential customers at taxi ranks or in the street do not have the opportunity to ‘price 
shop’ for a cheaper fare. It is suggested that new technology may undermine the case 
for fare regulation even in the hackney carriage market,
48
 although this argument is 
based on a model which is essentially that of the private hire trade and so is of limited 
relevance to rank or street hail services. Gallick and Sisk point out that although price 
fixing can protect customers from dishonest and unscrupulous drivers, it also creates 
two incentives for drivers which could operate to the detriment of customers.
49
 One is 
that drivers will reject short unprofitable journeys in favour of longer more profitable 
ones; the other is to try to increase profits by using older, poorly maintained vehicles, 
or driving recklessly. So fare regulation only protects the public when combined with 
other forms of regulation relating to quality of service. 
 
   The notion of the aim of regulation being to protect the public was only taken up by 
central government as recently as 2006. 
50
 However, as will become apparent from the 
findings of this study, protection of the public is the aim which councils claim they 
                                                 
46
 These quality standards are examined further in chapter 5. 
47
 KM Gwilliam, ‘Regulation of Taxi Markets in Developing Countries: Issues and Options’ (World 
Bank, Transport Note Number TRN-3, 2005) 2, 5. 
48
 Siebert (n 42).  
49
 EC Gallick and DE Sisk, ‘Reconsideration of Taxi Regulation’ (1987) 3 Journal of Law Economics 
and Organization 117, 120. 
50
 Department for Transport, ‘Taxi and Private Hire Vehicle Licensing: Best Practice Guidance’ 
(London, October 2006) [8]. This view has been repeated in the updated version of this document 
issued in March 2010. 
 46 
are attempting to achieve by regulating taxis. Whether that, or a different aim, is what 
they achieve in reality will be considered and explained in this study.  
 
c) Protect and promote the trade 
 
   Legislation and its enforcement are claimed to be in the interests of reputable 
businesses in any industry, as they provide legal protection against unfair competition 
and their absence creates opportunities for the unscrupulous.
51
 Some writers take the 
view that regulation is justified by the benefits it confers on the interests of the taxi 
trade itself. Stigler, for example, suggests that where forms of economic regulation 
are beneficial to business, then they will be actively sought by the incumbent firms. In 
particular, the taxi trade as a whole is likely to welcome regulation that relates to 
control over entry to the market and price fixing.
52
 This view is supported by some 
early studies of the taxi trade in other jurisdictions. Papillon reports that the greatest 
demand for regulation came from taxicab owners, who saw government backed 
cartelization of the industry as to their advantage.
53
 In USA, Teal and Berglund report 
that the main supporters of economic regulation are, and historically always were, the 
established taxicab owners.
54
 
 
   In England and Wales, although the precise rationale for the 1976 Act is never 
clearly articulated, there is evidence that it was motivated by growing concern about 
the rapidly increasing numbers and activities of private hire vehicles. Before 1976 
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such vehicles were completely unregulated. During the early stages of the Bill which 
was to become the 1976 Act, the MP for South Shields spoke of  
 
the great difficulties in the North East and many other areas whose strong 
objection has been expressed to the way in which some private hire vehicles 
have been allowed to operate to the detriment of hackney carriages.
55
  
 
   Therefore, despite the obvious public safety implications of unlicensed and 
unregulated vehicles and drivers transporting fare paying passengers, the main 
concern was the detrimental effect of private hire vehicles on the economic well-being 
of the hackney carriage trade. Koehler makes the point that, because quantitative 
regulation in its current form focuses on demand for taxi services,
56
 where it is 
imposed it can only serve to promote the interests of incumbents.
57
 Both qualitative 
and fare regulation can be seen to protect existing members of the trade from being 
undercut by suppliers offering an inferior, but cheaper, service using sub-standard 
vehicles and drivers. Existing studies directly link fare regulation with the other facets 
of regulation. The prevailing opinion is that retention of fare and quality controls 
benefits both the trade and consumers, even if all entry controls were eliminated.
58
  
 
d) Increase competition 
 
   This suggested aim of taxi regulation can be seen as the antithesis of the aim 
discussed above. In this case, the argument is that regulation is imposed only to the 
extent that it is necessary to open up the regulated trade to market forces. On the face 
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of it there does not appear to be anything intrinsically monopolistic or otherwise 
peculiar about the market for taxi services that would require prices and entry to be 
fixed by the government.
59
 Indeed, Beesley takes the view that in the absence of 
intervention the taxi industry would approximate the characteristics of a perfectly 
competitive market.
60
 On this analysis there can be no justification for regulation of 
the taxi industry to promote competition in the market. A different view is taken by 
Ogus who considers that a driver responding to a person who hails a taxi in the street 
has a de facto monopoly position, as that potential customer would be unable to 
compare prices and other terms of carriage with those offered by other taxi drivers.
61
 
Dempsey takes a similar view of taxis operating from stands on the basis that there is 
a lack of readily available information and opportunity for the customer to indulge in 
‘cab shopping’ for a more favourable arrangement.62  
 
   I think this argument is essentially an economic one about the removal of 
quantitative regulation, referred to, somewhat misleadingly, in the literature as ‘de-
regulation’. Opponents of this form of regulation claim that it creates an unfavourable 
barrier to entry into the market, and thereby unfairly limits competition, reduces the 
availability of taxis and increases fares. Proponents justify the use of entry controls as 
necessary to ensure taxi cab owners a satisfactory income, reduce traffic congestion, 
and avoid destructive competition amongst taxi proprietors and drivers.
63
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   The issues surrounding deregulation of the taxi market have been actively debated 
since the 1970s. The early literature was based upon purely theoretical economic 
models. The majority view amongst the economic theorists is that it is inefficient and 
unjust in terms of competition to limit entry to the taxi market by quantitative 
restrictions.
64
 On this basis, writers such as Williams
65
 and, more recently, Harris
66
 
argue in favour of complete deregulation of all aspects of the industry. However, 
others, such as Verkuil
67
 and Beesley,
68
 suggest that entry to the market should be 
deregulated whilst retaining regulated fares. On the other hand, some economists and 
legal academics favour retention of quantitative limits on market entry.
69
 In Shreiber’s 
view, for example, an unregulated taxi market will produce a large number of cabs, 
short waiting times for customers and high fares. He therefore advocates both entry 
and price regulation in order to achieve satisfactory competition.
70
 
 
   There does not appear to have been any attempt to test these theories empirically 
until Teal and Berglund’s study of the deregulated taxi market in a number of cities in 
the USA in the late 1980s. This study concluded that,  
 
Taxicab deregulation cannot be demonstrated to have produced in most cases 
the benefits its proponents expected. Prices do not usually fall, improvement 
in service is difficult to detect and…there is little evidence that either 
consumers or producers are better off.
71
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   Dempsey’s study in the mid 1990s, also conducted in the USA, concluded that of 
the 21 cities that deregulated prior to 1993, the experience with deregulation was so 
profoundly unsatisfactory that only four of the smallest cities within the group 
retained a fully unregulated system. This movement from regulation to deregulation 
and then a return to re-regulation is seen as firm evidence supporting the retention of 
quantitative regulation in the taxi trade.
72
 Although these studies present critical 
assessments of deregulation in the United States, other countries are reported to have 
had more positive experiences of deregulation. In Ireland, for example, removal of 
entry restrictions was said to have substantially increased the numbers of taxis on the 
streets of the main cities and towns, producing an improved service for customers.
73
 
New Zealand similarly experienced greater availability of service, at least in urban 
areas, following relaxation of both entry and fare restrictions in 1989.
74
 However, 
experiences in other European countries, such as the Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden, are portrayed in mixed terms.
75
 
 
   In England and Wales, the Transport Act 1985 is said to have been part of a general 
overall design to apply free market principles to the road passenger industry, and to 
deregulate the passenger transport system as a whole.
76
 Although this Act was 
directed primarily at liberalization of the bus market,
77
 section 16 effectively removed 
quantitative regulation of the taxi market, except in very restricted circumstances. The 
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courts took the view that the aim of section 16 was to ‘remove restraints and allow 
market forces to take their course in a way which did not exist before section 16 came 
into effect.’78 In the same case, Bingham LJ said, ‘the new Act substituted a free 
market policy into the taxi trade.’79 Keene LJ, giving the lead judgment in R(Maud) v 
Castle Point BC, emphasized that the purpose of section 16 was ‘to allow market 
forces to play a larger role in the taxi business’.80 
 
   Whilst Parliament’s intention in passing section 16 may well have been to increase 
competition within the taxi trade, the imposition of qualitative regulation removes any 
notion of a freely open market for taxi services. As Beesley points out, customers who 
would prefer cheaper but less safe taxis cannot have them, and a customer with good 
knowledge of a town cannot have a cheaper but topographically ignorant taxi driver.
81
 
So the suggestion of regulation increasing competition can only apply, on this view, 
to quantitative regulation. 
 
   Fare regulation also is incompatible with an entirely competitive market, where 
theoretically the economic forces of supply and demand ensure that fares do not 
significantly exceed the marginal costs of supply. As Ogus points out, this 
presupposes that the customer has adequate information on the prices charged by all 
suppliers to the market and that the customer is not the victim of oppressive conduct 
as a result of the supplier’s monopoly position.82 Whilst price fixing may standardize 
fares within an area, this has little impact on competition within the trade. Gaunt, in a 
study in New Zealand, found that removal of fare regulation was of no consequence 
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for competition except in areas of large population, and even there the impact was 
minimal.
83
  
 
   The view that regulation improves competition overlooks three characteristics of the 
taxi market. First, in the absence of regulation, there is likely to be a plentiful supply 
of taxis, with supply of vehicles and drivers being at its highest in times of 
recession.
84
 This means that there will be more taxis available if the customer is 
willing to wait for one. Second, in the absence of regulation, the terms of hiring are a 
matter for negotiation and contract between the driver and the potential passenger. 
Most taxi customers will be regular users of taxis and will be familiar with the 
prevailing pricing structures. The third characteristic is that the taxi market relies on 
repeat custom and this, rather than regulation, is what prevents abuse of the operator’s 
superior knowledge of the market.
85
 However, it is accepted that strangers to an area 
or infrequent users of taxis may still be vulnerable to unscrupulous drivers. 
 
e) Provide effective means of control   
 
   Toner suggests that the initial attempts to regulate the taxi business were aimed at 
control of the trade as an end in itself.
86
 This view finds some support in judicial 
opinion in certain cases, although these observations must be regarded as obiter. For 
example, in Newcastle City Council v Blue Line Taxis (Newcastle) Ltd, the court held 
that the statutory power to impose qualitative regulation by way of licence conditions 
                                                 
83
 C Gaunt, ‘The Impact of Taxi Deregulation in Small Urban Areas: Some New Zealand Evidence’ 
(1996) 2(4) Transport Policy 257, 262.  
84
 Dempsey (n 62)  98. 
85
 M Rothschild, ‘Models of Market Organization with Imperfect Information: A Survey’ (1979) 81 
Journal of Political Economics 1283. 
86
 Toner (n 22) 80.  
 53 
pursued a legitimate aim of better control over the licence holder’s operation.87 
However, such a view indicates that the purpose of regulation is to ‘control’ what 
would otherwise be an independent business enterprise. I think it unlikely that 
Parliament intended local authorities to take direct charge of the taxi trade rather than 
simply to monitor its activities.  
 
   Within the literature, there are some suggestions that the aim of regulation is to 
make the regulator’s task of controlling the trade easier and more readily achievable. 
This is particularly so in the area of quantity restrictions. Frankena and Pautler, for 
example, imply that restricting the number of taxis would make the regulator’s 
workload more manageable and reduce enforcement costs.
88
 Similarly, Eckert argues 
that limits upon taxi numbers in Los Angeles arose because they made it easier for 
regulators to regulate the industry.
89
 Although these are valid arguments, they are 
limited to quantitative regulation and do not explain how the imposition of quality or 
fare regulations might be said to improve or make easier the regulator’s control over 
the industry.   
 
   There is, however, another sense in which it could be said that the aim of regulation 
is to provide a more effective control of the trade. One of the criticisms of the 
legislation was that it was felt to rely too heavily on the traditional command and 
control style of regulation.
90
 According to the literature, prosecutors have experienced 
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problems in persuading magistrates to take regulatory offences seriously.
91
 As most 
taxi offences impose strict liability, in common with many other such offences, the 
courts have shown a reluctance to treat these offences as ‘criminal offences in the full 
sense of the word’.92 Even where there is a successful prosecution, sanctions imposed 
by the courts are regarded as derisory by the regulators,
93
 and as weak and ineffective 
in achieving the aims of regulation.
94
 In the light of these comments, it might be 
argued that the purpose of regulation is, or ought to be, to provide the local authority 
regulator with effective means of enforcement over the trade.    
 
f) Conclusions on the aim of regulation 
 
   A number of theories can be posited about what the aim of taxi regulation is. All of 
these theories have some support in the relevant literature and governmental or 
judicial pronouncements. There is greater academic support for some theories than for 
others. I think that the multiple aims for regulation are used interchangeably by 
central government, the courts and local authority regulators to support particular 
decisions or points of view. In this way, a controversial action or unpopular policy can 
be justified on the grounds that it is ‘in the public interest’ or helps to promote 
competition within the industry or whichever of the other suggested aims suits a 
particular argument.  
 
   Certain hypothesized aims are more convincing than others, but I think that the 
primary aim of taxi regulation ought to be the protection of the public. This aim has 
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the most convincing theoretical support in my view and is the one aim which can be 
linked persuasively to all three areas of regulation; quantitative regulation, quality 
controls and fares. As this study shows, protection of the public is also the aim which 
local authorities claim they are trying to achieve in practice, and so it is the one 
against which their regulatory activities ought to be measured.
95
 
 
3) Discretionary Powers  
 
   The legislative framework grants wide discretionary powers to local authorities. 
This enables councils to decide when their powers may be used, how their powers are 
to be applied, and what methods are to be used to carry out their different regulatory 
functions.
96
 In this section, I consider some of the theories concerning the use and 
effect of discretionary powers and how those theories might apply to regulation of the 
taxi trade.  
 
   The exercise of discretionary power by both government and non-governmental 
agencies has been the subject of much academic debate. As long ago as 1944, Hayek 
observed an increasing tendency to qualify legal provisions by reference to what is 
‘fair’ or ‘reasonable’. For Hayek such qualifications placed more and more discretion 
in the hands of judges or administrative authorities, and this resulted in increased 
arbitrariness and uncertainty.
 97
 Hayek later developed these views to conclude that 
discretion undermines the requirement that authority be exercised according to 
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general rules.
98
 Later writers accept that some measure of discretion in administering 
the law is inevitable. Davis, for example, generally views the widespread exercise of 
discretion as desirable, so long as that discretion is properly confined, structured and 
checked.
99
 In other words, discretion should be exercised for certain purposes and 
within certain limits to avoid it being used in an arbitrary way.  Similarly, Galligan 
suggests that the prime legal strategy is to keep discretion to a minimum and work 
towards its regulation by fixed and certain rules.
100
 On the other hand, Baldwin and 
Hawkins, using their famous toothpaste tube analogy, point out that attempting to 
confine discretion by fixed rules in one area simply produces discretion in another 
part of the system.
101
  
 
   Dworkin, in an attempt to bring some precision to the concept of discretion, 
famously compares it to the hole in a doughnut; it ‘does not exist except as an area 
left open by a surrounding belt of restriction.’102 Dworkin goes on to identify what he 
describes as ‘weak discretion’ and ‘strong discretion’.103 The essential difference is 
that exercise of weak discretion involves the interpretation of a given standard in 
order to apply it; strong discretion involves the decision maker in creating his or her 
own standards outside the bounds set by the authority which granted the discretion. 
This means that the exercise of strong discretion is not settled by applying established 
legal principles but is effectively beyond the law. Galligan, however, takes issue on 
this latter point, arguing that matters of weak and strong discretion are not easy to 
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distinguish in practice and that any  exercise of official power should be capable of 
being explained in terms of its purposes and within a framework of constraining 
principles.
104
   
 
   There are unresolved arguments on both sides of the debate about where the line is 
to be drawn between broad, open textured discretion and structuring of the exercise of 
discretion by specific rules. The advantages and disadvantages of both are considered 
in some detail by Jowell, who argues that the main merits of rules are considered to be 
that they adhere to the rule of law and can be used to conserve official resources. The 
main disadvantage of rules is that they may lead to rigidity and legalism, whereas 
discretion provides flexibility and adaptability at the cost of predictability and 
certainty.
 105
 Galligan considers that there is a strong case to be made for the use of 
discretion if its use facilitates and enhances the realization of social goals.
106
 
 
   In England and Wales, councils have been given a broad discretion which enables 
them to tailor activities or services to local needs.
107
 This means that the regulatory 
regime for taxis is heavily weighted towards broad, open textured discretion, with 
very little structure. It was as recently as October 2006 that the Department for 
Transport issued its ‘Best Practice Guidance’108 for the taxi and private hire trades. 
The legal status of this document is somewhat uncertain, as are its impact and 
effect.
109
 The guidance emphasizes that it offers only general guidance, with no 
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specific information that could assist local authorities in the exercise of their 
discretion. 
 
   Such an approach does not find favour in other common law jurisdictions, however. 
The Government of South Australia, for example, in 2009 introduced a 
comprehensive code in an effort to regulate all aspects of the taxi trade, including 
such matters as applications for licences, vehicle specifications, conduct and 
appearance of drivers, suspension and revocation of licences.
110
 A similar system was 
introduced in Ireland under powers contained in the Taxi Regulation Act 2003, which 
Act provides a framework for regulating all aspects of the taxi trade. Specific 
provisions are made for the granting, suspension or revocation of licences, the 
conduct of drivers and passengers, taximeters, fares and dealing with complaints 
against taxi drivers or operators. The statutory regime creates powers to promulgate 
detailed regulations dealing primarily with qualitative standards in each of these 
areas.
111
  
 
   In regulatory areas other than taxi licensing, it is difficult to discern clearly whether 
officials who have the task of enforcing the regulations would prefer to have clearer 
rules or more discretionary powers. Preference appears to vary between the regulators 
of different industries. Baldwin’s research into the aviation industry, for example, 
showed on the whole that enforcers prefer more specific rules.
112
 On the other hand, 
the environmental health officers studied by Hutter were more equivocal.
113
 Davis 
also identifies increased levels of what he calls unauthorized discretion, in the sense 
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that officials assume to themselves the power to depart from, change or selectively 
enforce legal standards.
114
 
 
   It must be borne in mind that the use of local authority discretion does not happen in 
isolation. Council officials exercise discretion within the cultural background and 
influence of their particular organization. It is said that the existence of discretion may 
result in decisions being shaped by professional ideologies, personal attitudes, beliefs 
and assumptions of individual officers, and attitudes of officials. Local authority 
departmental guidelines designed to structure discretion may also be an important 
influence in how decisions are taken.
115
 Although all of these elements are likely to 
vary from one council to another, and will also be influenced by local considerations, 
it has been suggested that all local authorities display basically similar cultural 
characteristics.
116
 It will be an important part of this study to examine how far the 
cultures and attitudes of local authorities vary and how this influences the exercise of 
discretion. 
 
   From the above discussion, it can be seen that the use of discretionary powers in 
relation to taxi licensing raises five issues. The first is whether local authorities ought 
to have discretion at all in some aspects of regulation or whether that discretion 
should be replaced by specific rules. The second question is, assuming the use of 
discretion is unavoidable, how that discretion is exercised in practice. How is the 
discretion confined, structured and checked? What factors do licensing officials 
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consider when required to exercise discretion? Finally, there is the issue of whether 
taxi licensing officials assume for themselves powers which are not provided to them 
by the legislative framework and what is the effect of them doing so. I consider all of 
these questions in the light of the empirical data in subsequent chapters.   
   
4) Localism 
 
   Many of the central government’s regulatory functions have been delegated either to 
local government authorities or to some form of public body exercising ostensibly 
independent regulation of a particular industry or sector. In the case of the taxi trade, 
responsibility for regulation has been placed firmly in the hands of the local council 
for each borough or district in England and Wales.
117
 This means that each local 
council has the duty and the power to regulate all taxi services operating within its 
geographical boundaries. Whilst regulation of the taxi trade is undoubtedly a locally 
decided and operated system, no real thought has been given to why localism is to be 
preferred to other scales of government. The literature suggests than there is a 
common assumption that locals know best and care most about their locality.
118
 
However, this assumption is criticised in the literature, as ‘local’ is not necessarily the 
best and other scales of governance may be more effective in achieving a desired 
outcome.
119
 In this section, I discuss two issues. The first is whether local control is 
more appropriate to regulation of the taxi trade. The second is the source of the 
council’s ‘authority’ to regulate the industry.   
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a) Local or national regulation  
 
   With each new area for which the state assumes responsibility for regulation, the 
question arises whether enforcement of the legislation should be a function of central 
or local government. Rhodes says that this question has always been answered in a 
piecemeal fashion without regard to the overall effect on the responsible local 
authority department.
120
 Delegation of regulatory functions to local government 
appears to take its rationale from the need to spread the responsibilities of central 
government and for appropriate services to be directed by local knowledge. John 
Stuart Mill stated in 1861 that ‘it is but a small portion of the public business of a 
country, which can be well done, or safely attempted, by the central authorities’.121 
Mill went on to identify three spheres of duty of local authorities; purely local 
business, matters of national interest placed under local management subject to central 
supervision, and matters of interest which could only be managed locally. It was this 
last sphere of duty in which arose the difficult question of how far the local authority 
should be entrusted with discretionary power free from central control.
122
 Regulation 
of the taxi trade appears to fall within this third sphere. 
 
   There is a substantial body of literature that considers the role of local government 
as the provider of services, but very little as regulator of private sector business and 
commercial activities. There is some consideration of local government as regulator in 
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relation to the licensing of sex shops
123
 and in relation to land use and resource 
planning, and environmental health.
124
 Other studies have focused on the difficulties 
of local authority regulators in relation to their enforcement functions.
125
 However, 
very little of the literature considers why regulation is carried out by the local 
authority rather than central government or a specifically created regulatory agency.  
 
   One notable exception is Hutter’s study of environmental health officers; local 
authority employees who enforce the regulation of such matters as food hygiene, 
health and safety at work, and social housing.
126
 However, even Hutter’s study is 
essentially of an enforcement agency only. Environmental health departments, at least 
at the time of Hutter’s study in the mid to late 1980s, were primarily enforcement 
agencies operating under the auspices of the local council. They were not responsible 
for ‘cradle to grave’ regulation of an industry by way of granting licences, controlling 
entry to the market or regulating prices.
127
  
 
   Local authority control is said to have the advantages of easier access to information 
about local defaults, and councils are better acquainted with the conditions of local 
trade, can respond more swiftly to local problems and they are a body with which 
local customers are accustomed to dealing. Local authorities are, however, felt to 
suffer from a lack of consistency and uniformity.
128
 All of these claimed advantages 
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and disadvantages can be seen in regulation of the taxi trade. Specifically in relation 
to vehicle entry to the market regulation, Schaller concludes that the differences 
between areas mean that policies need to be adapted to each area’s unique 
characteristics and needs.
129
 However, in other areas of regulation, particularly quality 
standards which impact on safety, the variation between local authorities produces a 
lack of uniformity which is difficult to justify. Notions of what constitutes a ‘safe’ 
vehicle and a ‘safe’ driver should be universal. Granting local authorities powers to 
interpret the legislation as they see fit produces a variety of measures of ‘suitability’ 
across the country. 
 
   Given the benefits and drawbacks of local authority regulation, is it possible to find 
an alternative approach? Other areas of regulation combine central agency 
responsibility for licensing provisions with local authority enforcement.
130
 A feature 
of the Labour administration of the late 1990s and early 2000s was the so called ‘third 
way politics’ which attempted to steer a mid-course between total local and total 
national control. Influenced by the writings of Giddens, this model attempted to 
utilize the discipline of the market to the public interest. It involved a balance between 
regulation and deregulation.
131
 In practice it meant that central government provided a 
framework of basic general principles which local authorities used as a model to 
exercise local control. It was this approach which was heavily influential in the 
framing of the Licensing Act 2003 which introduced radical changes to the liquor-
licensing regime. A similar approach was taken to the gambling industry.
132
 This 
model was not applied in other areas of regulatory control, and the taxi trade in 
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particular was overlooked. This may have been as a result of the taxi industry having 
undergone recent radical changes brought about by the Transport Act 1985, whereas 
alcohol licensing was still based upon legislation from the 1960s.
133
 It may also be the 
case that the hospitality industry presents a more unified and powerful interest group, 
able to lobby the government of the day for change in that industry’s favour. 
 
   Could an approach along these lines be used as a model for the regulation of the taxi 
trade? And would it be beneficial to do so? It is questionable whether such an 
approach would resolve the underlying tension between local and national 
government in regulating the trade. Hunt and Manchester argue, in respect of the 
Licensing Act, that the appearance of devolution of power and influence to a network 
of stakeholders in conjunction with licensing authorities may be illusory. In their 
view, central government still exerts considerable influence over licensing decision 
making by the use of statutory guidance.
134
 As will be seen, the findings of my 
research indicate that, even under the current regime, central government exerts 
substantial influence over councils. This issue is of particular significance to the taxi 
trade, however, because the Law Commission has proposed a system of national 
standards for vehicles and drivers, with enforcement powers to remain with local 
authorities. The proposals also include a residual power for councils to add their own 
local standards.
135
 The merits of such a scheme will be discussed in the light of the 
empirical findings of the study.    
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b) The ‘authority’ of local authorities  
 
   At the heart of regulation lies the government’s power to coerce individuals and 
groups. Stigler points out that the one resource which a state has and which is not 
available to its citizens is the power to coerce.
136
 Some writers argue that the power to 
coerce should only be used in very limited circumstances. Hayek, for example, 
believes that coercion should be resorted to as little as possible, and instead regulation 
ought to be left to the spontaneous forces of society (by which he meant market 
forces).
137
 Nozick also contends that coercive power should be limited to the narrow 
functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, and enforcement of contracts only, 
and in particular that any use of coercion to prohibit activities to people for their own 
good or protection would violate their individual rights.
138
 Such a view is seen as 
extreme or unrealistic in a modern context, given the wide range of managerial roles 
that modern government has taken on or is called upon to deal with.
139
 Nonetheless, 
government should still use regulatory powers in accordance with some recognizable 
principles of justification, at heart of which is the notion of legitimate authority.
140
 
Such authority has to be recognized as legitimate both by the citizens upon whose 
behalf the regulation is exercised and by the members of the trade who are regulated.  
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   Local authorities performing their regulatory functions are doing so in accordance 
with the Weberian idea of ‘legal authority’ as the main pure type of legitimate 
authority. This form of authority rests on the belief in the legality of patterns of 
normative rules and the right of those elected to authority under such rules to issue 
commands.
141
 In England and Wales the local councils derive their authority to 
regulate the taxi trade under the specific statutory powers to do so granted by the 1847 
and 1976 Acts. 
 
   The local council may have authority to act, but is that authority accepted as 
legitimate? And why is it important that it is so? According to Baldwin, legitimacy of 
regulatory action appears to be based on the existence of one or more of five key 
criteria: legislative mandate; accountability of the body performing the regulatory 
action; the existence of democratic, open, fair procedures for determining questions of 
policy and individual decision making; the expertise of the regulatory body; and 
whether the action is effective.
142
 There are problems with all of these criteria. Much 
legislative authority is couched in broad discretionary terms allowing regulators 
considerable leeway in their approach to regulatory activity. There are also difficulties 
defining notions of effectiveness. Nonetheless, Baldwin concludes that the greatest 
claim to legitimacy for regulatory bodies appears to be in respect of its expertise. 
However, it must be borne in mind that Baldwin is writing about ostensibly 
autonomous regulatory agencies which are generally not directly accountable to the 
public or the electorate in the same way that local authorities are.  
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   How helpful are Baldwin’s five criteria in assessing the legitimacy of a local 
authority regulator? In practice, the claim to legitimacy on the grounds of expertise 
appears to be the weakest one when applied to local authorities. Although licensing 
officials within local authorities are undoubtedly experts in the field of licensing, very 
few councils have the luxury of being able to employ officials whose expertise is in 
taxi licensing alone. Most licensing officers are also responsible for other areas of 
local authority licensing and registration, such as public houses, dog-breeding 
establishments and take-away food outlets. Stronger support for the legitimacy of 
local authority control would appear to stem from the other criteria, in particular the 
facts that the local authority possesses a legislative mandate to regulate, albeit one 
couched in very broad discretionary terms, and the local authority is accountable to 
the electorate.        
   
   In general terms, Hoque considers that the legitimacy of local authorities stems from 
adopting and reflecting the will of its citizens.
143
 The expression of local norms comes 
from the ballot box at local elections to elected representatives. This is a difficult 
position to support in practice, given that local election campaigns are often 
dominated by national, not local, issues,
144
 and the traditionally low rates of 
participation in the local electoral process.
145
 However, Orford et al make the point 
that, although voters in local elections take their cue from national issues, it is how 
those issues impinge upon their local services that affects electors’ voting 
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behaviour.
146
 The provision of neighbourhood taxi services may not necessarily be a 
burning issue, unless some incident has raised the profile of the taxi trade in the local 
media. However, local authority activity to ensure a taxi service that is safe, reliable 
and inexpensive, whilst still allowing those who work in the industry to make a 
reasonable living should be seen as possessing legitimacy by all concerned.    
 
c) Conclusions on localism 
   
   The issue of localism is likely to remain influential in the regulation of the taxi 
trade. The present Coalition Government has expressed a clear preference for local 
over national regulation. This expression finds statutory form in the Localism Act 
2011. Heavily influenced by Barber’s notion of ‘strong democracy’ concentrating 
local control in the hands of local people,
147
 the Act establishes central government’s 
choice for neighbourhood issues to be addressed and regulated by the communities 
directly affected. Although the Act does not specifically relate to taxi services, it does 
give an indication of the government’s preference for local services to be 
administered locally, with minimal intervention from national government.
148
 
 
   The key area of research that arises from this discussion is whether the identity of 
the regulator is significant in achieving the regulatory aims. Does effective regulation 
of the taxi trade require a degree of local knowledge and choice or could a national 
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regulatory body better achieve the objectives of the legislation? I answer these 
questions from the empirical findings of the study in the chapters which follow.   
 
 
5) Who benefits from regulation?   
 
   Although this question has some overlap with the aims of regulation, in this section 
I look at the possible effects of regulation, and the methods used, rather than its 
specific aims. The question is whether regulation of the taxi trade in its current form 
furthers the public interest, specifically the interests of taxi customers and other road 
users or protects existing members of the trade from increased competition. Is it the 
regulator itself which benefits most from its regulatory powers? In considering this 
issue, however, I bear in mind that the competing interests seeking to benefit from 
regulation need not be mutually exclusive. A well-regulated taxi market should be 
capable of benefiting the public, the trade and the regulators. 
 
   Moore found that there is some truth in the view that the effect of licensing is to 
protect the public from ‘quacks, shysters and inexperienced persons.’ 149 On this view, 
regulation through a system of licensing is clearly designed to protect the user of 
licensed services against being injured or taken advantage of. Although he questions 
what public interest is served by licensing particular occupations, Gelhorn agrees that 
licensing has some real benefits for the public.
150
 Indeed, the rationale for using 
licensing as a regulatory form rather than other methods, such as registration or 
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certification,
151
 is that this best serves the public interest. According to Ogus, 
licensing is more effective in protecting the public because the prospective licence 
holder is subjected to ex ante scrutiny rather than ex post investigation and sanctions 
where something has gone badly wrong.
 152
    
 
   However, some commentators take a different view, concluding that most 
regulatory policies are pursued only if they prove acceptable to the interests of the 
regulated group.
153
 Writers have offered a ‘life cycle’ theory of regulation whereby 
the regulator’s initial enthusiasm and vigour is lost and regulatory functions 
eventually become subordinated to the interests of the regulated industry.
154
 Such a 
process has been dubbed ‘regulatory capture’, and is said to benefit the business 
involved because it enables the trade to manipulate performance of the regulator’s 
tasks in a way which is favourable to the regulated population.
155
 Although the notion 
of ‘regulatory capture’ is still influential in regulatory theory, it has been criticised as 
lacking both a theoretical basis and empirical support.
156
 Notwithstanding these 
criticisms, however, in the case of taxi regulation there are certain aspects of the 
licensing regime, particularly in relation to quantitative regulation and fares, which 
display some elements of regulatory capture. An important part of the study will be to 
examine how far the suggestion of regulatory capture in these areas is accurate.  
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   Specifically on the licensing of occupations, Stigler believes that this is a use of the 
political process to improve the economic circumstances of the group.
157
 On this 
view, the pressure for licensing emanates from the members of the occupation itself. 
Friedman’s objection to occupational licensing is that it involves control of a 
profession by members of the same occupation.
158
 Although this is not the case in taxi 
licensing, it is arguable that the taxi trade still enjoys the economic benefits of 
licensing, even though it has no direct control over administration of the system. 
Indeed, the greatest opposition to licensing in the literature comes from economists 
who argue that it produces monopoly rents in the form of high monetary values on the 
vehicle licence.
159
 Toner observes that in restricted markets a substantial and 
increasing licence premium is enjoyed by licence holders.
160
 However, Cairns and 
Liston-Heyes believe that such premiums are not evidence that regulation is 
inefficient, nor evidence that regulation is instituted because of rent seeking by the 
industry. Instead, they consider that such premiums may be justified on the basis that 
the ‘medallion’ (the USA equivalent of the vehicle licence in the UK) acts as a bond 
for appropriate performance of the taxi service.
161
 On this view, the imposition of 
quantitative regulation actually benefits the public thorough improved quality of 
service.  
 
   However, Toner’s study of deregulation of the taxi market concludes that entry 
deregulation had only limited success in achieving its purported objectives of 
increased vehicle numbers and lower fares. Indeed, deregulation appeared to result in 
                                                 
157
 Stigler (n 8) 13. 
158
 M Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1962) 140.  
159
 Seibert (n 42);  Barrett (n 73). 
160
 Toner (n 22) 83. 
161
 RD Cairns and C Liston-Heyes, ‘Competition and Regulation in the Taxi Industry’ (1996) 59 
Journal of Public Economics 1 
 72 
lower standards of quality enforcement, measured by the age limits imposed upon 
vehicles and the frequency of routine testing.
162
 This is evidence that removal of 
quantitative regulation acts to the detriment of the public in terms of lower standards 
of service. On the other hand, it does not appear to demonstrate any great benefit to 
the trade either.  
 
   Although there is a statutory scheme for the setting of fares,
163
 this only provides for 
consultation with local citizens and the trade whenever the local authority 
contemplates a revision of the fare rates. An Office of Fair Trading report in 2003 
recommended that local authorities take steps to make customers aware that set fares 
were a maximum and could be negotiated subject to this upper limit.
164
 There is no 
evidence that local authorities have followed this advice. Beyond this, there are no 
other views on the effects of fare regulation or who is supposed to benefit. 
Anecdotally, members of the public regard taxi fares as expensive and drivers see 
them as too low, but there is no empirical support for either view. 
 
   Although this is not mentioned in any of the literature, it might be argued that local 
authorities themselves benefit from licensing, if only because licensing fees generate 
income for the council. However, local authorities are required to fix fees at a rate to 
cover operating and administrative costs only, and are not supposed to produce excess 
income for the council.
165
 Aquilina’s recent study suggested that deregulation may be 
of benefit to those local authorities that fail to regulate the market properly, but 
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quantity restrictions ought to be retained by those authorities that manage the taxi 
market in their area well.
166
 However, the results of this study should, as the author 
himself acknowledges, be interpreted with caution as they are based on a small 
sample of local authorities. 
 
   To conclude, there are competing claims in the literature as to who benefits from 
regulation. Moore concluded that legislatures licence those occupations which are 
most in need of regulation in the public interest and, in so doing, establish certain 
regulations which benefit practitioners.
167
 So it is possible that all actors in the system 
could benefit from regulation, even if different parties may benefit from different 
types of regulation. I shall consider the question of who gains most from regulation in 
relation to the empirical materials. 
 
6) Enforcement  
 
   Regulation is of precious little use if it cannot be effectively enforced. The main 
reason cited for regulatory failure is ineffective enforcement,
168
 although the reasons 
for such ineffectiveness can vary. Enforcement may be ineffective as a result of the 
objectives of the regulation being unclear or poorly defined
169
 or lack of agency 
resources
170
 or agency capture, as discussed above. Enforcement carries with it the 
idea of compulsion in that people are unwilling to carry out their obligations unless 
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pressure of some kind is put on them.
171
 In this section, I analyse how far that element 
is still essential and whether the legislative framework provides appropriate means to 
secure effective enforcement. 
 
   When it comes to enforcement, it is said that the function of the regulator is 
principally one of securing compliance with legislative goals encapsulated in statutory 
rules or standards.
172
 The effectiveness of enforcement depends upon the extent to 
which regulators can secure present and future compliance.
173
 Although this sounds 
simple, the meaning of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘compliance,’ and how they might be 
measured, is not clear. Hopkins makes the point that the crucial question in seeking 
how best to ensure compliance is to ask what it is that the regulated are required to 
comply with. The answer to this question will often dictate how regulators go about 
their task.
174
  
 
   Local authority regulators face the task of deciding how best to achieve effective 
enforcement, although how such effectiveness is to be assessed is a difficult 
question.
175
 Galligan reminds us that effectiveness is of vital importance in the 
exercise of discretionary power,
176
 and as such is a key issue in this research. 
Unfortunately, the literature reveals opposing views of how to measure effectiveness 
of enforcement. For some writers, the number of prosecutions is seen as an indication 
of work undertaken and a sign of success.
177
 Advocates of this approach suggest that 
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more regular detection and prosecution of offences are the only ways to ensure that 
safety is taken seriously and any other strategy leads to endless prevarication on the 
part of the regulated.
178
 However, other commentators argue that measuring success 
by numbers of prosecutions can lead to regulators prosecuting trivial cases in order to 
give a false impression of effectiveness.
179
 A better measure is how far enforcement 
activities achieve compliance with the regulatory aims without resort to formal legal 
procedures.
180
 Such a basis, however, is not without its difficulties, as it involves a 
‘complex process of defining responses to mandates that are often ambiguous.’181  
 
   Although regulatory regimes are generally underpinned by the criminal law, 
enforcement does not necessarily mean resorting to criminal prosecution. The 
literature identifies two major systems or strategies of enforcement - compliance and 
deterrence.
182
  The former is a conciliatory style designed to be remedial, whilst the 
latter is a penal style and designed to punish violators. The literature suggests that 
most regulators prefer a compliance approach.
183
 Hutter considers that these 
contrasting approaches should be treated as analytical models only, with regulators in 
reality using a combination of both styles.
184
 Indeed, Ayres and Braithwaite point out 
that in reality the regulatory agencies which succeed best at achieving their goals are 
the ones that strike a balance between the two models.
185
 I will use the terms 
‘conciliatory’ and ‘deterrence’ to describe these two models in order to avoid 
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confusion about the use of the word ‘compliance’, which has an ordinary meaning, as 
already used in the preceding paragraphs, as well as this technical meaning. 
 
   Advocates of a conciliatory approach argue that rigid prosecution of every ‘petty’ 
violation is counterproductive because it puts the employer on the defensive and 
destroys any possibility of co-operation or open communication about compliance 
problems which an employer might have.
186
 On the other hand, it is said that the 
conciliatory approach involves an unjustifiable tendency to see things from the 
employer’s point of view and leads to the ‘capture’ of regulatory agencies by those 
they are supposed to regulate.
187
 A conciliatory approach depends on the regulators 
and the regulated being able to maintain a reasonable working relationship. It has 
been said that the role of enforcement officers should be as the ‘handmaidens of 
business – helping them to comply – rather than the local branch of the Gestapo’.188  
This comment was no doubt tailored for its audience and is grossly unfair to local 
authority officials, but it illustrates a preference, at least on the part of central 
government, for a conciliatory approach to enforcement.   
  
   Hawkins considers that those who are subject to regulation have good economic 
reasons not to comply.
189
 So why do the regulated comply with the regulators? Some 
taxi drivers may accept the authority and legitimacy of the licensing authority and 
obey its instructions because they consider that they are binding upon them. Other 
drivers may simply comply out of respect for the legitimacy of the local authority to 
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regulate their activities, whether in the public interest or otherwise. Raz, however, 
considers that acceptance of the legitimate authority of the government is a less 
important reason for compliance than more prudential and practical reasons. Even 
people who believe they are not subject to the authority of the law may still obey the 
rules because disobedience will do more harm than good.
190
  This raises the question 
whether, in reality, members of the taxi trade comply with regulators because it is in 
their interests to do so or because they want to avoid the financial and stigmatizing 
consequences of non-compliance.  
 
   It is suggested in the literature that compliance is most likely to be achieved when a 
regulator adopts what Ayres and Braithwaite call an ‘explicit enforcement 
pyramid’.191 In this model, most enforcement action occurs at the base of the pyramid 
where attempts are initially made to coax compliance by persuasion. Enforcement 
activities then escalate up the pyramid to a warning letter, civil monetary penalties, 
criminal prosecution, temporary suspension of a licence to operate, to finally 
permanent revocation of a licence to operate. This critique of command and control 
style regulation demonstrates that the least amount of enforcement activity occurs at 
the apex of the pyramid where the most serious sanctions occur.  
 
   The alternative to a conciliatory approach is to adopt a deterrence strategy. Despite 
endeavours at persuasion, there will always be certain members of the regulated who 
are unable or unwilling to comply. No amount of accommodation, urging or 
insistence will make them comply, and so the regulator will in such circumstances 
have to resort to a deterrence strategy. This does not necessarily involve the use of 
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prosecution as its main weapon to enforce the regulations, although prosecution is 
seen by some as the ultimate sanction, if only in symbolic and instrumental terms.
192
 
   Administrative sanctions in the form of suspension, revocation or refusal to renew a 
licence are likely to have more impact on the regulated than low financial or other 
penal sanctions imposed by the courts.
193
 This is reflected in the activity at the apex of 
Ayres and Braithwaite’s pyramid. The threat of such administrative sanction is in 
itself likely to induce a recalcitrant licence holder into compliance. Removal of the 
licence has the advantage for regulators of an instant final disposal of the matter 
unless the licensee takes the initiative to appeal or seek judicial review.
194
 In either 
case the burden of proof falls on the licence holder to demonstrate that the regulator’s 
decision was wrong.
195
 The courts do not have the power to order removal of a license 
holder’s licence, even upon conviction. Removal is an administrative action of the 
licensing authority in accordance with the statutory provisions.
196
 However, the 
statutory grounds do not necessarily require a conviction, and a licence can also be 
suspended or revoked by the licensing authority for some ‘other reasonable cause’.197 
 
   An important part of my research is to find out how local authority licensing 
officers go about their task of enforcement of taxi regulation, whether councils adopt 
a conciliatory or deterrence strategy, and whether enforcement activity is effective in 
achieving the regulatory aims.  
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7) Conclusions 
 
   In this chapter, I have reviewed some of the theoretical arguments underpinning 
regulation, both in general and more specifically in relation to regulation of the taxi 
trade. The prime objective of this chapter was to discover the aim of taxi regulation. A 
number of possible aims are suggested, but there is not one predominant aim 
articulated as such by either the literature, by Parliament or by the courts. Indeed, the 
aim of regulation appears to be a malleable concept, which can be prayed in aid of 
whatever point of view central or local government or the courts wish to advance. As 
will be seen, local authority regulators claim that all of their endeavours are to further 
the aim of the protection of the public. However, as will also be seen, what they 
achieve in practice is often something other than that aim. 
 
   Looked at from a historical perspective, regulation of the taxi trade appears to 
follow a regulatory pattern identified in other forms of public transport, such as buses 
and trains. Regulation introduced initially for social reasons, usually connected to 
public safety, is later taken over by mainly economic regulation, in terms of control of 
entry to the market and price fixing.
198
 In the case of taxis, regulation was initially 
introduced to prevent congestion of the streets and internecine battles between drivers 
competing for business. Notwithstanding arguments that control of congestion should 
still be the primary aim of regulation, the focus has moved to economic debates about 
whether the purpose of regulation is to benefit the trade or the regulator. In this thesis, 
I argue that it is largely the local authorities themselves which have gained most from 
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regulation. Any benefit that is derived from the licensing regime is not that of the 
travelling public.  
   
   A number of theoretical issues have been raised during the course of this chapter, 
although not all of these will be pursued in subsequent parts of this thesis. The 
underlying theories considered in this chapter will be taken as models against which 
the reality of regulation of the taxi industry will be gauged. The theoretical models 
which will be mapped onto the empirical findings of the study will be those which 
most closely relate to the research questions, in particular those which relate to when 
discretionary powers should be used or when they should be displaced by rules, how 
discretion is exercised, whether local or national control is appropriate, who benefits 
from regulation, and how best to achieve effective enforcement. Essentially, I 
consider how accurately the abstract concepts discussed in this chapter reflect what is 
happening in real life. This will enable conclusions to be drawn on the extent to which 
either the theory or practice is in need of revision.  
 
   The themes of the exercise of discretion and localism run through this thesis, and 
Chapter 4 will focus largely on those concepts. In Chapter 4, I will analyse why and 
how vehicle entry to the market is regulated through the exercise of both limited and 
open-ended discretion, and the influence which localism plays in decisions to restrict 
entry. This analysis is underpinned by the issues of whether discretion is appropriate, 
what factors influence the exercise of discretion and whether local or national control 
is more effective. The findings of the empirical part of the study will be used to assess 
the validity of the views set out in the literature. I will return to these points in 
Chapter 4, before which I will outline how the study was carried out. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
   In this chapter, I describe and explain the methodology adopted in the research 
which was broken down into four stages. The first stage was a review of the existing 
literature on regulation both in general and in relation to taxis in particular. Much of 
this literature focussed on economic regulation. The second stage involved a survey, 
mostly conducted online, to obtain as much information as possible direct from all the 
local authorities throughout the country on their approaches to taxi regulation. This 
information was then used to select a sample of councils from which to obtain and 
analyse more detailed documentary evidence as the third stage. Finally, based on the 
contents of the documentary evidence, semi-structured interviews were arranged with 
various actors involved in taxi licensing from half of the third stage sample councils.  
 
   One point that was clear from the early stages of the research was the lack of 
empirical evidence on regulation of the taxi trade. In view of the absence of empirical 
information, I wanted to undertake an empirical study in order to put some flesh on 
the bare bones of the theoretical models of taxi regulation. As a former licensed 
hackney carriage driver, I had some experience of the regulatory system in action, but 
I wanted to see things from the point of view of those who were responsible for the 
day to day running of the system, as well as those directly affected by the regulatory 
regime. As was pointed out by Blumer, ‘an alert and observant actor in the setting is 
bound to know more than the researcher ever will about the realities under 
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investigation.’1 I sought to capture data on the perceptions of those involved in taxi 
licensing ‘from the inside’.2 
 
   I decided to take a qualitative approach to the research for two reasons. First, 
because a qualitative methodology is particularly suitable for studying the way in 
which ‘different people experience, interpret and structure their lives.’3 I was 
interested in the thoughts, opinions and beliefs of those involved in the day-to-day 
practice of the taxi trade either as regulators or as a member of the regulated 
occupation. A qualitative approach provided a more appropriate way of doing this. 
The second reason is because of the large number of licensing authorities in England 
and Wales. This made it necessary to reduce the number of councils participating in 
the study to a smaller sample in order to explore the issues in more depth. I 
concentrated on a sample of 32 councils, representing approximately ten per cent of 
the total, in order to examine the issues in greater detail.  
  
a) First Stage: Literature review 
 
   The first phase of the research started with a review of the available literature both 
on regulation generally and in relation to taxi licensing more specifically. This review 
enabled me to adopt a model of what regulation is seeking to achieve and how the 
regulator goes about this task. I was able to identify some broad general themes, 
issues and theoretical models from the literature. Although Hutter suggests that the 
literature review should be used to ‘identify language and phrases that might be 
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meaningful to those involved in the trade’,4 this was not necessary for me, as I was 
already familiar with the jargon of the actors involved. The review did, however, 
provide me with useful insight into the sort of data I would need to look for during the 
course of the study. 
 
b) Second Stage: General survey 
 
   In the second stage, I carried out a full review of the information readily available to 
the public on vehicle and driver licensing to get an extensive picture of what local 
authorities are doing and how they go about their task and exercise their powers. This 
stage of the research was carried out predominantly by searches on each local 
authority’s website, although some searches had to be followed up by email or 
telephone call to obtain further documentation or clarification of the authority’s 
procedures. I anticipated that this would be a relatively quick way of gathering 
preliminary information on the different approaches to regulation of trade by each 
authority, and so it proved to be. 
 
   There are 315 local authorities in England and Wales with responsibility for taxi 
licensing. These comprise 35 Metropolitan District Councils, governing the major 
conurbations in England, 27 Unitary Authorities, 22 Welsh Councils and 231 city, 
borough or district councils for each area. From these 315, I was able to obtain some 
information from 275 councils (87.3 percent) in total, including where the website 
search was supplemented by telephone or email enquiry. In the case of nine councils, 
it was not possible to obtain any information at all due to technical difficulties with 
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either the website or in making contact; for the other 31 councils information was 
only available on written application. 
 
   From the results of this initial survey, I was able to identify some common themes 
and characteristics of taxi regulation which could be coded for the purposes of 
analysis. I was also able to identify some less common, but nonetheless popular, 
elements used by local authorities, as well as some unusual features which were seen 
in only a few councils. These latter features would be considered ‘outliers’ in research 
terms, but are still useful as they add an extra dimension to the study and they can also 
be useful as a check to test the strength of the basic findings.
5
 Examples of this type of 
characteristic include drug testing, additional driving requirements, literacy and 
numeracy testing, and formal qualifications. The results of this initial survey are 
displayed in Table 1 below. 
 
   Percentage figures in Table 1 are calculated as a percentage of all 315 councils. The 
mathematically astute reader will observe that the total number of councils from each 
of the categories above is more than 315 and the percentages total more than 100. 
This is because all councils exhibited more than one of the above features in 
combination, with some local authorities having several such elements as part of their 
regulatory regime. The different characteristics identified in Table 1 call for further 
elucidation. A total of 84 licensing authorities (26.7 percent) retain quantitative 
regulations upon their taxi fleets throughout the whole or part of their area, despite the 
barrier to such a form of regulation created by section 16 of the Transport Act 1985.  
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Table 1: Features of Regulation from Initial Survey 
Characteristic Number of Councils  Percentage of Total 
No Information available 40  12.7 
Quantitative Regulation  84  26.7 
Vehicle 
Requirements 
 
257 (81.5)  
Vehicle Specifications 225 71.4 
Approved Types 89 28.3 
Age Restrictions 109 34.6 
Livery 38 12.0 
WAV only 45 14.3 
Driver 
Requirements  
 
263 (83.4) 
Medical Form 243 77.0 
Knowledge Test 180 57.0 
Driving Test 116 36.8 
Additional Driving Experience 38 12.0 
References  75 23.8 
Literacy/numeracy Test 27 8.6 
Formal qualifications 35 11.1 
Mandatory Drugs Test 6 1.9 
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A full list of these councils is attached as Appendix A to the thesis.
6
 As part of the 
study, I examined why so many local authorities still impose quantitative restrictions, 
despite central government discouragement.  
 
   257 councils provided information relating to vehicle requirements. The demands of 
these councils varied considerably, even within the various characteristics identified. 
So, for example, the general vehicle specifications set by 225 local authorities cover 
different combinations of stipulations relating to the external appearance of the 
vehicle, the internal dimensions of the passenger compartment, the construction of the 
vehicle, safety features, and the provision and use of taximeters. Many specifications 
also include technical requirements, such as the minimum cubic capacity of the 
engine or the external dimensions of the vehicle. Of the councils which operate 
approved lists of vehicles, some are very restrictive, requiring that vehicles be only 
the ‘London Cab style’ of vehicle, while others approve longer lists list of acceptable 
makes and models of vehicle.
7
 Maximum age limits at first licensing varies widely 
between councils from brand new up to ten years old. Similarly, age restrictions 
beyond which current licensed vehicles would no longer be considered suitable vary 
between five and 20 years.
8
 
 
   ‘Livery’ refers to the requirement that all hackney carriages in an area are the same 
colour or follow the same colour scheme. Colours vary from all black, white, red, 
yellow or green to combinations involving distinctively coloured bonnets and boots 
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on the vehicle, or coloured stripes down the side of the taxi. ‘WAV’ is a commonly 
used acronym to denote a wheelchair accessible vehicle, and 45 councils will licence 
only such vehicles either at first licensing or upon replacement of existing licensed 
vehicles. However, there is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a 
WAV.    
 
   Of the 263 councils which provided information on driver requirements, 243 had a 
specific stipulation that an applicant be certified ‘medically fit’ in a medical report 
completed by the driver’s own GP or by a local authority nominated doctor following 
medical examination. Although medical forms varied in content, detail and format, all 
were designed to elicit information on any physical or psychological conditions that 
might affect an applicant’s ability to drive safely.  
 
   ‘Knowledge tests’ are a popular, but not universal, feature of taxi driver regulation. 
These devices are designed to gauge an applicant’s suitability as a driver, but vary 
widely in content, method of assessment, and degree of difficulty between local 
authorities. Tests can examine geographical knowledge of an area only, whilst others 
also include knowledge of the taxi legislation, conditions of licences or the Highway 
Code. Tests may be oral, written or a combination of both, and different pass marks 
apply.
9
 
 
   The requirement of 116 councils that applicants undergo a further driving test, either 
under the auspices of the Driver Standards Agency or the council’s own driving 
assessor, is surprising given that, in obtaining an ordinary driving licence, an 
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applicant will already have passed what is widely regarded as a stringent test of his or 
her driving ability. A similar point can be made about the 38 councils which require 
applicants to have held an ordinary licence for more than the statutory minimum of 
one year.
10
 
 
   All 263 councils required driver applicants to obtain a Criminal Records Bureau 
(CRB)
11
 certificate as evidence of his or her good character, and most were content to 
accept that as conclusive. However, 75 councils additionally required character 
references. This is also surprising, as references are normally associated with 
applications for employment. Applicants are seeking authority to carry on a trade, 
often as self-employed entrepreneurs. The local authority is not their employer.  
 
   The requirement of 27 councils that applicants satisfy basic communication, literacy 
and numeracy standards is also somewhat surprising, as those skills are normally 
associated with the needs of employers too, and the same can be said about formal 
qualifications. The power to carry out mandatory drug tests claimed by six councils 
seems to be a gross invasion of an applicant’s privacy, particularly as it requires no 
proof, or even reasonable suspicion, that the applicant uses drugs.  
 
   The initial survey enabled me to obtain the fare tariffs set by each council, although 
some of these looked somewhat out of date. There was little information available on 
this survey about enforcement of regulation. Some websites contained vague general 
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comments that the council was responsible for enforcement of the taxi legislation, but 
nothing specific about how enforcement was carried out.  
 
   Two things were clear from this initial survey. One was that councils employed a 
variety of approaches to the task of taxi regulation. Even where the same regulatory 
characteristics were present, the way in which they were used varied from one council 
to another. The second point of note is that none of the elements of regulation set out 
above are statutory requirements; they are all the creations of local authorities.
12
      
 
c) Third Stage: Sampling and documentary analysis 
 
   Due to the numbers of local authorities involved in the second stage of the research, 
it was clear that a more in-depth analysis would require selection of a smaller number 
of councils to act as a sample.
13
 So far as the appropriate number of authorities for the 
sample was concerned, Hoinville and Jowell suggest that,  
 
the complexity of the competing factors of resources and accuracy means that 
the decision on a sample size tends to be based on experience and good 
judgement rather than relying on a strict mathematical formula.
14
  
 
   From the sample frame of all 315 councils, I selected a sample of 32 local 
authorities, for two main reasons. First, this number was large enough to obtain a 
reasonable geographical spread of councils across the whole of England and Wales 
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with a mix of urban and rural locations. Second, 32 councils represent approximately 
one in every ten local authorities and 32 is an easily divisible number to work out 
appropriate proportions. By using 32 councils as a sample, I was able to use what is 
referred to in the research literature as proportionate stratification.
15
 This means that 
the number of councils selected as examples displaying the main characteristics 
identified in stage two correspond proportionally to the number of councils exhibiting 
such features across the country. The sample of 32 councils was selected on the basis 
of geographical location, nature of the local topography, and main regulatory features. 
By using these characteristics as the main bases for selection, I was able to obtain a 
sample set spread around the country which was approximately in a representative 
proportion to the occurrence of the selection criteria throughout the country as a 
whole. For example, roughly 25 per cent of councils in England and Wales retain 
quantitative regulation, so eight councils (25 per cent of 32) were chosen for the fact 
that they imposed limits on the number of taxi licenses issued. This pattern was 
followed for the other selection criteria. The results of this sampling exercise are set 
out in Table 2 below.  
 
   I devised topographic categories to divide the councils between those which govern 
large cities and other centres of high population density (Urban), smaller cities or 
larger towns combined with surrounding areas of low population (Mixed urban/rural), 
and mostly rural areas based around a medium sized market town (Mainly Rural). The 
term ‘assessment’ in the regulatory feature column is a generic term for all forms of 
additional ‘testing’, such as driving tests, literacy or numeracy tests and formal 
qualifications. Although each council’s main regulatory characteristic is listed, some  
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Table 2: The Sample of 32 Councils 
  
Council Location Topography Main Feature 
Amber Valley West Midlands Mixed urban/rural Knowledge test 
Bath & North East 
Somerset 
South West Mixed urban/rural Quantitative 
Regulation  
Birmingham West Midlands  Urban  Quantitative 
Regulation 
Bristol South West Urban  Knowledge test 
Canterbury  South/South-East Mixed urban/rural No information 
Carlisle  North  Mixed urban/rural Knowledge test 
Cherwell West Midlands Mainly Rural  Knowledge test 
Copeland  North  Mainly Rural  Age limits 
Cornwall  South West Mixed urban/rural Quantitative 
Regulation 
Fenland East Midlands Mainly Rural  Assessment 
Flintshire  Wales Mainly Rural  No information 
Gloucester South West Urban Assessment  
 92 
Great Yarmouth East Midlands Mainly Rural Knowledge test 
Horsham South/South-East Mainly Rural  Age limits 
Kings Lynn & West 
Norfolk 
East Midlands Mainly Rural Age limits 
Lancaster North  Mainly Rural Quantitative 
Regulation 
Lichfield  West Midlands  Mainly Rural Age limits 
Mid-Devon South West Mainly Rural  Assessment  
Mid-Sussex South/South-East Mainly Rural  Quantitative 
Regulation 
Newcastle upon 
Tyne 
North  Urban  Quantitative 
Regulation 
North East 
Lincolnshire 
East Midlands  Mixed urban/rural Quantitative 
Regulation 
Northampton East Midlands  Urban  Knowledge test 
Oadby & Wigston East Midlands  Mainly Rural  Assessment  
Rhondda Cynon Taf Wales Mixed urban/rural Age limits 
Sandwell  West Midlands  Urban  Assessment  
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Solihull  West Midlands  Mixed urban/rural Knowledge test 
Southend-on-Sea South/South-East Mixed urban/rural  Quantitative 
Regulation 
Tendring South/South-East Mainly Rural  Assessment  
Uttlesford  East Midlands Mainly Rural Age limits 
West Dorset South/South-East Mainly Rural  Knowledge test 
Winchester South/South-East Mixed urban/rural Knowledge test 
Worcester  West Midlands Mixed urban/rural Age limits 
 
fulfil more than one criterion. No council satisfied only one characteristic. Some 
overlap of categories is unavoidable, but this does help to maintain a proportionate 
balance. For example, 17 of the councils in the sample use a knowledge test, even 
though this only appears as the main feature for nine councils in the table. 
 
   From this sample of 32 councils, I undertook a more detailed examination of all 
publicly available documents from each of these local authorities. Documents are a 
valuable source of information because they are intrinsic subjective accounts of the 
actor’s world,16 they offer access to routine behaviour that is unaffected by the 
research process,
17
 and they are readily available.
18
 The documents analysed in my 
research included general information issued to licence holders, such as handbooks, 
                                                 
16
 Burgess (n 3)123. 
17
 L Kidder and C Judd with ER Smith, Research Methods in Social Relations (5
th
 edn, CBS 
Publishing, New York 1986) 311. 
18
 YS Lincoln and EG Guba, Naturalistic Inquiry (Sage, Beverley Hills 1985) 278.  
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administrative forms, licence conditions, policy statements, and enforcement 
guidelines. I also examined minutes of licensing committee and sub-committee 
meetings, reports of officers to committees, reports of disciplinary proceedings and 
similar documents for the one year period between 1
st
 April 2010 and 31
st
 March 
2011. Most of these papers were easily accessible through each council’s website, but 
some of the information had to be requested by email or telephone call. Whilst 
reading through these documents, I was conscious of Hutter’s observation that 
‘councils vary with regard to the amount and type of information they record.’19 This 
was certainly true in respect of the documents obtained from the councils in the 
sample. There was considerable variation in the amount and depth of data available. 
Some councils kept copious and detailed records, others were brief and lacking in  
specifics. Whilst I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of any of the documentary 
records, as I was to discover during the next stage of the study, some of the 
information was not as full as it might have been.  
 
   The documentary data was coded in line with their relevance to the main areas of 
regulation; quantitative, qualitative, fares and enforcement. From this information, I 
was able to identify a number of common themes and points of divergence in each 
area. These public documents provided insights into some of the policies and 
practices employed by the 32 local authorities, the methods used and the exercises of 
discretion to carry out the task of taxi regulation. The documents also provided 
evidence of the justifications, motivations and thought processes behind council 
decision-making. However, the documentary evidence did not provide a full picture 
of the regulatory process, and so it was necessary to investigate the issues in more 
                                                 
19
 Hutter (n 4) 19. 
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depth. From the documents I was able to formulate some further lines of enquiry 
which could be pursued at the next stage of the study - semi-structured interviews 
with some of the stakeholders in taxi regulation. I decided to use interviews as this 
appeared to be the best way of discovering the thoughts, beliefs and motivations of 
those involved in the day-to-day operation of taxi licensing. Interviews are more 
effective in obtaining this sort of information than alternatives, such as 
questionnaires.
20
 I also believed that respondents would be more likely to co-operate 
and provide richer data if they were interviewed in their normal environment. In 
addition, I saw the next stage of the research as an opportunity to probe some of the 
areas where the documentary data was lacking in detail. 
 
d) Fourth Stage: Semi-structured interviews 
 
   In the fourth stage, I reduced the number of councils involved in the study from 32 
to 16 to make the numbers of interviews more manageable, whilst still obtaining 
sufficient data from which to analyse the research questions and to maintain a 
proportionate balance between the characteristics of regulation, location and 
geographical spread. I selected 16 councils from the original 32 based on the same 
criteria identified at stage two and retaining the same proportionate balance between 
the features set out in Table 2. I then devised an interview schedule from the 
documentary information obtained in stages two and three of the study. The interview 
schedule was designed to provide a guideline for the points to be discussed in the 
interviews and to extract information, ideas and attitudes on the subject of taxi 
                                                 
20
 AN Oppenheim, Questionnaire Design, Interviewing, and Attitude Measurement (Pinter, London 
1992) 67.  
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regulation with a minimum of distortion.
21
 This schedule was intended to provide a 
series of questions with which to start off a conversation with the respondent on a 
particular topic, and also served as a checklist to ensure that all the salient points were 
covered during the course of the interview. The schedule was not designed to be a 
series of questions fired by way of interrogation of the respondent. The purpose of the 
questions was to guide the respondent to talk about a particular area of regulation 
whilst allowing the respondent to lead the conversation in any direction he or she 
chose within the broad confines of that topic. Supplementary questions could then be 
used to maintain the flow of the conversation, depending upon any points raised by 
the respondent. The final version of the interview schedule is at appendix B.   
 
   I wanted to interview respondents from one of four groups of actors in the 
regulatory process. One group comprised licensing committee chairs as policy makers 
and elected representatives. Another group was composed of full time senior licensing 
officers, the officials with day to day responsibility for supervising the system. One 
group was to be selected from enforcement officers, the field operatives on the ground 
responsible for monitoring and enforcing the regime. The final group was taxi 
representatives, those on the receiving end of regulation. These categories of 
respondent were selected as each had a particular role to play within the regulatory 
regime, whether as policy maker, responsibility for implementation of the legislation 
and policy decisions, enforcer of the regulatory regime, and as a member of the 
regulated industry expected to comply with the rules of the system. The intention was 
to interview one member of each group from all 16 councils, although this proved 
                                                 
21
 ibid 121.  
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unachievable and impractical in reality. This arrangement was designed to elicit the 
widest range of views from all stakeholders involved in regulation of the trade.    
 
   The next step, of course, was to gain access to the respondents. I had anticipated 
that this may the most difficult aspect of the interview process. As Lincoln and Guba 
point out, obtaining approved access from those in overall charge does not guarantee 
other persons involved will co-operate.
22
 Even obtaining formal permission may have 
proved problematic. As it turned out, such concerns were unfounded. On the whole 
the response from the stakeholders approached was excellent, gaining access was not 
a problem, and the respondents were very co-operative throughout. I was able to carry 
out 51 recorded interviews with a mixture of respondents from each of the groups 
across all 16 councils. This represents a response rate of 79.7 per cent (51 out of a 
possible 64 respondents). The interviews took place with twelve licensing committee 
chairs, 14 senior licensing officers, nine enforcement officers, and 16 taxi 
representatives.    
 
   It is said that an interview is a conversation with a purpose.
23
 The purpose of the 
interviews in this case was to obtain as much information as possible that would 
verify, amend, refute, explain or expand upon the data already obtained from the 
literature and documentary sources. I wanted to obtain material from a range of 
different viewpoints on how the regulatory system for taxis operated in real life, and 
the thoughts, feelings and beliefs of those most closely associated with the operation 
of the licensing regime. This, I hoped, would build up a picture of how those who had 
to implement, apply and work within the legislative framework viewed some of the 
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 Lincoln and Guba (n18)  252. 
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issues which commonly arose, such as quantitative regulation or various controversial 
enforcement methods, for example test purchasing. The interviews produced a 
considerable amount of relevant data. I was surprised by the variety of views 
expressed by the respondents. Although there were many areas of commonality, each 
respondent had his or her own ideas on particular issues. This helped to produce a rich 
set of materials from which to draw conclusions.  
 
   The interviews were carried out in a variety of locations. In general, interviews with 
all the senior licensing and enforcement officers and some of the committee chairs 
were carried out in offices on council premises. The nature of the offices varied, 
however, from formal interview or meeting rooms in the council’s administrative 
centre, usually the city or town hall, to pre-fabricated offices located within council 
testing depots. Some interviews with committee chairs took place in the very formal 
setting of the council chamber. Other interviews were carried out in much less formal 
locations away from the council’s premises, usually a nearby café or similar 
establishment. Meetings with taxi representatives tended to take place either in taxi 
booking offices, for those representatives who were affiliated to a radio operator, in 
vehicles or outdoors by the side of taxi ranks. In 32 of the interviews, other persons 
were present, but were some distance from the location of the interview and did not 
participate. Whether the location of the interview was formal or informal, interviews 
were all carried out in a space which the respondent would regard as his or her ‘own’ 
or at least represented neutral territory. This helped to put the respondent more at his 
or her ease and made for a more conducive atmosphere than if the location had been 
chosen by me.  
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   All the interviews were conducted in a cordial and convivial atmosphere. The 
respondents were all content to discuss the issues which arose and to provide their 
views on the topics raised in the interview schedule. The schedule questions provided 
useful starting points with which to commence conversations and generally thereafter 
respondents spoke at length on the indicated topic. Further questions only became 
necessary where either the conversation on one point dried up or the respondent raised 
an interesting point which required expansion, explanation or clarification. This meant 
that some of the schedule questions had to be asked in a different order to the one in 
which they appear in the schedule, particularly where respondents raised an issue 
themselves at an early stage in the proceedings. On the whole, respondents gave their 
views around the broad scope of the interview questions, although some occasionally 
went off at a tangent. In such cases, I allowed them to continue before bringing them 
gently back to the main point under discussion. Naturally, some respondents were 
more loquacious than others and required very little prompting; others needed more 
encouragement to share their thoughts and beliefs. On the whole, however, all 
respondents were very cooperative and provided a rich source of data.  
 
   The interviews lasted between 38 minutes and one hour and 15 minutes, with a 
mean average length of 51 minutes. Respondents were asked about the issues raised 
by the literature review and documentary analysis as set out in the interview schedule. 
Some of the questions were suitable only for particular groups of respondents, such as 
the taxi representatives, and so were only asked to that group. Other respondents felt 
that their position and responsibilities within the council meant that they were not able 
to answer certain questions and that a member of another group of respondents may 
be in a more authoritative position to answer that question. However, all respondents 
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were able to provide detailed responses to all of the questions which they felt were 
within their competence. Interviews were conducted under the recognised research 
convention that researchers are free to use the information provided, but neither the 
identity nor the affiliation of the source of the information may be revealed. This 
encourages openness and the sharing of information, and makes the respondent more 
at his or her ease and able to provide honest views. Because of this convention, the 
anonymity of the respondents has to be preserved, and for this reason I have not 
revealed the names of the 16 councils involved in the interview phase of the research. 
 
   With the exception of two interviews, all the conversations were digitally recorded 
as they took place, with the express consent of the respondent. This made for a more 
natural atmosphere within which to conduct the interview, and meant that I could 
listen to what the respondent was saying without having to write notes. All 49 
interviews were then transcribed shortly after they took place. In the case of the two 
exceptions, neither respondent felt able to consent to tape recording of the interview, 
but had no objection to the taking of notes. These interviews were conducted and 
recorded by the use of contemporaneous handwritten notes. These notes were 
transcribed immediately after interview whilst the events were still fresh in my mind 
and the notes still relatively legible. Whilst transcribing the recorded interviews or 
notes, the information was manually coded and subjected to thematic analysis in 
respect of its relevance to the main areas of regulation to elicit findings. So data 
relating to market entry was extrapolated from the remaining material, and the same 
exercise was conducted with material concerning post-entry controls and 
enforcement. The extrapolated material was then subjected to further coding in 
accordance with its relevance to particular issues within these broader categories of 
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regulation. The combined findings from the research are reported in Chapters 4 to 7 of 
the thesis.  
 
e) Some notes of caution    
 
   There are some notes of caution that ought to be sounded about the methodology for 
this research. By its very nature such a survey is subject to certain methodological 
limitations. The study was carried out over a period of 28 months between April 2010 
and August 2012, during which time I analysed the documentary evidence and carried 
out the semi-structured interviews. It is therefore a study of what was happening 
during that period. Some of the findings of the research are time dependent, such as 
the statistics used in relation to numbers of enforcement actions discussed in Chapter 
7. Other material is not so time critical and is of general application for the whole 
period of the study. It must be borne in mind, however, that situations may change, 
and may be changing as the results are being written. Although the nature of 
qualitative research is to obtain evidence on attitudes, opinions and beliefs rather than 
simple facts, even these are subject to change over time. 
 
   As the sample size was quite small in relation to the population of the group studied, 
the findings cannot be claimed as representative of all councils in the country. The 
results of the study present a picture of the approaches and views of those councils 
which took part, but it cannot be assumed that this reflects the views of all the other 
local authorities. However, as I have explained and used the technique of 
proportionate stratification, the councils selected were chosen to be as representative a 
sample as possible in an attempt to gain a picture of what is happening across the 
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country as a whole. This practice may still have some limitations, however, and the 
results should be viewed with this in mind.      
 
   My prior knowledge of the subject might be a possible source of bias.
24
 On the other 
hand, other writers have indicated that some prior involvement may be beneficial.
25
 I 
found that my previous experience as a taxi driver was invaluable in the interviews, 
particularly as this enabled me to establish an instant rapport with my respondents,
26
 
and it helped the conversation to flow without interruption to seek clarification of any 
technical language that was used. Whilst I was aware of the warnings with regard to 
interview data from the literature,
27
 I found all my respondents to be open and co-
operative. I had no reason to doubt that what I was being told was their honest opinion 
or belief.  
 
   Finally, the stages of the study did not follow as linear a progression as this account 
might suggest. Documentary evidence was still being obtained and analysed during 
the early interviews. Additional documents were kindly volunteered by interview 
respondents. New or unexpected information which emerged from the documents or 
interviews led to further searches of the academic literature.   
 
   In this chapter, I have explained the methodology used in the study and some of the 
limitations of that method. In the four chapters which follow, I analyse the theoretical 
models and research questions in the light of the empirical findings of the study.  
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CHAPTER 4: PRE-ENTRY VEHICLE CONTROLS 
 
1) Introduction   
 
   The need to obtain a licence in itself creates a barrier to entry in any occupation
1
 
and so some restriction on entry to the taxi market is inevitable under such a regime. 
The local licensing authorities’ position is encapsulated by one respondent who said,  
 
You can’t have any old Tom, Dick or Harry driving around in some death-trap 
on wheels, especially where the safety of the public is concerned, can you? 
Not every vehicle can be a taxi and not everyone who wants to can become a 
taxi driver. Interview 40, Chair of Licensing Committee.  
 
   In this chapter, I consider why and how vehicle entry to the market is regulated 
through the exercise of both strictly confined and open-ended discretion, and the 
influence which localism plays in decisions to restrict entry. In the rest of this section, 
I examine what local authorities seek to achieve by restricting access to the taxi trade. 
In section 2, I analyse the use of confined discretion in the context of quantitative 
regulation to ascertain whether and how this method achieves the aim of regulating 
entry. In section 3, I look at open-ended discretion and its exercise in the area of 
qualitatively restricted entry. From these results, I draw conclusions not only about 
which method better achieves the aim of restricting entry, but also whether local 
authority discretionary powers and localism are being used to their best advantage. 
 
                                                 
1
 MM Kleiner, Licensing Occupations: Enhancing Quality or Restricting Competition (Upjohn 
Institute, Kalamazoo 2006). 
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   From chapter 1, it will be recalled that one notable feature of the legal framework 
for regulating taxis was the difficulty in identifying any express or implied aim of the 
legislation. A number of possible aims are posited as the goal of regulation. Local 
licensing authorities in practice are unencumbered by such difficulties. They are very 
clear on what they are seeking to achieve, as the following statement illustrates:  
 
Safety of the public, that’s our primary feature that guides all our thinking. 
They are the ones that elect us to do the job and to look after their safety, and 
it’s up to us to ensure we do that to the best of our ability… If everyone could 
guarantee the safety of all passengers all of the time, we probably wouldn’t 
need much regulation. Interview 1, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
   The claim to regulate the trade to protect the public or ensure the safety of the 
public is the one aspect of regulation upon which all 32 councils were in agreement, 
according to their documents. This point was reinforced by all senior licensing 
officers, committee chairs and enforcement officers who participated in interviews. In 
respect of vehicles, this concern is underpinned by a desire to safeguard members of 
the public against taxis which are in an unsafe structural and mechanical condition. 
Typical views on this point were:  
 
[In] my view, the whole point of regulation of taxis is the public safety. The 
person who uses the taxi is often alone, potentially vulnerable. You need to 
make sure that the vehicle they’re [travelling in] is a safe vehicle. So my view 
is that licensing regulation is all about public safety and ensuring…your safety 
throughout. Interview 11, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
As the [licensing] officer, my real concern is to make sure that the taxis are 
safe to be used by the general public throughout the whole of the area. We are 
here to regulate the trade for the public safety. Interview 30, Senior Licensing 
Officer. 
 
I go along with the idea that we are here to enforce standards, standards of 
vehicles that are directly linked to safety of the passengers, because no one 
wants taxis with dodgy brakes, badly worn tyres or where the wheel’s about to 
drop off. Interview 16, Senior Licensing Officer. 
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   What local authorities believe they are trying to achieve is clear enough from these 
interviews. Councils claim to be, and believe that they are, protecting the public by 
regulating entry to the trade. The obvious questions which flow from this claim are: 
how do they go about this task? Do they achieve their stated aim? If the councils are 
not achieving their stated aim, what are they achieving by restricting entry to the 
market? Less obvious questions concern the role of discretion and localism in 
restricting entry. Given that they feature so prominently in the legislation, how do 
discretion and localism influence the methods used by local authorities? Do discretion 
and localism assist in achieving protection of the public?  
   
   It is the legislative framework itself which grants local authorities discretionary 
power and provides for a local system of governance in preference to a national 
system. Quantitative restriction on entry for vehicles is based upon a tightly confined 
and limited discretion. Restriction of entry to vehicles on the basis of their quality, on 
the other hand, is founded upon an open-ended discretion, which is only confined, 
structured and checked (in the sense used by Davis
2) by each local authority’s own 
policies and practices. There is no logical construction underpinning these different 
levels of discretion or explanation why they apply to distinct areas of regulation. The 
different levels of discretion do not in themselves provide any clues as to how they 
are connected to protection of the public. Any such connection, if it exists, has to be 
established by how the discretion at each level is exercised in practice. Localism cuts 
across the two levels of discretion identified here. It is clear from the legislative 
framework that regulation of the taxi trade is designed to be governed locally rather 
                                                 
2
 KC Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Louisiana State University Press, Baton 
Rouge 1969) 52.   
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than simply being the local administration of centrally determined policies. In this 
context, localism involves the question of government by locally elected officials, 
rather than central government, and the local variations in requirements. Therefore, as 
Leigh points out, discretion and localism are inextricably linked
3
 and enjoy a 
symbiotic relationship. Local authorities are granted discretion and in exercising that 
discretion produce local variations influenced by factors in their own local sphere. In 
the rest of this chapter, I consider how discretion and localism combine to regulate 
entry to the taxi market through analysis of the two different levels of discretion.  
 
2) Confined discretion: quantitative restriction of vehicle entry  
   
   The most straightforward method of regulating entry to any market is to impose a 
numerical limit on the number of entrants. Such a method is not favoured by central 
government under its current ‘open-market’ ethos. The model of market entry 
preferred by central government, at least since the passing of the Transport Act 1985, 
has been one based on the interacting economic forces of supply and demand, with no 
other restrictions on entry.
4
 The Department for Transport has made it clear to all 
local authorities that ‘the government considers that, unless a specific case can be 
made, it is not in the interests of consumers for market entry to be refused to those 
who meet the application criteria.’5  
 
   In chapter 1, I described the historical discretionary power of local authorities to 
limit the numbers of vehicle licences granted and how this power is now severely 
                                                 
3
 I Leigh, ‘The Changing Nature of Local and Regional Democracy’ in Jowell J and Oliver D (eds), 
The Changing Constitution (7
th
 edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011) 239-240. 
4
 Department for Transport, Taxi and Private Hire Vehicle Licensing: Best Practice Guidance (HMSO, 
London, March 2010). 
5
 Department for Transport, ‘Letter to Chief Executives of Local Authorities’ 16th June 2004. 
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restricted by the provisions of section 16 of the Transport Act 1985. In accordance 
with central government’s belief in market forces as the appropriate model for 
restricting entry, the effect of section 16 is to transform the exercise of the local 
authorities’ powers from what was previously a wide discretionary power to a very 
confined exercise of discretion. Although the discretion to restrict numbers survives 
the amendment introduced by section 16, it may now be exercised only where the 
licensing authority can satisfy itself that there is no significant unmet demand for taxi 
services in its area.  
 
   The question of imposing quantitative limits on the numbers of taxi licences granted 
is the most controversial issue which divides regulators and the trade today. Some of 
the theoretical approaches to this issue of quantitative regulation, both generally and 
specifically to the taxi trade, were considered in chapter 2. There are equally divided 
opinions on the issue amongst councils, although they do not necessarily coincide 
with the arguments contained in the literature. In this section, I examine the debate 
surrounding the exercise of local authority discretion to limit the numbers of licences 
by analysing the reasons why those councils which restrict numbers do so, why those 
which do not decline to do so, and which approach better serves the aim of regulation.  
 
a) Why exercise the discretion to limit numbers? 
 
   The amended legislation created a situation in which it became very difficult for 
local authorities to limit the number of taxi licences they granted.
6
 In order to restrict 
numbers, local authorities have to be able to demonstrate that there is no significant 
                                                 
6
 C Walker and I Cram, ‘Taxi Deregulation and the Courts’ (1991) 20 Anglo-American Law Review 
482.   
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unmet demand for hackney carriage services in their area. There is evidence that 
councils have received legal advice to the effect that they must grant licences unless 
they can prove there is no significant unmet demand.
7
 It should also be borne in mind 
that, because the power to grant licences is discretionary, councils are not obliged to 
limit the numbers of licences even where there is no significant unmet demand. There 
are examples of councils electing not to limit numbers, even where an absence of 
significant unmet demand can be proved. 
8
 Strictly speaking, the exercise of discretion 
is in choosing whether to impose a limit having first established the qualifying 
condition of no significant unmet demand. However, the findings of this study show 
that councils do not approach the decision in that way.  
 
   Although it is the area of most restricted discretion, it is the one area where local 
control and knowledge would be invaluable. When it comes to regulation of entry, 
awareness of local needs and demands would be useful and relevant in assessing the 
number of taxis required to meet those needs and demands. Clearly the number of 
taxis and drivers needed in Birmingham or Bristol is considerably larger than in a 
small rural area like Flintshire or Fenland. The local council is in the best position to 
judge how many vehicles are needed to meet local demand and whether a limit should 
be placed on the number of licences granted. One chair of a licensing committee said:  
 
We as a regulatory committee take the view that we can continue to regulate 
numbers by having regard to the peaks and troughs of demand provided that 
overall unmet demand is not considered significant. We decide what is a 
significant amount of unmet demand for this area based on surveys and other 
                                                 
7
 North East Lincolnshire Council, ‘Report of Executive Director of Community Services to 
Community Protection Committee’ 15th March 2010. This advice is based on the interpretation of 
section 16 preferred by the court in Egan, discussed in chapter 1 section 3b).  
8
 Gloucester City Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting Licensing and Enforcement Committee’ 16th 
November 2010; Worcester City Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting Licensing Committee’ 10th March 
2011. 
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information we receive, such as lengths of queues at taxi ranks. Interview 40, 
Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
However, in the case of vehicles, the local authority is only able to limit numbers 
within the restricted discretion provided for by the statute.  
 
   Interpretation of the phrase ‘significant unmet demand’ was initially left to local 
authorities, but it is now widely accepted that significant unmet demand has to be 
established on the basis of an expert survey.
9
  This further restricts the circumstances 
in which local authorities may exercise their discretion to limit numbers, as obtaining 
the necessary survey is both time-consuming and expensive.
10
 Although councils set 
great store by the surveys carried out on their behalf, it is clear that they also take into 
account other local factors. In so doing, councils attempt to strike a balance between 
the needs of the public and the trade, as the following example illustrates:  
 
I know that the police sometimes say that we could do with more taxis on 
Friday and Saturday nights, but you can’t cater for peak demand on a busy 
Friday or Saturday night, leaving taxis with nothing to do for the rest of the 
week. The streets just get more congested with taxis sitting about doing no 
work. Interview 14, Chair of Licensing Committee.  
 
   The academic literature in support of quantitative regulation of the trade endorses 
the restriction of entry on the basis that such regulation maintains the supply of taxis, 
driver incomes, quality standards and enforcement costs within reasonable 
boundaries.
11
 These arguments correspond with a range of different legislative aims, 
as discussed in chapter 2, not necessarily the protection of the public aim claimed by 
                                                 
9
, R(North Devon HCOA) v North Devon District Council [1999] EWHC 503 (Admin). 
10
 The councils which took part in this study estimated the cost of demand surveys at between £18,000 
and £30,000.  
11
 JP Toner, ‘English Experience of Deregulation of the Taxi Industry’ (1996) 16(1) Transport Reviews 
79, 83. 
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local authorities. Those who argue against removal of numerical limits claim that this 
is an issue of public safety because falling incomes result in poorly maintained and 
serviced vehicles and drivers working longer hours.
12
 The trade unanimously takes the 
view that deregulating numbers is detrimental to public protection and safety. Two 
taxi representatives said:  
 
There are just too many drivers competing for customers. Livelihoods are at 
risk - they can’t afford to maintain their vehicles properly. You see them 
driving around with bald tyres and all sorts. It’s a question of passenger safety. 
Interview 34, Taxi Representative. 
 
Rising competition caused by deregulation is leading to fewer fares and 
forcing drivers to work longer hours and encouraging poor conduct at the 
ranks. Interview 4, Taxi Representative. 
 
   Eight of the 32 councils (25 per cent) imposed a maximum number of licences for 
hackney carriages throughout the whole or parts of their area. From the documentary 
evidence, the councils justify retaining numerical thresholds by reference to the 
negative aspects of removing the limits rather than on the positive aspects of imposing 
them. Explanations such as increased traffic congestion, reduced income for drivers, 
and reduced quality of vehicles, frequently appear amongst council documents as 
justification for retaining numerical regulation.
13
 More unusual suggestions for having 
a numerical limit on the number of taxi licences include that the removal of limits 
might attract organized crime to the trade as a cover for money laundering.
14
 With the 
exception of vehicle quality issues, none of these justifications has any obvious public 
protection implications. Nor do they particularly reflect local concerns.  
                                                 
12
 Transport Committee, ‘The Regulation of Taxis and Private Hire Vehicle Services in the UK’ HC 
(2003-04) 251-I. These arguments were canvassed in more detail in chapter 2 section 2b). 
13
 Cornwall Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting Miscellaneous Licensing Committee’ 5th November 2010 
[MLC/124] as one example. 
14
 Newcastle City Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting Licensing Regulatory Committee’ 19th May 2010 
[6.3]. 
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   From the interview materials, the reasons given for having numerical controls are 
more limited, but are no clearer on how they involve local needs or seek to achieve 
the aim of the legislation. Councils which retain quantitative restrictions justify doing 
so on the grounds that this has always been the position historically and regulation is 
designed to deal with concerns about congestion and public disorder. One licensing 
officer took the view that:  
 
Historically I suppose you look back to the Town Police Clauses Act where 
you had lots and lots of cabs, didn’t you, and they needed to be regulated 
because some bad practices were going on, and that’s the history of regulation 
of taxis. Interview 32, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
   Another respondent recalled the experience, albeit some years ago, in a different 
city from the one in which he now chaired the licensing committee:  
 
We went through a period of taxi wars because there were too many taxis in 
the city, and there quite literally was violence and mayhem with cabs being set 
on fire, turned over in the street. That’s what happens in an open market. It 
was regulated but it became unregulated by sheer volume and unless you keep 
a very close eye on it, it can become ‘interesting’. Interview 44, Chair of 
Licensing Committee. 
 
   The decisions of councils based upon historical perspectives echo the views of 
writers who claim that increasing insistence on local control over local environments 
reflects urban disorder generally.
15
 Although such concerns are important and are 
better dealt with at a local level than a national one, any disorder resulting from an 
oversupply of taxis is likely to be confined within the trade. The public need to be 
protected from the collateral consequences of such oversupply, such as congested 
                                                 
15
 RC Schragger, ‘The Limits of Localism’ (2001) 100 Michigan Law Review 371, 380. 
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streets or poor driving practices in order to maximize journey numbers, but such 
effects do not represent a direct threat to public safety.  
 
   In fact, it is the impact on the trade that plays a major role in the decisions made by 
councils which retain quantitative regulation. As was seen in chapter 2, supporters of 
a deregulated market argue that it is the trade itself, rather than the public, which 
benefits most from restrictions on entry. Although there is no evidence that councils 
decide to limit numbers purely for the benefit of the trade, there is some suggestion 
that councils may be heavily influenced by the trade in retaining quantitative 
regulation. The importance of the economic interests of the trade in the decision to 
regulate numbers of vehicles is illustrated by the following statements from three of 
the respondents: 
 
It’s historic, and I think once it’s established you then have the vested interest 
of the hackney carriage trade who have paid to enter the trade and obviously 
that makes it harder to change…But you have to have a happy medium to stop 
the market being flooded. Interview 16, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
[Limiting numbers is] beneficial to the taxi community because as soon as the 
unmet needs study starts being mentioned, they all get very nervous because 
they’re convinced we’re going to double the number of licences and they’ll all 
be earning half what they need to earn. Interview 14, Chair of Licensing 
Committee.  
 
[Trade representatives] approached, on a number of occasions, the committee 
or the committee chair, who was not minded to change their policy. In the end 
they went to their MP. They decided they wanted an unmet demand survey. 
Essentially, the survey was done at the behest of the trade. The trade felt that 
there were too many vehicles and the survey said that there were. Interview 
20, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
   In the last example, it may be argued that the trade’s position was vindicated in that 
the demand evaluation confirmed the existence of the statutory grounds for exercise 
of the council’s discretion to limit numbers. However, it is the council’s discretion to 
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exercise, not that of the trade. Nevertheless, this last statement highlights that councils 
consider the effect that their decisions will have on the trade as one factor in deciding 
whether to exercise the discretion, once the qualifying condition has been met. 
 
   By limiting the number of taxi licences granted, local authorities are aware that they 
are acting against central government advice and open market ethos. Notwithstanding 
these difficulties, licensing authorities continue to restrict entry in this way because 
they consider, whether under the influence of the trade or not, that such an approach is 
beneficial for their area. One respondent emphasized the local context of the decision 
when they said: 
 
Well, it’s obviously against the government guidelines, it’s against the OFT 
recommendations, it’s against EU recommendations. It’s against practically 
everything, isn’t it? When the trade protested, we had a survey which 
recommended we continue with managed growth, but [the full council] 
decided that the best thing to do was to re-limit the numbers. Interview 32, 
Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
   I conclude from this information that councils which decide to exercise their 
discretion to restrict vehicle entry by imposing a numerical limit justify their choice 
largely by reference to ideas of congestion management and the perceived problems 
of oversupply. Such problems provided the background to the original statutory 
intervention in 1847. In doing so, they are addressing problems which vary according 
to locality and which may be of concern to local citizens. However, it is difficult to 
identify any direct public protection issue which is addressed by quantitative 
regulation, and councils do not lay any claim to be doing so.  
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b) Why decline to exercise the discretion? 
   
   Is the position any different for the 24 councils which do not regulate their taxi 
licence numbers? The point to be borne in mind is that, so far as limiting numbers is 
concerned, there is no discretion. The underlying presumption is that no applicant will 
be refused on the grounds that a quota has been reached. Advocates of removal of 
entry limits argue that it produces more taxis, reduces waiting times for passengers, 
lowers fares, reduces administrative costs, and prevents excessive prices being 
demanded upon transfer of existing licences.
16
 Again, it is questionable how far any 
of these objectives are directly connected to the aim of protecting the public. 
Supporters of deregulation claim that reduced waiting times mean that vulnerable 
passengers are not left standing for long periods of time awaiting the arrival of the 
next taxi.
17
 In my view, however, this it is several steps removed from the methods 
used to achieve the stated aim of regulation.   
 
   With the exception of the economic argument of preventing excessive price 
demands on the transfer of licences, none of the theoretical arguments are used by 
councils to justify their deregulatory stance. The main reason for not imposing a limit 
on the number of licences granted is that the council supports the open market ethos 
of central government used to underpin the empowering legislation and the 
government’s guidelines on best practice. This justification appears in the 
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 LA Harris, ‘Taxicab Economics: The Freedom to Contract for a Ride’ (2002) 1(1) Georgetown 
Journal of Law and Public Policy 195. 
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 Office of Fair Trading, ‘The Regulation of Licensed Taxi and PHV Services in the UK’ (OFT, 
London, November 2003).   
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documentary evidence from councils
18
 and was reinforced by some of the views 
expressed in interview. 
  
We thought, on balance, that we ought to deregulate. There was the report 
from the Office of Fair Trading. We had had a limit on prior to that and we 
took it off following the recommendations in that report and the government 
advice that followed. Interview 27, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
On entry control, it’s a free market, supply and demand. The market usually 
settles the number of taxi licences. Our numbers have been pretty stable over 
the last few years, so I think we’ve reached the optimum number the market 
will stand. Interview 10, Enforcement Officer.  
 
Historically we’ve never controlled. Until recently there’s never been an issue. 
I think it’s fair to say that a few years ago the passengers were fighting each 
other for taxis, but more recently it’s the taxi drivers fighting each other for 
fares …There is this fine balance between numbers. Now it’s the view of this 
council that it’s not our place to start regulating numbers, it’s a free market 
economy. Interview 45, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
   It is clear from these statements that councils which choose not to impose 
quantitative regulation still appreciate the need to limit numbers and the potential 
public order implications of not achieving the appropriate balance. However, in those 
areas where there is no predetermined limit on the number of taxi licences, the council 
places its faith in market forces to achieve the necessary balance without any local 
authority intervention.  
   The main concern of councils which do not impose numerical limits is to avoid 
what they see as the primary disadvantage of regulating market entry by fixed 
numbers, namely that quantitative regulation creates monopoly rents reflected in large 
monetary values being placed on vehicle licences.
19
 Two of the respondents 
highlighted this point:    
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 For example, Bristol City Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting Public Safety and Protection Committee’ 
12
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 November 2007. 
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 SD Barrett, ‘The Sustained Impacts of Taxi Deregulation’ (2010) 30(1) Economic Affairs 61.  
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I know that there are some authorities that restrict the number of hackney 
carriages, and then a hackney carriage plate can go for ridiculous amounts of 
money because people are on waiting lists. But I think it should be dealt with 
by market forces. Interview 42, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
As soon as you restrict numbers you create difficulties, because if you want to 
get into the taxi trade and you can’t get a taxi because the council won’t issue 
any more licences, you then become prey to the rogue traders. We know what 
happens, we restricted numbers for over 20 years…this black economy, with 
plates being passed around for huge sums. You don’t need it. Interview 8, 
Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
   However, this reasoning fails to take into account the argument that high monetary 
values placed on vehicle licences represent a significant financial commitment by the 
licence holder to the trade. No licence holder will want to risk losing such a 
substantial investment by trading in a manner which jeopardizes his or her licence.
20
 
More importantly, it is not part of the local authority’s function to regulate the price 
for which licence plates change hands. Even if licence holders are making ‘excessive’ 
profits on the sale of their plates, it is not clear how preventing them from doing so 
advances the aim of protecting the public. 
 
   By the same token, the argument that quantitative regulation protects the interests of 
the trade, leaving the limitation of taxi numbers to the open market, has been 
criticized as protecting the financial interests of the licensing authorities. There are 
suggestions that authorities which do not regulate entry regard licensing as a ‘cash 
cow’,21 and there is, unsurprisingly, some support for this point of view amongst the 
trade. One taxi representative said: 
 
                                                 
20
 EC Gallick and DE Sisk’ ‘Reconsideration of Taxi Regulation’ (1987) 3 Journal of Law, Economics 
and Organization 117, 123. 
21
 Law Commission Advisory Group on Taxi and PHV Regulation, ‘Minutes of Meeting’ 22nd 
November 2011 [7] (J Button). 
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The fees keep going up, but I’m not sure what we are getting out of it. All we 
seem to get in return is a load of hassle and stupid rule changes. The council is 
doing very well out of us taxi drivers. Interview 36, Taxi Representative. 
   
   Councils, of course, dispute any suggestion that they are acting unlawfully or 
inappropriately. One senior licensing officer specifically made the point that,  
 
the purpose of licensing…is not to make money; that would be illegal. 
Interview 32, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
   However, it is clear from the documentary evidence that all councils which consider 
the issue of quantitative regulation mention that a consequence of regulating is the 
loss of income from reduced numbers of licence fees. Restriction of numbers reduces 
incomes generated by licence fees, and deregulating brings increased fee incomes. 
Increased revenue and avoidance of the costs of a survey every three years are factors 
cited for retaining a deregulated market.
22
  
 
   While, in interview, no participant admitted that loss of income from reduced 
numbers of licence fees was a factor in their decision to limit numbers, the effect of 
regulation on fee income was a matter of concern. This unease related to the impact of 
reduced fee income on the service provided by the council or the use to which 
increased income from more vehicles would be put. Two of the respondents expressed 
these worries as follows: 
 
What hasn’t helped from our point of view is that [limiting numbers] has 
reduced income. Now there’s nowhere near the new applicants we were 
getting. There’s still important work to be done and the cost of the service is 
covered by the fees. We’re trying to improve things, but it all costs money and 
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without a fee rise, the income has dropped. Interview 20, Senior Licensing 
Officer. 
 
If they kept staff levels as they are now then, we’re busy enough as we are 
now, it would be undoable really. But if you’ve got another 800 licences, those 
fees must be paid in providing a service, but a lot of councils they use it as a 
revenue collecting service, and it’s wrong. They should not be doing that. It all 
just goes in the pot. Interview 32, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
   Councils which decide not to regulate numbers of taxis by imposing a specific 
numerical limit still appreciate the need to control numbers to prevent congestion and 
oversupply. The difference between these councils and those which do impose 
numerical limits is that the former have faith in market forces to set the appropriate 
levels rather than have an ‘artificial’ limit set by the council. Justification for not 
exercising their discretion is found in an appeal to the ethos of the open market rather 
than the lessons of history. However, such a justification does not address the 
question of how restriction on the basis of market forces better protects the safety of 
the public than fixing a numerical limit.     
 
c) To exercise discretion or not to exercise discretion? 
   
Councils which adopt a policy of relying upon the open market to determine the 
appropriate number of licences firmly believe that their approach is the correct one 
and should be adopted by all other licensing authorities. One respondent’s view was 
very forthright:  
 
You wouldn’t have a policy to say you can only have 500 butchers. It just 
doesn’t stack up, it’s archaic. And it’s a shame really the government didn’t 
take on board the OFT recommendations a few years back. Interview 8, Senior 
Licensing Officer. 
 
 119 
   On the other side of the debate, councils which have a policy of quantitative 
regulation are not as enthusiastic in support of their position, and some of them are 
undecided on the subject, as the following statement indicates: 
 
I actually sit on the fence here a bit really. Part of me thinks the trade do 
actually have a point that oversubscription to taxis [means] the public don’t 
get such a good service. On the other hand, someone that wants to come into 
the trade as a hackney carriage operator, they have to wait for somebody to 
retire or drop out of the system. Interview 30, Senior Licensing Officer.   
 
   Viewed from a localism perspective, there is some evidence that both sides of the 
quantitative or open market debate could be right in that their decision on whether to 
limit numbers is the correct one for their area. An analysis of the size and nature of 
each council’s area supports a relationship between locality and a propensity for 
quantitative regulation. The more populated urban areas are more inclined to restrict 
numbers than the less densely populated rural ones. Councils in larger cities, such as 
Birmingham and Newcastle, favour restricted numbers of taxis, although their fleets 
are already quite large. In the smaller rural areas, such as Fenland or Mid-Devon, the 
councils have not exercised their discretion to limit numbers, and they have relatively 
small numbers of licensed vehicles. There is also some support for such a link in the 
interview data:    
 
In my experience the only authorities that do licence [taxi numbers] are in the 
bigger Mets, where potentially, if you didn’t regulate, there would be so many 
taxis you’d never get around the town. Interview 45, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
The removal of the limits on numbers just revolutionized things here in [this 
area]. Here the sale of taxis is much more reliant on market forces. The trade 
are more spread out here because [this area] is huge with lots of smaller towns 
and villages. I think that really makes a difference. Interview 23, Chair of 
Licensing Committee.  
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The one thing that I would like to see, and I’ll possibly be shot down by my 
colleagues here, I would like to see the number of cab licences issued related 
to the size of the population of the authority, because at the moment we’ve got 
a situation where we’ve got too many people chasing too little trade, all of 
them suffering and all of them taking chances. Interview 6, Senior Licensing 
Officer.  
 
   Despite these views, the evidence for such a relationship is inconclusive. The 
suggestion of a link between size of fleets and a preference for limiting numbers is 
contradicted by evidence from other areas. Bristol, for example, is a large city with a 
high number of licensed vehicles but does not regulate numbers. Lancaster, on the 
other hand, is a relatively small city with a low number of vehicles but retains limits. 
 
   It is difficult to assess which is the better approach in terms of its impact in practice. 
One point upon which all 16 taxi representatives who participated in the study agreed, 
whether their local council limited numbers or not, was that there were too many 
taxis. The trade invariably blamed the local authority for this state of affairs, either for 
not limiting numbers or for setting the limit on numbers at too high a figure. 
However, the difficulty from the local authority’s point of view is that the exercise of 
discretion is confined by the notion of ‘significant unmet demand’. This is a vague 
concept in itself, but ‘demand’ is not the only factor at play in determining taxi usage. 
Koehler makes the point that current legislative requirements focus entirely on 
demand and overlook the factors affecting the supply side of the economic balance.
23
  
The state of the economy, both generally and locally, is a major factor, as is the nature 
of the locality and the local ‘taxi culture’. This point is illustrated by the following 
comments from four of the respondents: 
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The trade will always complain. They think that the limit is set too high. 
Maybe it is, maybe it isn’t, but they don’t seem to appreciate that people just 
don’t have the money to go out like they used to, and that’s why business is 
bad. Interview 20, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
After we took the decision to deregulate, there was a big upsurge in demand 
for new taxi licences in the first few months. It’s starting to drop again now 
though because of the economy. People round here just aren’t using taxis like 
they used to. Interview 27, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
We don’t have a vibrant night-time economy like [a neighbouring area]. Our 
one and only nightclub closed down last year, so there’s no real late night 
business for the taxis here. People go to [the neighbouring area] if they want 
that kind of excitement. Interview 24, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
[This area] has never been a real taxi city as such. If you go to [a neighbouring 
area], they’ll get a taxi to the end of the street there. That just doesn’t happen 
in [this area], never has done. Interview 44, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
   The point is that only the local authority can know the level of demand for taxis in 
its area and what level of supply its taxi market is capable of sustaining. This is bound 
to vary depending upon the location. It is ironic that the method of restricting market 
entry that would benefit the most from local choice is the one in which use of locally 
exercisable discretion is most closely confined. Local authorities should be permitted 
the discretion to limit numbers or not depending upon local knowledge and local 
needs. 
 
d) Conclusions on confined discretion 
   
   Deciding between restricting market entry by quantitative regulation and relying on 
market forces is not easy to resolve. It has been discussed both by academics and 
those involved in the trade for many years and is likely to continue to be contentious 
for many more. There is some common ground in that both supporters and opponents 
of quantitative regulation appreciate that, without some limits to entry, there is likely 
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to be disorder and general poor behaviour and practices within the trade. The real 
debate revolves around whether a local authority imposed limit or the interaction of 
market forces is the better instrument to resolve such potential disorder. However, 
when this debate comes down to the issue of whether local authorities should exercise 
their discretion to limit numbers, councils see the function of restricting entry as 
managing actual or potential disorder within the trade. The general public is unlikely 
to be directly involved in any such control issues although there may be some indirect 
impact.  
 
   No council, whether it regulates numbers or not, attempts to justify its position on 
the basis that its approach better protects the public. Appeals to history, suggestions of 
trade capture, support for an open market ethos and suggestions of acting in the 
financial interests of the regulators themselves, all present interesting perspectives, 
but none of them addresses the fundamental question of how restricting market entry 
in this way achieves the stated aim of regulation. Furthermore, there is a strong case 
that use of quantitative regulation is something which can be best decided at a local 
level, taking into account the nature of the locality and local concerns and needs. It is 
unfortunate that the scope for localism is at its most restricted in this area. Although 
there is some limited evidence that councils take other factors into account in 
exercising their discretion, on the whole they feel bound by considerations which 
focus on the economic concept of demand. It is not clear how confining the use of 
discretion to limit numbers within such narrow boundaries, defined purely by the 
vague concept of ‘significant unmet demand’, helps to further the protection of the 
public.  
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   Overall, therefore, I have concluded that restricting market entry by permitting a 
fixed limit on numbers of licences issued to be imposed at the local authority’s 
discretion only in very restrictive circumstances does not achieve public protection. 
But, the alternative open market policy does not do so either. Regulating entry purely 
on the basis of numerical limits, whether determined by the regulators or left to 
market forces, protects certain economic interests. But it does not address in any 
meaningful way the protection of the public.   
 
3) Open-ended discretion: Qualitative restriction of vehicle entry 
   
   If the very restricted exercise of discretion does not achieve the regulatory aim, is 
the opposite way of exercising discretion in relation to qualitative restriction more 
effective in attaining that aim? The general power to grant licences to vehicles is 
expressed in open-ended discretionary terms. The operative words ‘may… licence to 
ply for hire’ contained in section 37 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 indicate 
that local authorities have a wide discretion to grant vehicle licences without any pre-
qualifying conditions or restrictions on the exercise of that discretion.
24
 
 
   In this section, I consider the following three issues concerning regulation of entry 
to the market of vehicles by the use of quality control. The first is whether local 
authorities control entry on the grounds of quality in practice, given the questionable 
lawfulness of so doing. Second, assuming that they restrict entry on this basis, I 
examine the methods by which councils regulate entry on the ground of quality and 
the extent to which local issues are influential in the choice and implementation of 
                                                 
24
 In contrast to the position with regard to private hire vehicles, where licences can be granted only to 
vehicles considered suitable in terms of type, size, design, mechanical condition, safety and comfort - 
Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s 48(1). 
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such methods. The third issue is whether quality can be the only basis for restricting 
vehicle entry to the market or whether local authorities may exercise their discretion 
on other grounds. 
 
a) Do councils restrict entry on the grounds of quality?  
     
Aside from unmet demand, the wording of section 37 of the Town Police Clauses Act 
1847 suggests that local authorities have wide discretion to grant licences to vehicles 
as they wish. It will be recalled that there are conflicting court authorities on whether 
councils have the power to restrict entry on the ground of quality at all.
25
 Whilst these 
arguments may not have been satisfactorily resolved in judicial circles, they do not 
cause any practical concerns for local authorities. Councils believe that they retain 
discretion to refuse to grant a licence for any reason, particularly in relation to the 
quality of the vehicle, and apply that belief in carrying out their regulatory functions. 
The confidence of local authorities in their power to regulate as they see fit is 
illustrated by the following comments:  
 
We’re here to make sure that any vehicles that want to be put on as taxis are 
suitable and safe. If they are not suitable and they don’t measure up to the job, 
then they don’t get in. It’s as simple as that. Interview 35, Senior Licensing 
Officer.  
 
We know there are rules to be followed, but we are not legal experts, or taxi 
experts if it comes to it…We have to decide whether a vehicle is suitable for 
use as a taxi. We try to come to a fair decision in accordance with our policies 
and common sense. But we rely on the opinions of others when it comes to 
technical issues. Interview 21, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
 We are there to make decisions for the benefit of the people of [this area], and 
we make the decisions about whether our vehicles are up to standard…what 
people expect when they get into a taxi. If someone wants to use a particular 
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vehicle as a taxi, it has to be up to the mark. Interview 14, Chair of Licensing 
Committee.  
 
 
   These views indicate that councils are concerned about the quality of vehicles that 
they are asked to licence, and they are prepared to place a pragmatic interpretation on 
the scope of their powers in order to address those concerns. Councils take for granted 
that they have the discretion to regulate entry to the market on the basis of quality 
standards, even if the legal basis for that presumption is contentious. Councils are 
aware that the practical effect of a policy of quality control is that there will be fewer 
applicants for licences, as not every proprietor will have the ability or the inclination 
to ensure that his or her vehicle meets the quality standards. Thus, quality control is 
used as a means of limiting numbers, with or without evidence of an absence of 
significant unmet demand. This is clear from the following statements from three of 
the respondents:     
 
We here in [this authority] take the view that any limit on numbers should be 
achieved by a quality control policy rather than a restriction on numbers. 
Interview 11, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
One method of indirectly limiting [entry] although that’s not the reason for 
doing it…is obviously to improve the standards. If you make the entry 
requirements higher in terms of improved vehicle quality, then less people are 
going to come in. Interview 20, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
If someone wants to put a completely new vehicle on now, we have 
completely disabled accessible [requirements], but of course that puts a certain 
amount of people off applying because those type of vehicles are more 
expensive than your average family saloon. Interview 27, Senior Licensing 
Officer.  
 
   Licensing authorities are not provided with any guidance on how to exercise their 
discretion. The literature on discretionary powers points out that open textured 
discretion operating without any boundaries or structure is ‘likely to morph into 
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arbitrariness, permitting any action or inaction.’26 Given the absence of any other 
direction, councils cannot be criticised for developing their own policies to assist in 
the exercise of their discretion. Indeed, it is imperative that they be encouraged to 
develop such policies to avoid suggestions of arbitrary decision making.
27
  
 
   All 32 local authorities, including the eight which impose quantitative restrictions, 
have developed policies, guidelines and practices with regard to quality standards they 
apply to vehicles in order to guide their exercise of discretion to grant vehicle 
licences. Eight of the councils in the study make it clear that they have taken a 
positive decision to adopt a policy of quality control, rather than quantitative 
restrictions, to control entry to the market. Two licensing officers said: 
 
We’ve taken the view here to move away from restricting the number of 
hackney carriage licences that we issue. We replaced numerical control with 
quality control, so that for any new hackney carriage we set a quite high 
vehicle standard, and they must be fully compliant. Interview 8, Senior 
Licensing Officer.   
 
We wanted to move towards quality control rather than go for quantity 
regulation. The members declined to order a survey of demand and went for 
quality control instead. Interview 2, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
  Councils clearly believe that they have the power to control entry on the basis of 
vehicle quality and have developed policies to structure their discretion in exercising 
this power. In the next sub-section, I consider how this translates into practical control 
of quality.  
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b) The application of quality standards 
   
   Although all councils are consistent in having a policy on quality regulation, there 
are wide variations in the detail of the quality standards applied.
28
 I examine how 
these different standards are applied to confine and structure discretion, and the 
influence of localism, in respect of each criterion. All 32 councils have some form of 
standard specifications that apply to all vehicles seeking a licence. The level of 
complexity and detail in such specifications varies between the different councils. 
Written specifications range in size from two sides of A4 paper
29
 to a 20 page 
document containing much technical detail,
30
 with every permutation in between. 
Commonly, however, vehicle specifications lay down either precise or general 
requirements relating to such matters as external or internal dimensions of the 
vehicles, numbers and lay out of seats, numbers of doors, construction and appearance 
of the vehicle, and basic safety equipment such as fire extinguishers, first aid kits, or a 
functioning spare wheel and jack. Although vehicle specifications vary in their detail, 
they all have one feature in common – they generate a set of rules with which vehicles 
applying for a licence must comply before a licence may be granted. Vehicles which 
meet the specifications are usually granted a licence; those which do not are normally 
refused. This means that the exercise of local authority discretion is strictly confined 
to the choice of the requirements to be included in the specifications or the choice of 
whether to depart from the specifications in an individual case as an exception to the 
general rule. 
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 Newcastle upon Tyne City Council, ‘Hackney Carriage Licensing: Testing and Inspection Guidance’ 
undated.  
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   In the case of one of the councils, Birmingham City Council, the discretion to grant 
a licence is more limited than in the other authorities. This is because Birmingham 
City Council grants licences only to specified makes and models of vehicle. The list 
of approved vehicles runs to 23 makes and models, but the only element of discretion 
is the choice of which vehicles appear on the list. If a particular make or model is not 
an approved vehicle, then no licence will be granted. Where a vehicle is listed as an 
approved vehicle, then the grant of a licence is dependent upon it fulfilling the other 
quality criteria in the Council’s specifications. Such an arrangement is a manifestation 
of localism in that it is contrary to central government advice
31
 and is claimed to be a 
‘long established practice in Birmingham’.32 There is recent authority from Scotland 
which indicates that there is nothing unlawful in maintaining a list of approved types 
of vehicle.
33
 There is no indication, however, in the case of Birmingham, why the 
vehicles on the list are considered more appropriate or desirable than other makes and 
models or how such an arrangement addresses local needs and demands. Whilst other 
councils do not replace discretion with rules quite so restrictively as Birmingham, 
some, such as Carlisle and Great Yarmouth, require their licensed vehicles to match a 
generic description, such as ‘London Cab Type Vehicle’.34 Only certain vehicles can 
comply with such a specification and so, by definition, the number of such vehicles 
must be limited. 
 
   The remaining councils do not limit their licensing power to particular makes or 
models of vehicles, but they nonetheless create their own set of rules, with which 
                                                 
31
 Department for Transport: Best Practice Guidance (n 4) [27-28]. 
32
 Birmingham City Council, ‘Report of Director of Regulatory Services to Licensing Committee’ 10 th 
June 2010 [4.1.1].  
33
 Re Spring Radio Cars Ltd, Petitioner [2013] CSOH 15; 2013 SLT 491. 
34
 Carlisle City Council, ‘Hackney Carriage Specifications’ (1st August 2007); Great Yarmouth 
Borough Council, ‘Hackney Carriage and Landau Licence Conditions’ (August 2009).  
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applicant vehicles must comply, by setting vehicle specifications which take the 
nature of their locality into account. Certain vehicles, such as limousines, traditional 
‘London’ style taxis and those based on motorcycles, are considered to be unsuitable 
by many councils to deal with local road conditions and the needs of particular 
passengers. Nonetheless, local authorities like to retain the flexibility to deal with 
developing vehicle technology that not specifying particular makes and models 
permits. These points are illustrated by the following statements from respondents: 
 
You have to bear in mind that we are a fairly rural area and have a lot of 
elderly people who are not as mobile as they used to be. With the best will in 
the world, the buses are not great, so many of them rely on taxis to get about. 
Some of these vehicles might not be suitable for the passengers or the roads 
they encounter. Interview 1, Chair of Licensing Committee.  
 
We don’t insist on our hackney carriages being a particular type of vehicle 
because it’s a big geographical area. It’s not like in London where taxis are 
generally going relatively short distances. It’s predominantly rural, and so it 
wouldn’t suit necessarily [London] hackney carriages. There’s a lot of places 
[large vehicles] just couldn’t go and if [the driver] got the vehicle stuck down 
a lane, he’d never get it out again. Interview 27, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
We don’t have a set policy on what vehicles will be allowed. We’ve got 
guidelines on it, but technology is changing so much, vehicle sizes are 
changing so much, if we said we will only allow these, they may not be 
suitable. We won’t allow tuk-tuks [which] may be suitable in Bangkok, but 
not suitable for this area. Interview 3, Enforcement Officer.  
 
   The types of vehicle licensed, and the requirements which such vehicles are 
expected to meet, have obvious safety implications, particularly those aspects of the 
specifications which relate to the construction and mechanical condition of the 
vehicle. Local authorities devise rules about the types and specifications of vehicle to 
which they are willing to grant licences, rather than simply having an open-ended 
invitation to any form or make of vehicle. This results in vehicle specifications which 
vary from one area to another. While councils link the nature of their localities to the 
 130 
policies they devise, they fail to address why those policies are needed for that area. 
Particular types of passengers, roads or terrain are not unique to one council’s area. 
Indeed, none of the local authorities considers that there is anything ‘unusual’ about 
their area that differentiates it from other areas when it comes to setting standards. 
Nevertheless, many local authorities implement vehicle standards which go beyond 
basic construction and mechanical condition specifications. 
 
   Six councils have no additional quality standards beyond their set of vehicle 
specifications. The remaining councils, however, use other quality criteria, such as 
age limits, livery, and wheelchair accessibility, either individually or in combination, 
to limit entry of vehicles to the market. These standards are used cumulatively and in 
different combinations in order to make entry to the market more restrictive for 
potential applicants. Councils take a ‘pick and mix’ approach to the additional 
standards that they wish to impose, without any thought about why those individual 
requirements are considered necessary, how they fit with the other specifications, or 
why they are appropriate for their locality. This creates an impression that the 
selection of these additional criteria is arbitrary, without any connection to any aim of 
regulation. By creating more obstacles for prospective licence holders to overcome, 
the local authorities are generating a situation where they are restricting the exercise 
of discretion and replacing it with strict rules. Whilst boundaries for discretion are 
appropriate, the standards adopted by councils become firm rules from which there is 
little scope for departure. According to the literature, one of the claimed advantages of 
rules over discretion is consistency and uniformity.
35
 When viewed nationally, these 
rules lack consistency and uniformity. A situation is created where a vehicle may be 
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licensed in one area but would be refused a licence in another purely on the basis of 
its age, engine size, colour, or a combination of those characteristics. Where the 
primary concern is said to be the safety of the public, such variation and inconsistency 
does not assist local authorities to achieve their aim.   
 
   There is considerable variation between different localities. Maximum age limits on 
vehicles entering the market for the first time were imposed by 18 councils in the 
study. Such age limits ranged from the eldest at a maximum age of six years
36
 
downwards to the four councils which would license only brand new vehicles.
37
 The 
adoption of an age limit policy is said to: 
 
make sure that you know, or at least can be fairly certain, that the vehicle is 
going to be up to a reasonable standard and making the most of safety 
advances in vehicle technology. Interview 32, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
   However, the safety argument is not accepted by the councils which do not impose 
age limits. One council official said: 
 
We don’t have a maximum age limit on first licensing here. It’s the condition 
of the vehicle that matters, not the age. Some people have really looked after 
some older cars, and others have some newish vehicles that are real sheds. 
Interview 16, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
   As the following statement illustrates, passenger safety is advanced as the reason 
behind a livery requirement. 
 
We want passengers to be able to identify our hackney carriages and 
distinguish them from private hire and other ordinary private vehicles. This 
                                                 
36
 West Dorset District Council. 
37
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colour scheme really does that and helps protect passenger safety. Interview 8, 
Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
   Using a distinctive colour scheme does not really address passenger safety issues. 
The imposition of a livery requirement does not, for example, consider private 
vehicles which have the same colour as the livery selected, and so could be mistaken 
for hackney carriages. Councils which do not have livery requirements oppose them 
on the grounds of cost and diversity. One respondent commented: 
 
I don’t think I’d support that a) because of the expense that has to be borne by 
the drivers and b) because we actually value the diverse nature of all our taxi 
cabs. We’ve got some black cabs; one’s got a huge union jack painted on, it’s 
lovely. I don’t see the merit at all in making them have a livery. Interview 14, 
Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
   Ten councils have a requirement that all licensed vehicles are wheelchair accessible, 
but there is no universal agreement about what constitutes a wheelchair accessible 
vehicle. Another difficulty is that none of the councils which have such a policy claim 
safety as a justification. The reason given by all ten councils is, ‘to fulfil the 
requirements of the DDA’. This is not only a misinterpretation of what is now the 
Equality Act 2010, which requires only reasonable provision for wheelchair 
accessibility,
38
 but also fails to consider the needs of non-wheelchair users. Councils 
which do not impose wheelchair accessibility standards prefer to have a ‘mixed-fleet’ 
of vehicles. One respondent pointed out that: 
 
People don’t always like the bigger wheelchair accessible vehicles. Older 
people with mobility problems can’t get in them because they’re too big, and a 
lot of able bodied people think that a WAV will cost them more. They’re 
wrong, but that’s what they think. Interview 17, Enforcement Officer. 
 
                                                 
38
 Equality Act 2010, s 165-172 
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   While there are obvious links between some aspects of vehicle quality control and 
safety, particularly in relation to the construction and mechanical condition of the 
vehicle, many of the policies, or the implementation thereof, are merely cosmetic. 
These policies are linked more closely to issues of civic pride and reputation than to 
safety. Commenting on their respective pre-licensing testing regimes, two council 
officials said.  
 
Part of [the inspection is] mechanical, part of it’s cosmetic, because obviously 
if somebody takes a vehicle and it’s filthy inside, it won’t pass the test. And 
unless it passes the test, it doesn’t get a licence. Interview 27, Senior Licensing 
Officer. 
 
The vehicle test is about the MOT and we put them through a supplementary 
test alongside the MOT which is about presentation of the vehicle. We’ve got 
an international reputation to maintain; often the first person or only person 
that somebody coming into the city might come into contact with will be a taxi 
from the airport or the station so the vehicle should be up to standard that puts 
[the area] in a good light. Interview 11, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
 
   The control of entry through quality standards is clearly an important exercise of 
discretion. Failure to meet the quality standard is often portrayed as the only ground 
for councils which do not adopt quantitative regulation to refuse to grant a licence. 
However, in doing so local authorities are replacing discretion with hard and fast rules 
which suggests that the discretion is not as open-ended as it might appear from the 
wording of the statute. Furthermore, the use of discretion may also extend to factors 
other than quality, and I explore this point in the following sub-section. 
 
c) Use of discretion beyond quality standards 
   
   Five councils have recently introduced a further stipulation which potential 
applicants must overcome before their application is considered: that the applicant 
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must confirm, usually in the form of a written declaration, that the vehicle will be 
used predominantly within the licensing authority’s area and will not be used to fulfil 
private hire bookings in other areas. Strictly speaking, this is not an issue of quality, in 
that it does not relate directly to the condition or nature of the vehicle itself. However, 
such a prerequisite has the effect of erecting a further barrier to entry as refusal or 
failure to make such an assertion affords grounds upon which the council may refuse 
to grant a licence.
39
  
 
   The stipulation has been introduced as a result of the High Court decision in 
R(Newcastle City Council) v Berwick upon Tweed Borough Council.
40
 In this case, the 
court endorsed an earlier ruling that hackney carriages did not commit an offence by 
fulfilling private hire bookings in areas other than the one in which they were 
licensed.
41
 This view was said to support ‘the inherent right of the hackney carriage 
proprietor to undertake pre-booked hirings anywhere in England and Wales.’42 
Berwick Borough Council had granted large numbers of taxi licences in the belief 
that, in the absence of evidence of significant unmet demand, they had no choice other 
than to grant a licence to any vehicle that applied for one.
43
 Many of the Berwick 
licensed taxis were being used as private hire vehicles in Newcastle. The judge held 
that it could be a proper use of the licensing authority’s discretion to refuse to grant a 
licence to a vehicle,  
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that is not intended to be used to ply for hire within its area and/or is intended 
to be used (either entirely or predominantly) for private hire remotely from the 
area of that authority.
44
  
 
   This approach has been approved recently both in the High Court
45
 and in the 
Crown Court in dismissing appeals against refusal to grant a licence for declining to 
give such an undertaking.
46
  
 
   In creating such a barrier to entry, the local authorities claim to be exercising their 
discretion in order to maintain adequate control over the licensed vehicles which 
operate in their area and to avoid vehicle owners taking advantage of what are 
perceived to be laxer licensing regimes elsewhere. Two respondents expressed their 
concerns as follows:   
 
It might not be illegal, but it flies in the face of public safety. Having people 
licensed in one area but operating in another means we have no control over 
taxis. We don’t have the jurisdiction to control taxis from outside the area, and 
we can’t control our taxis if they’re working in [another area]. Interview 10, 
Enforcement Officer.   
 
People can have a hackney carriage licensed in Rochdale or Shrewsbury or 
wherever and they can come and operate as a private hire in [our area]. They 
don’t have the same standards as us. It’s just madness. Interview 11, Senior 
Licensing Officer. 
                  
   Although local councils argue that this exercise of their discretion addresses an 
issue of public protection, I think it raises two different and distinct issues. The first is 
that by refusing to grant a licence to a vehicle whose owner fails to provide the 
requisite declaration, local authorities are imposing a rule and are not exercising their 
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discretion at all. The second is that the real concern of local authorities is to protect 
their own interests. After all, the vehicles operating in another council’s area are 
licensed vehicles. The council which has granted a licence to that vehicle will have 
done so on the basis that certain quality standards were met. The councils which 
object to this practice are concerned that vehicles operating in their area do not 
comply with their standards, but no one has suggested that other councils impose such 
low standards that the other councils are licensing vehicles which are unsafe. Councils 
are taking the localism view that ‘our standards are better than other councils’ 
standards’ and this may well be correct. However, as has been discussed, many 
councils impose standards which are beyond basic safety requirements. Standards of 
cosmetic appearance and comfort are not the same as standards of safety. The 
problem with which councils are troubled is more one of enforcement rather than 
restricting entry to the market, as the councils’ real concern is that they have no 
jurisdiction to control ‘out of town’ vehicles operating in their area. Exercising 
‘discretion’ on the basis of where a vehicle intends to operate addresses the aims of 
control over the trade and income generation by the councils, but it has no direct 
relevance to protecting the public. 
 
d) Conclusions on open-ended discretion  
   
   In the opening part of this section, I raised the question whether open-ended 
discretion on quality regulation exists at all and, if it does, how open-ended is it. 
Whatever the strict legal position may be, and the issue may still be seen as 
contestable, councils take the view that they have such powers to regulate entry to the 
market by reference to the quality of vehicles licensed. If it were otherwise, any 
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vehicle could be licensed, regardless of its condition or quality. There has to be limits 
on vehicles permitted and how councils exercise discretion. This is achieved by local 
authorities confining their own discretion by considering quality issues and by further 
structuring the exercise of discretion by policies on which to base decisions about 
acceptable standards of quality. However, the exercise of discretion is not as open-
ended in practice as it might first appear on reading the statute, because councils 
create their own system of rules with which vehicles must comply, thereby removing, 
or at least severely restricting, discretion. 
 
   The quality of vehicles in terms of their construction and mechanical condition 
clearly link to public protection and safety issues. All councils’ basic specifications 
are devised to cover the essential structural and mechanical condition requirements at 
least, but many go beyond what is necessary from a safety perspective. Additional 
factors such as age of vehicle, livery, accessibility and engine size do not have any 
direct impact on public safety, despite attempts by certain councils to justify them on 
that basis. Not only is there no direct link between public safety and some elements of 
quality standards, there is no connection between local issues and those same 
standards. Localism produces local variation in quality requirements but does not 
create justifications for the need to have such a requirement at all or for the specific 
detail of that standard. 
 
   The creation of national standards for vehicle quality would remove any argument 
on the appropriate criterion of safety, but would replace discretion with rigid and 
inflexible rules and would effectively remove the element of local control except to 
the extent of enforcement. I will return to the issues surrounding whether national 
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standards should replace local discretion in subsequent chapters, but to conclude this 
section, it appears that in reality local authorities already replace their own discretion 
with specific rules and thereby create their own local regime.      
 
4) Conclusions on regulation of vehicle entry.  
  
   Restricting entry of vehicles to the taxi market is vital to ensure that only safe and 
suitable vehicles are licensed. The current legislation does not make this purpose 
sufficiently clear to those responsible for regulating the market. Local authorities are 
given discretionary powers to determine the basis upon which vehicles will be granted 
a licence. This has produced a licensing system which is characterized by confusion, 
complexity, inconsistency and lack of uniformity. 
 
   The quantitative versus qualitative regulation debate about restriction of entry to the 
market is one that is difficult to resolve on the basis of these findings. There are 
firmly entrenched views on both sides of this debate and some evidence which 
supports both arguments. None of the arguments or supporting evidence adequately 
addresses the issue of which approach better serves the aim of protection of the 
public. I conclude on the basis of this research that neither method advances this aim 
in any meaningful way. However, I found that the emphasis on the exercise of 
discretionary powers to control entry is the wrong way around. Where wider 
discretion would be most beneficial, in the setting of quantitative limits on numbers of 
taxis for an area using knowledge of the local market, the current regime imposes the 
most restricted use of discretion, exercisable in certain circumstances only and by 
reference to very limited criteria. On the other hand, where wide discretionary powers 
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currently exist, in the setting and application of quality standards, this produces the 
most inconsistency, uncertainty and lack of uniformity. Whilst local officials should 
have the discretion to refuse entry to a vehicle on quality grounds, otherwise there 
remains the prospect that any vehicle, regardless of condition or suitability, could be 
licensed, the exercise of this discretion in practice creates a confused picture both 
nationally and locally. It is also the area in which the councils take it upon themselves 
to impose strict rules in place of the discretion which the statute has granted to them. 
 
   An important finding of this study was that locality and local culture are more 
significant factors in the decision whether to impose quantitative restrictions on 
market entry in practice than the legislation or most of the literature would suggest. I 
think the exercise of discretion ought to be more open-ended in the case of 
quantitative regulation, structured by local needs and demands. This would enable 
local authorities to take into account the nature of the locality, local culture and other 
local factors, such as the economy, which influence both the demand and supply sides 
of the market. The present restrictive exercise of discretion is too heavily reliant on 
determining levels of demand, and overlooks the importance of other factors. The 
study provides some empirical support for Schaller’s view that, at least in relation to 
quantitative restrictions, policies need to be adapted to each area’s unique 
characteristics and needs.
47
  
 
   The other point which emerges from this study is that all councils restrict entry to 
the market by imposing quality standards, in the form of vehicle specifications, even 
those councils which claim to regulate entry by market forces. This is an illustration 
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of the considerable divergence between what councils claim they are doing when they 
restrict entry to the taxi market and what they are actually achieving. All local 
authorities believe that they are acting in order to protect the public, and there is no 
reason to doubt the sincerity of that belief. However, when it comes to putting that 
aspiration into practice, this is not necessarily what is achieved. So far as regulation of 
vehicles is concerned, the aim is to protect the public against the potential dangers of 
unsuitable or unsafe vehicles. In so far as quality specifications imposed by all 
councils provide for minimum standards of construction and mechanical condition for 
all licensed vehicles, I think councils may justifiably claim some success. 
Unfortunately, I also found that much of this achievement is often hidden by the 
extension of regulatory powers into areas where there is no clear link between those 
powers and the protection of the public. Quality standards beyond construction and 
condition requirements and intervention to control the location where licensed 
vehicles are to operate are not public safety issues and cannot be justified on such 
grounds. 
 
   There is little doubt, in my view, that discretion and localism play important roles in 
regulating the entry of vehicles to the taxi market, at least in terms of how they shape 
the methods used to restrict such entry. Discretion and localism do not necessarily 
assist, and may even hamper, efforts to achieve the aim of regulation. I have already 
mentioned the misplaced emphasis on the exercise of discretion when considering the 
issues of quantitative and qualitative regulation. Localism is used to justify policies on 
the grounds of public protection, policies which more often than not have little 
connection to either the specific needs of the local area or this aim of regulation. I 
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think that these characteristics of the regulatory regime could be better employed to 
achieve the claimed aim of regulation. 
 
   Local authorities are clearly achieving something by restricting the entry of vehicles 
to the market, but not necessarily what they claim to be achieving. One of the 
potential aims of regulation is administrative convenience, and I think this view is 
borne out in the case of quantitative restrictions. A taxi market which has a limited 
number of vehicles is administratively easier to manage than a deregulated market. 
The council knows how many vehicles it has to regulate, what its income from licence 
fees will be, and so it is easier to plan the administration and enforcement of the 
system. On the other hand, a deregulated market is more difficult to administer but 
does bring the opportunity to increase revenue in the form of more licence fees. 
Although the findings of this study indicate that neither administrative ease nor 
increased incomes are driving forces behind vehicle regulation, both are relevant 
factors considered by local authorities. There is no doubt that many of the quality 
standards imposed by local authorities have improved the physical and cosmetic 
appearance of vehicles, the comfort of passengers, and have enhanced civic pride. I 
think, however, that the contribution of such standards to improved safety, or indeed 
levels of service, is debatable.   
 
   I think that a solution to some of these difficulties would be to permit the exercise of 
more discretion based on local knowledge in the area of quantitative regulation, 
combined with a set of national quality standards for all licensed vehicles. No local 
authority in this study provided a paradigm for national standards. I think any such 
standards would have to be devised at national government level and would have to 
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address issues about responsibility for enforcement and licence fee rates as well as 
setting the appropriate quality standards. This is an issue which will be returned to in 
Chapter 8. Attention now turns to the entry of drivers to the taxi market.
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CHAPTER 5: PRE-ENTRY DRIVER REQUIREMENTS 
 
1) Introduction   
  
   In the previous chapter, I examined regulation of entry to the market for vehicles to 
determine how far the aim of the legislation was achieved by restricting entry to the 
market. Every taxi needs a driver to make it commercially productive, and entry of 
taxi drivers to the market is also regulated by the local licensing authorities. Although 
many features of entry restriction are common to both vehicle and driver licensing, 
there are a number of matters raised which are unique to regulation of driver entry. In 
this chapter, I consider the following issues concerning regulation of driver entry to 
the market. First, what are local authorities seeking to achieve by restricting entry of 
drivers to the market? The second issue is how far discretion and localism, which 
feature so prominently in vehicle regulation, influence the way in which councils set 
about their task and contribute to attaining the aim of driver regulation. Third, what 
are the methods used by local authorities to limit driver entry and are they appropriate 
to the task? The fourth issue is how the predominant method used to control entry is 
applied in practice and how closely the outcome of this method approximates to the 
aim of restricting entry. The final issue is whether local authorities are able to employ 
other means of limiting entry to the driver market and, if so, how far the outcome of 
these methods achieves the aim of regulation.     
 
   As in the case of vehicle entry, the first of these issues is a relatively straightforward 
matter to determine. There is very little consideration of the aim of regulating driver 
entry in the literature on this subject, which tends to concentrate on the economic 
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effects of vehicle regulation, particularly quantitative restrictions on entry to the 
market. Despite the absence of a theoretical basis, when it comes to regulating the 
entry of drivers to the taxi market, local authorities are very clear that their aim is the 
protection and safety of the public. In the case of driver regulation, this approach is 
underpinned by the concern that members of the public travelling by taxi are in a 
vulnerable position, as illustrated by the following views: 
 
The whole point of regulation of taxis is the public safety. A lot of users are 
vulnerable because they have been out for a night out, it’s late at night, they 
may have had alcohol. They are going into a confined environment with a 
person they don’t know. You need to make sure [the drivers] are medically fit 
to be driving…they’ve got a driving licence… they’re not under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs…and that they’re not a rapist, murderer, likely to cause 
assault etc. So to me the whole point of the licensing regime is all associated 
with public safety. Interview 11, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
In terms of why should it be regulated, basically for the protection of the 
public I would say the main reason. It does need regulation because there’s no 
doubt about it, a person in a vehicle with that other person is a very vulnerable 
person. They are at risk. Interview 32, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
You’re talking about vulnerable people, of course. They may be vulnerable for 
lots of reasons, because they’re elderly or very young, disability, gender even. 
You have to try to make sure that drivers are not going to assault them, abuse 
them, molest them or rip them off. That’s the point of regulation. Interview 35, 
Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
   Although, as in the case of regulating vehicle entry, the stated aim of local 
authorities is crystal clear, how they go about seeking to achieve this by restricting 
driver entry is somewhat more complex. As the above statements illustrate, councils 
are concerned with regulating the physical and moral attributes of human beings 
rather than the construction and mechanical condition of machines. This in itself 
makes the task of restricting driver entry an altogether more difficult proposition than 
regulating vehicle market entry. Notwithstanding these difficulties, it is a function 
which the local authorities are obliged to perform. How they go about it, whether they 
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achieve their aim and what they are achieving are questions which I address in this 
chapter.        
 
2) Discretion, localism and driver entry regulation 
    
   The exercise of discretionary power and localism are dominant characteristics of the 
restriction of entry for drivers, just as they are for controlling vehicle entry. Discretion 
and localism are recurring themes throughout the study of restriction of market entry, 
and consequently throughout this chapter. In the case of driver entry, however, there 
is no clear explanation of why these notions are believed to be preferable to the 
alternatives or how these features are connected to the aim of regulation than there is 
in the case of vehicle regulation. 
 
   Regulation of entry into the taxi market for drivers, nonetheless, provides a different 
insight into the operation of local authority discretionary powers. The circumstances 
in which licensing authorities may exercise their discretion are much more 
circumscribed than for vehicles. Entry controls for drivers are built upon a discretion, 
the exercise of which is conditional upon satisfaction of a specified statutory standard. 
There does not appear to be any reason why this approach is adopted in the case of 
drivers but not for vehicles. However, such a model provides a useful tool for analysis 
of how the exercise of discretionary power is connected to the protection of the 
public. The different approach used in the case of driver entry means that conclusions 
can be drawn about whether such a practice better achieves the aims of regulation.    
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   It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that, before a driver may be granted a licence, the 
local authority has to be satisfied of two things: that the applicant is a ‘fit and proper 
person’ to hold a licence;1 and that the applicant has been the holder of a full ordinary 
driving licence for a minimum period of twelve months preceding the application.
2
 
Both criteria produce their own difficulties which are considered in subsequent 
sections of this chapter. However, at this stage it should be noted that the grant of a 
driver’s licence rests on the exercise of discretion which is itself confined and 
structured, in Davis’ terms,3 by the preconditions of the qualifying criteria. The 
exercise of discretion lies not in whether to grant a licence but in deciding what 
factors constitute the qualifying conditions. Unless an applicant meets the necessary 
standard, councils are prohibited from issuing a licence.
4
 The local authority has no 
discretion to allow the application if one of the conditions is not met.  
 
   This approach to restriction of driver entry raises two issues. First, what sort of 
discretion is being exercised? Are councils simply required to interpret and apply the 
statutory criteria before deciding whether to grant a licence? Or are they obliged to 
create their own standards to determine the basis upon which their discretion is to be 
exercised?
5
 Second, how far does the exercise of discretion extend? Are local 
authorities exercising discretion in deciding both the meaning of the statutory 
conditions and how the facts are characterised within that meaning?
6
 
 
                                                 
1
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s 59(1)(a).  
2
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976,  s 59(1)(b). 
3
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4
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5
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6
 DJ Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (Clarendon Press, Oxford 
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   Although these two issues are useful for analysis purposes, licensing authorities do 
not exercise their functions with such distinctions uppermost in their thoughts. While 
councils appreciate that they are exercising discretion, they tend to focus their 
attention on the ‘fit and proper person’ criterion within which all other elements of 
their discretion are subsumed. In general,
7
 where this criterion is met to the council’s 
satisfaction, the grant of a licence will almost always follow. This is illustrated by the 
following statements from three of the respondents: 
 
It’s all about the fit and proper person test, isn’t it? If they are fit and proper, 
then there’s no reason why we can’t give them a badge. We’re not here to stop 
anybody from making a living. If they are going to be safe on the roads and 
around passengers, then they should be allowed a licence. Interview 39, Senior 
Licensing Officer. 
 
I think that the fact is that you’re working with old legislation which says you 
will if someone comes up, you will give them a licence. So that’s the starting 
point. Now the legislation says if there’s a fit and proper person, he gets the 
licence. Interview 7, Enforcement Officer.  
 
We go by the phrase ‘fit and proper person’ as far as the driver is concerned 
and that is something usually we don’t need to worry about that at all, 
particularly with our drivers. They’re particularly good so most applications 
go through without a problem. Everything depends on whether they are fit and 
proper in our view. Interview 14, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
   These statements support the view from the literature that, from a practical 
perspective, distinctions between the exercise of strong and weak discretion or 
questions about how far discretion extends are immaterial, as all such issues tend to 
be determined together.
8
 Although councils are called upon to interpret the phrase ‘fit 
and proper person’ before applying the test to the circumstances of the application 
with which they are presented, Dworkin’s weak sense of discretion, they are not 
provided with any guiding principles upon how the phrase is to be interpreted. This 
                                                 
7
 Some exceptions to this generalization are discussed in sections 4 and 5 of this chapter. 
8
 Galligan (n 6) 35.  
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suggests that local authority officials will have to determine their own principles upon 
which their discretion is to be exercised – the strong sense of discretion in Dworkin’s 
terms. However, as the above points illustrate, councils do not divide their decision 
making into such fine distinctions. Reliance on the ‘fit and proper person’ criterion as 
the sole consideration upon which to base the exercise of discretion means that 
councils are giving little thought to how this phrase is interpreted by them. As the 
quotations mentioned above illustrate, local authorities tend to treat the ‘fit and proper 
person’ criterion as if its meaning is self-evident, when it is not. And yet it is the 
interpretation of this criterion, as well as its application, which creates such a variety 
of approaches by the councils. It is in these respects that councils may be said to be 
exercising strong discretion in devising their own standards outside settled principles 
and using discretion in the interpretation of criteria and application of the relevant 
facts. However, I think a better view is that of Galligan, who argues that any official 
exercise of power must be explicable in terms of its purposes and within recognised 
principles.
9
 Licensing officials should be able to explain why an individual is 
considered to be a fit and proper person and how that finding is grounded in the 
purposes of the legislation. There ought to be some measure of consistency both 
between different councils and within the same council.    
 
   What each council understands by ‘fit and proper person’ is determined as a local 
issue. The following statements from three of the respondents indicate that local 
authorities regard it as appropriate that the criterion should be interpreted in 
accordance with local standards:    
          
                                                 
9
 ibid 20. 
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We may want to set different standards to, say, [neighbouring authorities]. It’s 
right that there should be freedom in the legislation to give us discretion to set 
standards locally. Interview 5, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
[This authority] isn’t [the neighbouring authority] and I don’t want our drivers 
to worry that we will follow their decisions. They have a totally different 
environment to work in. It’s local decisions, based on local needs. We have 
our own way of deciding these issues. Interview 14, Chair of Licensing 
Committee. 
 
I’d say the balance is about right as having discretion allows us to be flexible 
and do things our way, without being too concerned about any outside 
influences or what other authorities do. We can set our own local standards to 
make local decisions. Interview 37, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
   Although localism significantly influences the interpretation of the qualifying 
standards, councils do not offer any further justification for local variations in those 
standards other than to differentiate their area from other local authorities. Councils 
do not address the issues of why their interpretation of the qualifying conditions is to 
be preferred to that of another area or why their local area’s requirements differ so 
much from those of other areas. However, because each council applies its own 
interpretation of the circumstances in which discretion may be exercised, localism 
also influences the methods of regulating driver entry, particularly when it comes to 
applying those methods in practice. The methods used to restrict driver entry are 
considered in the next section. 
 
3) Methods of regulating driver entry 
   
   Historically, the power to grant a licence to a driver was unqualified and open-
ended, but is now restricted by the need for applicants to satisfy the qualifying criteria 
of fitness and propriety and holding an ordinary driving licence for the minimum 
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period of twelve months.
10
 The exercise of discretionary power in the interpretation 
and application of these qualifying conditions, in particular the ‘fit and proper person’ 
requirement, was considered in section 2 of this chapter.  The use of a ‘fit and proper 
person’ criterion creates difficulties both in terms what this phrase means and what it 
encompasses. 
 
a) What does ‘fit and proper’ mean? 
   Although the ‘fit and proper person’ test is designed to play an important part in 
restricting driver entry to the market, there is no definition of this phrase in the 
legislation and the assistance provided by the courts is of limited benefit.
11
 In the 
absence of definitive guidance, it is not surprising that local authorities adopt their 
own interpretations of the phrase. One respondent indicated that his council used the 
statement of Lord Bingham CJ in McCool
12
 as their guide to interpretation: 
 
I can recite it [Bingham CJ’s dicta] word for word it comes up that often in 
committee meetings and appeals. [He recites passage from Bingham’s 
judgement]. That’s what we base our understanding of fit and proper person 
on. Can the applicant measure up to that? Interview 10, Enforcement Officer.   
 
   It will be recalled from chapter 1 that Lord Bingham’s criteria for determining a fit 
and proper person included that the applicant be a safe driver with a good driving 
record, experienced, sober, mentally and physically fit, honest and not someone that 
would take advantage of their employment to abuse or assault passengers.
13
 Other 
councils are aware of Lord Bingham’s dicta but do not make direct reference to it or 
have it in their minds when interpreting the phrase ‘fit and proper person’. There are, 
                                                 
10
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s 59 
11
 Discussed in chapter 1 section 3b).  
12
 McCool v Rushcliffe BC [1998] 3 All ER 889 – discussed in chapter 1 section 3c). 
13
 ibid 891f (Lord Bingham CJ). 
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however, similarities between the elements involved in Lord Bingham’s description 
and those upon which officials base their interpretation. Three respondents explained 
how they interpreted ‘fit and proper person’: 
 
You look at all sorts really whether [the applicant] has a criminal record, what 
it’s for, what [the applicant’s] driving record is like, what [the applicant’s] 
character is like. Do they come across as decent and honest or a bit of a 
villain? Interview 40, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
You weigh up the different factors, don’t you? Has this person been in trouble 
before? What was the nature of any previous offence? How long ago was it? 
Have they kept out of trouble since? Do they have family or relatives to 
support? Are they up to the physical and psychological demands of the job? 
You weigh it up and come to a decision. Interview 45, Senior Licensing 
Officer. 
 
I would want to see that [the applicant] is going to be a safe and competent 
driver, they are not going to attack someone or fleece them, drive like a lunatic 
and be someone I would feel comfortable being driven by. Whatever they 
have done in the past is only relevant to how they would act as a driver. 
Interview 18, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
   In addition to these general factors that licensing officials use to determine the 
fitness or otherwise of an applicant, it became apparent from the interviews that there 
is a widespread use of what is referred to as the ‘relative’ or ‘loved one’ test. This 
non-statutory and vague test is used by councils as a means of simplifying the process 
of interpreting the ‘fit and proper person’ requirement. Although there are different 
versions of this simplified test, they all essentially ask the decision-maker, ‘Would 
you be happy for your relative, wife, child, or loved one to travel in a taxi with this 
person?’ Opinions as to the effectiveness of this test are divided, as the following 
statements illustrate: 
 
I think it’s a useful test, as there’s no doubt about it that there are certain 
people who would put themselves in the position of taking people for hire and 
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reward who you would not want your relatives to be in with; you would not 
want them in there. Interview 32, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
We always use the test about whether you would trust this person to drive your 
wife, daughter or loved one. If you can say ‘yes’, then the licence should be 
granted. We…always find that quite helpful in these sort of cases. Interview 2, 
Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
One way is to apply the test of harm, you know the…would I trust my 
daughter to be with this taxi driver? If you’ve ever met my daughter, I’d be 
more concerned for the taxi driver. But it’s very subjective, isn’t it? It depends 
how protective you feel towards your family. But then, what would you 
replace it with? Interview 5, Chair of Licensing Committee.    
   
When you look at the ‘would you want your loved one in a taxi with this 
person’ test, well some days I’d be happy to see my [spouse] get in a taxi with 
Freddy Krueger so long as he was out of my hair…I’m being facetious, I 
know, but you get my point. The test is too subjective. I’m not sure that it’s 
the best test we could use. Interview 40, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
   At first glance, these statements give the impression that local authorities are 
‘making it up as they go along’ when interpreting the qualifying standard of the ‘fit 
and proper person’ test. This would suggest a degree of Dworkin’s notion of strong 
discretion in that the interpretation is based on principles of the council’s own 
making, outside the bounds of their legal constraints. When examined more closely, 
however, the factors contained in Lord Bingham’s dicta or the similar elements used 
by authorities or the ‘loved one’ test could all be seen as attempts to create some 
recognizable principles, albeit somewhat imprecise ones, upon which to interpret a 
provision which is itself vague and poorly defined. The practical difficulty is that with 
the use of locally determined principles comes local variation in interpretation of the 
term which leads to inconsistency in entry restrictions. An applicant considered ‘fit 
and proper’ on one council’s understanding of that phrase may not be deemed ‘fit and 
proper’ in another area, resulting, in the latter case, in refusal of a licence. This 
situation is not improved by a lack of consensus on the scope of the ‘fit and proper’ 
requirement. 
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b) What does ‘fit and proper’ include? 
   In trying to understand how entry to the market is restricted, an already complex 
situation is not helped by confusion about the scope of the ‘fit and proper person’ 
requirement. The statutory wording suggests that ‘fit and proper person’ is an 
overarching standard which has to be attained before the local authority may exercise 
its discretion to grant a driver’s licence. This is the view taken by 21 councils which 
consider the ‘fit and proper person’ standard to be constituted of a number of different 
factors, such as medical fitness, driving ability and criminal record.
14
  However, 
eleven councils, according to their documentation,
15
 treat the ‘fit and proper person’ 
requirement as either a stand alone element, which has to be satisfied in addition to 
the other factors, or as relevant to criminal convictions only.  
 
   The treatment of the ‘fit and proper person’ test as either a stand alone requirement 
or an overarching one causes a number of difficulties. One is what precisely 
constitutes the stand alone ‘fit and proper person’ test, if elements such as medical 
fitness, criminal record and driving ability are not included. Furthermore, does the 
local authority have the power to refuse a licence even where an applicant meets all of 
the other criteria? The fact that so many councils take such an approach serves to 
highlight a general inconsistency which is prevalent in the area of taxi licensing. The 
point may appear to be an academic one but it has practical implications for an 
applicant’s right of appeal which is regarded as an important check on the exercise of 
                                                 
14
 These factors are discussed further in section 4 of this chapter. 
15
 Great Yarmouth Borough Council, ‘Hackney Carriage and Private Hire Driver’s Licences: 
Information and Guidance Notes for New Drivers’ (2011), is one example.   
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necessary discretion.
16
 An aggrieved applicant whose application has been refused 
may only appeal if the ground for refusal was that the applicant was not considered to 
be a ‘fit and proper person’.17 If an application is refused for some other reason, then 
the applicant’s only redress is to challenge the decision by way of judicial review 
which is much more limited than an appeal. 
 
   Councils, however, do not draw any fine dividing lines between the ‘fit and proper 
person’ test and the elements which comprise it, regardless of the position set out in 
their documentation. In practice, local authorities either fail to appreciate the 
distinction, regard it as of no consequence, or treat the phrase ‘fit and proper person’ 
as a default position if no other element covers the situation with which they are 
presented. These points are illustrated by the following statements: 
 
I’m not aware of it being treated as a separate issue. If we’re asked to deal 
with a case, then we just treat everything as part of the [fit and proper person] 
test. I suppose it’s separate to cover any cases that aren’t covered 
elsewhere…we can’t think of every possible situation we might face. 
Interview 2, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
I don’t know really. I guess that’s designed to cover any other issues that come 
up that affects their fitness that might not be covered by our conviction or 
medical policies. Interview 30, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
[A case] is only likely to come before committee if something has come up on 
the CRB check or wherever. If it comes to our committee, there’s a grey area 
and we have to apply the fit and proper standard to that. Interview 14, Chair of 
Licensing Committee.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Davis (n 3) 142 
17
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s 59(2). 
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c) Conclusions on methods of regulating driver entry 
   
   Unlike the case of vehicle entry, in the case of drivers there is only one method of 
regulating entry to the market. This is based on a quality standard, achievement of 
which is assessed by the exercise of discretionary powers subject to the applicant 
satisfying two preconditions. The focus of the discretion is not so much on whether to 
grant the licence, but on the interpretation and application of one of the preconditions. 
It is in the meaning and scope of ‘fit and proper person’ that the choice lies and upon 
which authorities most direct their attention in determining applications. Satisfaction 
of the qualifying conditions does not, however, automatically guarantee that a licence 
will be granted as councils are still able to exercise the discretion to refuse, as will be 
seen.  
 
4) Practical application of ‘fit and proper person’ 
    
   Once local authorities have decided upon their own scope and interpretation of the 
qualifying requirement, that criterion has to be applied in practice. Local authorities 
are required to apply the ‘fit and proper person’ test to any potential applicant for a 
driver’s licence before deciding whether to grant a licence to that applicant. The 
difficulties created by having to interpret the phrase ‘fit and proper’ are discussed in 
section 3 of this chapter. To assist them in applying the ‘fit and proper person’ test to 
new applicants, councils separate the requirement into a number of constituent 
elements. Some elements are common to all councils, while others are used more 
selectively by individual authorities. In this section, the different elements are 
analysed to discover what influences their choice and application and how they 
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connect to the aim of regulation. The common elements are medical fitness and 
criminal history as well as individualized factors including knowledge test, practical 
driving tests and formal qualifications. 
  
a) Medical fitness 
   All 32 local authorities have a requirement that applicants for drivers’ licences have 
to demonstrate a certain level of medical fitness, both physically and mentally. This is 
normally achieved by the applicant’s own general practitioner or a medical 
practitioner appointed by the local authority examining the applicant and the 
applicant’s medical records and certifying that the applicant meets the Group 2 
medical standard set by the DVLA.
18
 There is no statutory requirement that applicants 
for taxi driver’s licences pass a medical fitness test although there is a discretionary 
power for local authorities to request a medical report.
19
 Notwithstanding the 
discretionary nature of this provision, all the councils in this study required a medical 
report to establish medical fitness as an element of the ‘fit and proper person’ test.  
 
   The need for taxi drivers to be medically fit is relatively uncontroversial. There is a 
clear and obvious link between medical fitness and the protection of the public. No 
passenger would want to be driven by a taxi driver who was unable to control the 
vehicle due to physical or mental infirmity or, even worse, who may not survive the 
journey. Because they are based on a national standard, medical fitness criteria vary 
little from one area to another. This is subject to the exception of three local 
authorities which, in addition to the general medical standard, impose a requirement 
                                                 
18
 This is the medical standard expected of all professional drivers, and is applied to drivers of heavy 
goods vehicles and passenger service vehicles as well as taxi drivers. 
19
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s 57(2)(a). 
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that all applicants pass a drug test. Although compelling applicants to undergo such a 
test intuitively feels unnecessary and intrusive, it is possible to see a public protection 
issue being met by such tests, as two of the respondents explained: 
 
We introduced drug testing…not that we saw a particular problem, but we 
noticed a lot of minor drug possession offences coming up on the CRB checks. 
That got us wondering if they were still using. We like our drivers to be calm, 
but not so chilled out because they’re stoned. They still have to be fit to drive. 
Interview 42, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
I suppose we are fairly unique in requiring this part of the medical. A lot of 
drivers originally failed for cannabis, but this is now very much reduced. The 
message is slowly getting home and we get very few failures on drugs test. 
The ones that know they are likely to fail the drugs test will apply for a licence 
elsewhere. Interview 7, Enforcement Officer.    
    
   While compulsory drug testing addresses a public protection issue, the views of the 
councils which impose such a requirement raise further questions. Offences of drug 
possession and recreational use of certain drugs are not problems confined to 
particular localities. There is no reason, therefore, why only a small number of 
councils should impose drug tests. On the other hand, there is no indication that taxi 
drivers driving under the influence of drugs is a significant cause for concern in any 
area, and even the councils which have drug testing accept as much. It may become 
an issue, if drug testing by only some local authorities means that drug using 
prospective taxi drivers apply to other areas. The results of this study confirm that, 
where drug testing has been introduced, the local authorities are satisfied with the 
outcome. 
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b) Criminal history 
   Medical fitness criteria may be uncontroversial but the same cannot be said for the 
criteria applied to an applicant’s criminal history and background. How local 
authorities assess the fitness and propriety of prospective taxi drivers who have 
criminal records generates great controversy between the trade and the regulators. It 
also produces the greatest local variation. All 32 councils have developed their own 
policy on the relevance of criminal convictions to applications for taxi driver’s 
licences. Most of these policies are based on the limited legislative framework 
available to councils on this topic which comprises two relatively dated central 
government circulars from 1992
20
 and later delegated legislation exempting taxi 
drivers from the provisions of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974.
21
 Because of 
the scant guidance available from central government, every council has created its 
own policy, and every policy is different.  
 
   By developing policies on how to deal with criminal convictions, councils 
acknowledge that to impose a blanket ban on any person with criminal convictions 
from ever being granted a taxi driver’s licence would be unfair, impractical and 
unnecessary to protect the public. The position of the local authorities is summarized 
by one respondent, who said: 
 
We obviously don’t expect our taxi drivers to be angels, but we do expect 
them to be relatively conviction free, reliable and trustworthy. That is why we 
have published criteria of persons who we would licence and people that we 
would not, but obviously every case is treated on its own merits. Interview 11, 
Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
                                                 
20
 Home Office Circular 2/92 and Department for Transport Circular 13/92. 
21
 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exemptions) (Amendment) Order 2002, SI 2002/171. 
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   The problem in practice for local authorities, particularly if their policies are drawn 
too rigidly, is one of over-inclusiveness. Potential applicants may find their fitness 
and propriety called into question because of offences which are either very old or of 
no relevance to the licence for which they have applied, as the following comments 
illustrate: 
 
We regularly get cases coming before the committee where the offences are 
nine or ten years old, or even more. I know it’s following the council’s policy, 
so it’s right on that basis, but some of it’s pretty trivial stuff. It makes you 
wonder if it’s really that necessary. Interview 12, Enforcement Officer. 
 
[T]he CRB check had thrown something up [which] was utterly unrelated to 
their driving skills, which is very unfortunate circumstances. You know lots of 
these drivers when they were very very young, as so many of us do, they were 
a bit wild and there’s no reason that they should suffer or be restricted in their 
life choices for evermore. And it’s usually something terribly mild. Interview 
14, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
   Even in cases where an applicant’s convictions may be relevant to the issue of 
public protection, local authorities recognize that assessment of the applicant’s 
suitability has to be based on present circumstances, not past misdemeanours. In 
deciding whether to grant a licence, councils seek to achieve a balance between 
protecting the public from harm caused by unsuitable drivers and protecting the public 
generally from the potentially harmful consequences of refusing a licence. This point 
is illustrated by the following statements: 
 
There’s that balance, isn’t there? I know it’s difficult, but if he’s an ex-convict 
and all he can do is drive a taxi, I’d rather see him drive a taxi and reform than 
burgle next door. Interview 5, Chair of Licensing Committee.   
    
We had a case recently. He was a bit thick, illiterate, rude manners and did not 
know where the bounds of appropriate behaviour lay, but was a good driver, 
clean licence and no recent trouble with the police. What do you do? Do you 
refuse, knowing that he will probably turn to crime, or do you give him a 
chance? Interview 28, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
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We all know that people make mistakes, sometimes they are serious mistakes, 
but if they’ve done their time and are trying to reform and they’re a fit and 
proper person, I’m not going to kick a man while he’s down. They should be 
given a chance. Interview 7, Enforcement Officer.  
 
   As the local authority is exercising a discretionary power in determining whether an 
applicant is a ‘fit and proper’ person, this enables councils to be flexible in their 
approach. In some circumstances, councils follow their policies when legislative 
guidelines may lead them in another direction. While councils cannot act contrary to 
the law, they may decide to adopt their policy guidelines to determine an applicant’s 
suitability in a situation where, so far as the law is concerned, the applicant is not yet 
‘rehabilitated’. An example of such a situation was given by one of the respondents: 
 
If the [applicant has] served a term of imprisonment, say for theft…should his 
penalty for not being able to apply for a licence, should it be four years or 
would you invoke the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act which is probably 
seven? We would weigh up, who it is, what it is, so we would take all that into 
account. Interview 32, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
   Whilst attempts at rehabilitating ex-offenders by licensing them to drive taxis are 
very laudable, this is not part of the council’s role. Local authorities exercising 
licensing functions are not responsible for creating job opportunities for those with 
criminal records. Policies on the treatment of applicants with criminal histories should 
be targeted more specifically at those offences which are directly relevant to the role 
of a taxi driver. This would be a better assurance of public safety. As the system 
works at present, it is difficult to see what it is achieving.  
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c) Additional factors: knowledge tests, driving skills and formal qualifications   
   Medical and criminal conviction policies are common to all 32 councils. For eight 
councils, these policies are the only means of structuring their discretion in assessing 
an applicant’s suitability as a taxi driver. The remaining 24 councils, however, 
employ a number of additional factors which are relevant to their determination of an 
applicant’s fitness and propriety. These different factors are used in various 
combinations by the councils to restrict market entry. Failure to meet any of these 
additional requirements is likely to result in a licence being refused. In a similar way 
to which vehicle quality standards are adopted,
22
 in the case of drivers, councils take a 
‘pick and mix’ approach to these additional factors. Again, little thought has been 
given to why these standards are considered necessary, how they fit with the other 
elements of the ‘fit and proper’ test or why they are appropriate for their locality. 
 
   The most common of these additional factors is the requirement to pass a 
‘knowledge’ test for the local area. Although 24 councils impose such a test on 
prospective taxi drivers, the nature, scope and quality of every council’s test are 
different. The variation between knowledge tests is considerable and complex. Tests 
may be either written or oral or a combination of both. ‘Knowledge’ may cover local 
geography, the general law, local byelaws and licence conditions or various 
combinations of these. Pass marks vary from 100 per cent on a ten question test in 
Sandwell to 90 per cent, on a more comprehensive test in both Bristol and Solihull 
and as low as 60 per cent in Amber Valley.  
 
                                                 
22
 Discussed in Chapter 4. 
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   By its very nature, a knowledge test is a ‘local’ matter. What is not so obvious, 
however, is why each council feels that it needs to have such a test. A topographically 
ignorant taxi driver can be a source of annoyance and frustration but rarely presents a 
public protection problem. Councils which have knowledge tests justify them on the 
basis that, in the council’s view, taxi customers expect drivers to know the local area, 
as the following statement makes clear: 
 
There’s a knowledge of the city test for hackney carriage drivers because if 
you get into a taxi you expect them to know where to take you. Interview 11, 
Senior Licensing Officer.   
 
   More enlightening on this point, however, are the following views of three officials 
at councils which do not employ any form of knowledge test: 
 
We’re only a small area, and it’s not too difficult to find your way around. In 
these days of sat-nav and all that GPS technology, drivers should not get lost 
in this area. The time and resources needed just aren’t justified by the benefits. 
Interview 46, Enforcement Officer. 
 
We don’t have a knowledge test, no. [We did] think about it, but decided 
against. This is a rural area. There aren’t that many roads, certainly not many 
large towns or one-way systems. So a bit of common sense and a map is all 
you need. Interview 37, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
We debate [the knowledge test] quite a lot. But we don’t get reports from 
members of the public that drivers don’t know where they are going. If we did 
we would consider it, but we don’t ever get that report. Interview 24, Senior 
Licensing Officer.  
 
   There are 13 councils which require applicants to pass a formal test of their driving 
ability, usually the test administered by the Driving Standards Agency. The statutory 
requirement that an applicant must have held an ordinary driving licence for at least 
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twelve months at the time of application
23
 means that the applicant has already passed 
what is generally regarded as a demanding test of his or her driving competence. 
Nonetheless, those councils which have such a requirement justify its imposition on 
the grounds of improving existing driving standards, as the following comments 
illustrate: 
 
We put them through a driving test so that we can validate their standard 
because I’m not potentially as good a driver as I was 20 years ago when I 
passed my test. You [have] got to bear in mind that a taxi driver is a 
professional driver. Interview 11, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
We are always trying to improve standards of driving. In [this area] we think 
our standards are pretty high. We don’t get many complaints about driving 
from customers, but you can always improve standards, can’t you? Interview 
23, Chair of Licensing Committee.   
 
   There is no indication why additional driving assessments are deemed necessary to 
protect the public, other than as a general improvement in driving standards. But it is 
not part of the local authority’s function to improve driving standards. Using a 
requirement of additional driving qualifications appears to treat drivers as employees 
of the council, when they are, in fact, mainly self-employed entrepreneurs. Local 
authorities impose such a qualifying condition because they have the power to do so, 
and the applicant will not be granted a licence unless he or she meets this qualifying 
criterion. Even if councils believe that this will improve driving standards across their 
area, it does not make such improvements part of their function, given that they have 
no equivalent power to impose such a condition on ordinary drivers. 
 
   Nine councils require applicant drivers to hold some form of vocational or literacy 
qualification. In some cases, the qualification has been introduced in response to 
                                                 
23
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s 59(1)(b) 
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particular customer complaints but not necessarily about safety issues. No thought has 
been given to why these qualifications are needed in a particular local area or how 
possessing the qualification achieves the aim of regulation. Councils which have 
introduced such requirements are satisfied with the results they have produced, as the 
following statements make clear: 
 
We’re happier with the other things like the training requirement, I think that’s 
helped. We used to get quite a lot of complaints about drivers not being able to 
understand people. We felt if we introduced a qualification that would help 
and it has helped in that respect. Interview 20, Senior Licensing Officer.     
 
The thinking behind [the NVQ qualification] was a chance to develop 
professionally, other employers have staff development and taxi drivers are 
professionals; we saw an opportunity to extend that professionalism. Interview 
14, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
   To my mind, these comments suggest that training and other requirements produce 
results which benefit the local authority rather than the public. Reduction in the 
numbers of complaints and a more professional appearance for drivers are not aims 
which are concerned with public protection. The second comment also overlooks the 
fact that taxi drivers are not council employees. Requirements such as those discussed 
here I think add weight to the suggestion that local authorities view control over the 
trade as an end in itself. By imposing additional requirements, councils restrict the 
exercise of local authority discretion because failure to meet these obligations results 
in refusal of a licence and the numbers of drivers considered eligible to enter the 
market is reduced. However, none of these additional provisions restricts entry in a 
way which achieves public protection or promotes local issues. 
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d) Conclusions on the application of ‘fit and proper person’  
   
   Local authority policies on medical fitness and the relevance of convictions have 
some connection to the protection of the public, particularly those that are designed to 
reveal certain medical conditions or indicate that an applicant has a propensity for 
violence, indecency or dishonesty or is simply a bad driver. Equally, it is clear that in 
developing their policies local authorities are structuring the exercise of their 
discretion to determine how to restrict market entry for drivers. What is not so clear is 
why there is such variation between local policies on an issue which has national 
application. Surely a ‘fit and proper’ taxi driver ought to be considered suitable to 
hold that position regardless of the area of the country in which he or she wishes to 
work. Nor is it clear why a particular local policy is thought to be more appropriate 
than an alternative policy for that area. The fact that the phrase ‘fit and proper person’ 
is so vague means that it can be interpreted and applied in any way that the local 
authority views as appropriate. Although the flexibility of exercising discretion in 
interpreting and applying this standard can be advantageous to decision-makers, the 
way in which the power is exercised in practice can result in decisions which are 
unconnected to the purpose for which the power was granted. 
  
   In this section the focus has been on the ‘fit and proper’ qualifying standard, and 
this is the centre of attention for local authorities exercising their discretion in 
deciding whether to grant driver’s licences. However, councils’ discretionary powers 
go beyond determining applicants’ physical and moral characteristics.  
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5) Residual discretion beyond ‘fit and proper person’ standard 
   
   On the wording of the statute, it would be assumed that once an applicant satisfies 
the local authority that they are a ‘fit and proper person’ and meets the minimum 
period as an ordinary licence holder, then there is no reason why a licence would not 
be granted. Councils, however, still retain a residuary discretion to refuse to grant a 
licence, even to an applicant who fulfils the criteria. The statutory wording is 
permissive and not mandatory. In this section, I examine the exercise of this residuary 
discretion by considering the two other bases, and they are the only two, upon which 
some local authorities use their discretionary power. The first is local authorities 
which impose their own minimum driving experience requirement beyond the 
statutory minimum twelve month period. The second is councils which attempt to 
control the location in which the driver is to operate.  
    
a) Minimum driving experience qualification 
   In most cases the requirement to have held a licence for a period of at least twelve 
months prior to the application does not cause any real difficulty as it is an easily 
verifiable factual state of affairs. Difficulties can arise, however, where councils 
require a minimum period of driving experience beyond the statutory twelve month 
period. Nine councils (28 per cent) in this study imposed an obligation for applicants 
to have minimum driving experience in excess of the statutory one year period. The 
councils concerned have a policy that requires prospective drivers to have held an 
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ordinary driving licence for two, three, or even four years before considering their 
application.
24
 
 
   It may be argued that, as councils have discretion to grant licences, there is nothing 
wrong with their adopting policies to guide the exercise of that discretion. Similarly, 
as the statute specifies that an applicant must hold a licence for ‘at least’ twelve 
months, councils are within their powers to impose a longer period. It could also be 
said that, as the extended minimum periods are local authority policy, not fixed rules, 
they can be departed from in appropriate cases. For example, Bath and North-East 
Somerset Council made an exception to their three year driving experience 
requirement in the case of one applicant, who had been driving for two years and nine 
months at the time of the application and had demonstrated her abilities as a good 
driver.
25
 The making of such an exception highlights a lack of certainty and 
uniformity in the approach to permitting market entry. Councils which apply extended 
minimum driving experience periods do not, however, seek to justify their policies on 
any of these grounds. The longer period of driving experience requirement is believed 
to be a matter of public safety, as the following statements from three of the 
respondents make clear: 
 
You’ve seen the statistics, I’m sure, about how many young drivers have an 
accident in their first few years of driving. Experience counts for a lot, and we 
like our drivers to have that bit of extra experience before giving them a 
licence. Interview 32, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
 Even after a year they’re not very experienced drivers. I’m not convinced 
they’re suitable to drive a taxi. In [this area] we like them to have bit more 
                                                 
24
 Amber Valley, Solihull, Sandwell and Mid-Devon have a minimum two year period; Bath, 
Lancaster, Southend and Northampton require three years minimum; and Tendring obliges applicants 
to have held an ordinary licence for four years.  
25
 Bath and North-East Somerset Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting of Licensing Sub-committee – Miss 
KD’ 1st March 2011, 86. 
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experience before being allowed to drive the public around. Interview 16, 
Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
[There is] nothing unusual about driving in our area that makes it different 
from elsewhere. Not sure a less experienced driver is necessarily suitable as a 
taxi driver, at twelve months they’re still learning. I would not be happy about 
my relative being driven by someone who has only passed their test twelve 
months ago. We all have to learn and gain experience, but the public should 
not be paying for a driver to gain experience. Interview 17, Enforcement 
Officer.  
 
   Where an extended minimum driving period is imposed, local authorities make a 
convincing case for their position on the basis of public protection. This might suggest 
some connection to the ‘fit and proper’ person test, but the two conditions are clearly 
distinguished in the statute and so any attempt to conflate the driving experience 
requirement with the fit and proper person test is potentially unlawful. However, what 
these councils do not address is why they consider their area needs a longer minimum 
period than the one set by central government and which is applied in other areas. 
None of the councils makes any case that driving conditions are more onerous in their 
area than in any other. Exercising their discretionary powers in this way creates a lack 
of consistency and an impression that councils are exceeding their powers because a 
prospective driver who fulfils all the statutory criteria is likely to be granted a licence 
in one area but refused one in another. There is no reason why any council should 
impose a period of driving experience of longer than the statutory minimum. If a 
longer period is felt to be necessary, for whatever reason, then this should be 
addressed by Parliament and a fixed period, rather than simply a minimum, ought to 
be imposed. 
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b) Location where the driver intends to work  
   In the case of vehicle entry, it may be recalled that five local authorities require 
prospective vehicle owners to give an undertaking that, if granted a licence, the 
vehicle would be used predominantly for hackney carriage work within the granting 
local authority’s area. Refusal to give such an undertaking normally results in refusal 
of a licence.
26
  The same five councils apply a similar provision to prospective 
drivers. Although the use of such a restriction on entry has been held to be an 
appropriate exercise of discretion in the case of vehicles,
27
 the position of drivers is 
different. The exercise of discretion in the case of vehicles is largely open-ended, 
whereas in the case of drivers the exercise of discretion is conditioned by the ‘fit and 
proper person’ test. Where a driver intends to work is not something which affects 
whether they are considered to be a ‘fit and proper person’ to hold a driver’s licence. 
Furthermore, a driver refused a licence on the grounds that he or she does not intend 
to work within the local authority’s area has no right of appeal against such a 
decision.
28
   
 
   Such difficulties are not appreciated, or have been ignored, by the councils which 
adopt such a practice. The local authorities justify their position as a public protection 
issue on the basis that their standards of fitness and propriety for drivers are better 
than other areas, and drivers with more questionable or colourful backgrounds may be 
able to operate in their area by obtaining a licence from other areas. As in the case of 
vehicles, this issue is of more relevance to enforcement than to restricting driver 
                                                 
26
 Discussed in more detail in chapter 4, section 3(c). 
27
 R(Newcastle City Council) v Berwick on Tweed Borough Council [2008] EWHC 2369 (Admin); 
[2009] RTR 34.  
28
 Appeals are limited to cases where refusal is on the grounds that the applicant is not a fit and proper 
person - Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s 59(2).  
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entry, and councils which have such a requirement acknowledge that enforcing such 
provisions may be difficult. One respondent explained their council’s position as 
follows:   
 
There’s a lot of licence holders who can’t get a licence in their preferred 
borough, so they go to neighbouring boroughs where they deem it easy to get 
licensed. That is something that we are aware of, not particularly happy about 
and trying to combat basically. I understand it may be difficult to enforce once 
they get the licence, but we’ll have to see how that works out. It is something 
we are trying to tackle. Interview 42, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
   Although the attempt to tackle the problems caused by this form of ‘forum 
shopping’ by drivers is understandable from the local authorities’ point of view, the 
use of discretion in this way to restrict entry is not provided for by the statutory 
regime. Nor does it convince as a local or public protection issue. As with the case of 
vehicles, use of discretion in this way serves mainly the interests of the council in 
terms of ensuring sufficiently high numbers of licensed drivers for its area and income 
generation. Such requirements permit local authorities to control the location where 
drivers work which is not a legitimate use of discretionary powers.  
 
c) Conclusions on residual discretion 
   There can be little doubt that, in the case of hackney carriage drivers, local 
authorities have a residual discretion to refuse a licence, even to an applicant who 
otherwise fulfils the statutory criteria. Most councils do not choose to exercise this 
discretion, and there is generally no reason why they should do so. Local authorities 
which exercise discretion beyond the confines of the ‘fit and proper person’ test create 
an impression that they are acting beyond the scope of their powers by refusing 
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licences in the circumstances that they do. Those councils which exercise discretion 
based upon driving experience make a strong case for doing so on public protection 
grounds. None of the uses of residual discretion, however, are exclusively local 
issues, and the difficulties raised by these points need to be considered at a national 
level. 
   It might be said that by making decisions based on driving experience and the 
location in which drivers are to operate councils are creating a rule and not exercising 
discretion at all. The only elements of choice are whether to impose the requirement 
in the first place or whether to overlook the criteria in individual cases. The fact that 
councils have such a choice suggests that such decisions are discretionary, but local 
authorities generally do not display or claim that they are guided by principles in 
exercising such discretion. Where they do so, such as in the case of extended driving 
experience being based on the principle of public safety, such principles are difficult 
to support because of a lack of an evidential link to protection of the public.  
 
6) Conclusions on restriction of driver entry  
   
   The aim of restricting driver entry to the taxi market is claimed to be protection of 
the public. In the case of drivers, this protection is against the potentially adverse 
consequences of the passengers’ vulnerable position in relation to the driver when 
travelling by taxi. In regulating entry of drivers by reference to their medical 
condition and the relevance of their criminal convictions, I think that local authorities 
believe they are protecting the public from its own vulnerability, and so are achieving 
the aim of regulation. I think the absence of widespread reported incidents of attacks 
upon or thefts from passengers by drivers supports this conclusion to some extent. 
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That is not to say that such incidents do not happen, and standards can always be 
improved. However, the way in which local authorities go about their task of 
protecting the public means that they often go further than is necessary to achieve 
their aim. Many of the restrictions on entry have no relevance to the protection of the 
public, which means that those that do are either lost amongst the irrelevant 
restrictions or do not receive sufficient attention to fulfil their aims properly. It is 
difficult to measure the effect of entry restriction in terms of protection of the public, 
although there are some provisions which are clearly designed to achieve this. The 
effectiveness of these protective provisions is often disguised by requirements which 
are designed to achieve other aims, such as the professionalism of drivers. 
 
   It is appropriate, in my view, that there should be discretion for the regulator to 
grant or refuse a licence to an applicant. In the case of taxi drivers, the local authority 
has discretion, the exercise of which is qualified by a pre-requisite condition. An 
important finding of this study is that the council has a residual discretion beyond 
merely satisfying that qualifying condition. Even if a local authority is satisfied that 
the applicant is a ‘fit and proper person’ and has the minimum period of driving 
experience, it can still refuse to grant the licence. Councils very rarely do this, largely 
because they do not necessarily realise that they have the power to do so. Decisions to 
grant licences mainly focus on the ‘fit and proper person’ test. Once that is met to the 
satisfaction of the council, the licence usually follows. In interpreting the qualifying 
condition, councils adopt guiding principles and standards as an aid to exercise of 
weak discretion. Licensing officials can normally point to criteria upon which his or 
her decision had been based, even if some of those criteria are themselves a little 
vague and imprecise. In the unusual cases where councils exercise discretion to refuse 
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beyond the scope of the fit and proper person test, this also tends to be guided by 
principle, although the connection between such principles and the claimed aims of 
regulation is dubious. 
 
   The findings of the study confirm that taxi licensing officials do not make any 
distinctions between interpretation of the statutory standards which precondition the 
exercise of their discretion and the determining and application of facts upon which 
the exercise of discretion is based. I think councils view the whole process as using 
their discretionary powers, but in doing so often take into account matters which are 
irrelevant to the purpose for which those powers are claimed to be exercised. Because 
the exercise of discretion allows for considerable variation in the interpretation and 
scope of the ‘fit and proper’ standard, this results in confusion, inconsistency and lack 
of uniformity. This means that it is possible for the same prospective driver to be 
refused a licence in one area on the grounds that they are not a ‘fit and proper person’ 
yet granted a licence in a different area. If the aim of regulation is public protection, I 
think this state of affairs is highly unsatisfactory. The concern must be that the current 
regime permits drivers with certain medical conditions or character traits to engage in 
‘forum shopping’ to obtain a licence that he or she may not be able to obtain in 
another area. This presents clear difficulties for the protection of the public. 
 
   Some of the difficulties caused by these inconsistencies may be removed by the 
introduction of national standards to create a clearer definition of the appropriate 
quality standard in place of the ‘fit and proper’ test. The problem with arguments for 
more consistency and uniformity is, of course, there has to be a decision about who is 
 174 
right.
29
 Any such standards would have to be devised at national government level, 
with local authorities having to make a case for departure from such national 
standards to accommodate specific local needs. I will return to the issues about 
national standards in Chapter 8. 
                                                 
29
 JL Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims (Yale University 
Press, New Haven 1983) 195.  
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CHAPTER 6: POST-ENTRY REGULATION OF VEHICLES, DRIVERS AND 
FARES 
 
1) Introduction 
 
   Once a vehicle and driver have been granted a licence, the local authority continues 
to regulate all aspects of the licensed trade. Post-entry to the market, the emphasis 
moves from controlling which vehicles and drivers are granted a licence to regulating 
the quality standards of those vehicles and drivers. Regulation also extends to 
controlling the cost to users of taxi services in the form of fares. Thus the licensing 
regime enables councils to supervise every facet of the taxi trade from beginning to 
end.
1
 Not only do the licensing authorities have a major role in ‘setting the basic rules 
of the game’2 but they also monitor the implementation of those rules.  
 
   There is widespread agreement in the literature on the need for regulation of quality 
standards in the taxi market.
3
 Regulation of the quality of vehicles and of the standard 
of service provided by drivers is justified largely on the grounds of safety for both the 
passengers and other road users.
4
 A potential customer is unable to assess the quality 
of a vehicle or its driver before hiring a taxi,
5
 but unsafe vehicles or misbehaviour by 
drivers may result in serious loss or injury being sustained by the customer. 
                                                 
1
 AI Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994) 214. 
2
 T Prosser, ‘Regulation and Legitimacy’ in J Jowell and D Oliver (eds), The Changing Constitution 
(7
th
 edition, OUP, Oxford 2011) 317. 
3
 EC Gallick and DE Sisk, ‘Reconsideration of Taxi Regulation’ (1987) 3 Journal of Law, Economics 
and Organization 117, 120; LA Harris, ‘Taxicab Economics: The Freedom to Contract for a Ride’ 
(2002) 1 Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy 195, 210. 
4
 C Siebert, ‘Taxi Deregulation and Transaction Costs’ (2006) 26(2) Economic Affairs 71, 71. 
5
 C Shapiro, ‘Investment, Moral Hazard and Occupational Licensing’ (1986) 53 Review of Economic 
Studies 843, 845. 
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Qualitative regulation of service providers is said to reduce the uncertainty and risk of 
injury or loss.
6
  
 
   Similarly, individuals will be unaware of the fare rates applicable for journeys in an 
unregulated market. This could result in drivers exploiting their advantage, in terms of 
knowledge of the appropriate rates, by charging excessive fares.
7
 Regulatory 
intervention is said to redress this inherent inequality of information in an open 
market.
8
 It is also argued that fare regulation prevents service providers from taking 
advantage of the limited supply of vehicles, as a reason for charging higher fares, 
where quantitative restrictions are applied.
9
 In this chapter, I examine the application 
of these viewpoints to post-entry regulation of the taxi trade.  
 
   There is no doubt from the interviews I conducted that local licensing authorities see 
their role in post-entry regulation of the trade as being all-embracing. Councils 
consider they have control of all aspects of the trade and this is for the protection of 
the public. The following comments from three of the respondents capture the typical 
views of the local authorities:  
 
Second to the concerns about public safety it is about standards, standards of 
behaviour, standards of vehicles. So the vehicle has to be fit and so does the 
driver. And the standards we expect of them, we set them pretty high. But it’s 
all closely linked to safety as well. Interview 12, Enforcement Officer. 
 
                                                 
6
 G Akerlof, ‘The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ (1970) 84 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 488, 500. 
7
 PR Verkuil, ‘The Economic Regulation of Taxicabs’ (1970) 24 Rutgers Law Review 672, 694; RD 
Cairns and C Liston-Heyes, ‘Regulation and Competition in the Taxi Industry’ (1996) 59 Journal of 
Public Economics 1, 15. 
8
 Ogus (n 1) 4. 
9
 C Shreiber, ‘The Economic Reasons for Price and Entry Regulation of Taxicabs’ (1975) 9(3) Journal 
of Transport, Economics and Policy 268, 278; RF Teal and M Berglund, ‘The Impacts of Taxi 
Deregulation in the USA’ (1987) 21(1) Journal of Transport, Economics and Policy 37, 50. 
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We are required to look after the interests of all citizens of [this area] and do 
what is in their interests to regulate all aspects of taxi service. We know full 
well that that contact between the customer and the hackney carriage driver in 
the early hours of the morning is a relationship which is open to be abused. 
Interview 8, Senior Licensing Officer.   
 
At the end of the day if you want to be a taxi driver, these are the rules and if 
you don’t like the rules, then don’t be a taxi driver. And the rules are there for 
a reason to protect the public whether they like the rules or not that’s a 
different kettle of fish, isn’t it? Interview 20, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
 
   In this chapter, I critically assess these claims of comprehensive control and 
protecting the public. The issue considered is whether local authorities achieve the 
aim of public safety and protection within the limits prescribed by the licensing 
regime itself or whether they are simply seeking ascendancy over the trade by 
whatever means are at their disposal.
10
 I analyse each substantive area of regulation - 
vehicles, drivers and fares – separately, through the measures used to impose quality 
standards on the trade. I evaluate the relative merits and limitations of the regulatory 
instruments available to local authorities – byelaws and licence conditions – in respect 
of each area of regulation to assess their ability to achieve the desired goals. Finally, I 
examine some elements of the trade which are beyond the control of the licensing 
authority, together with the implications that this may have for public protection.  
 
   Licensing authorities use a variety of non-statutory rules, regulations, procedures, 
orders and guidelines in order to carry out the functions required of them under the 
primary legislation. The basic statutory framework is supplemented by a mixture of 
secondary and tertiary legislation.
11
 The legal status and effect of secondary 
legislation, such as statutory instruments and byelaws, are well known. The same 
                                                 
10
 M Clarke, Regulation: The Social Control of Business Between Law and Politics (Macmillan, 
Basingstoke 2000) 117. 
11
 R Baldwin, ‘Governing with Rules: The Developing Agenda’ in G Richardson & H Genn (eds), 
Administrative Law & Government Action: the Courts and Alternative Mechanisms of Review 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994). 
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cannot be said for the assortment of additional rules and regulations, which Ganz 
collectively refers to as ‘quasi-legislation’.12 The form, content, legal validity and 
status of such measures can vary between local authorities. The detail and 
sophistication of the rules may vary from very short statements of the requirements of 
the local authority on a particular subject to very long and detailed statements, often 
considered to be authoritative and determinative of the local authority’s powers in any 
given situation. Procedural rules may direct how licensing regulatory committees are 
to conduct disciplinary hearings against alleged transgressors of the rules who appear 
before them. Understanding the status of such rules is not assisted by the variety of 
names attributed to them. What one council calls ‘guidelines’ may be another 
council’s ‘code of practice’ and another’s ‘rules of practice and procedure’. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I consider the various ‘quasi-legislative’ instruments used 
by the 32 local authorities in the context of post-entry control of the trade.   
 
2) Regulation of vehicles 
 
   Upon a licence being granted, a licensed hackney carriage is regulated by means of 
local authority byelaws and conditions attached to the vehicle licence.  
 
a) Regulation by byelaws 
 
   The power to regulate the taxi trade using byelaws is provided to local authorities 
by section 68 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847. The ability to promulgate 
byelaws is discretionary; the local authority ‘may from time to time…make byelaws 
                                                 
12
 G Ganz, Quasi-legislation: recent developments in secondary legislation (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 1987). 
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for all or any of the purposes following’.13 The ‘purposes following’ are a series of 
general purposes relating to the use of vehicles, conduct of drivers and monitoring of 
fares.
14
 However, the capacity to regulate vehicles by means of byelaws is restricted 
by two factors - the limitation placed on the scope of byelaws by the empowering 
statute itself and the need for the byelaws to be approved by central government. 
 
   Under the terms of section 68, there are only three general purposes for which 
byelaws may be made to regulate vehicles. These purposes are the display of the 
vehicle’s licence number; regulation of the numbers of persons to be carried; and the 
manner in which the vehicle is furnished.
15
 Of these three, only the second has a 
direct connection to public safety issues, as an overloaded vehicle presents a clear 
danger to both passengers and other road users. The first helps to identify the vehicle 
as a licensed taxi, distinguishing it from private vehicles, and so has a tenuous 
connection to the protection of the public. The manner in which the vehicle is 
furnished, which implies the interior fittings of the vehicle, has no obvious public 
safety implications. Byelaws promulgated under section 68, however, extend the 
normally understood meaning of ‘furnished’ to include the provision of a fire 
extinguisher, first aid kit, separate means of ingress and egress for passengers and 
drivers, and a taximeter. Although they might strain the meaning of the statutory 
language, such provisions plainly involve safety features.  Nevertheless, the scope for 
regulation of vehicles by byelaw is confined by the statutory wording, and cannot 
extend to such matters as the structural and mechanical condition of the vehicle. 
 
                                                 
13
 Town Police Clauses Act 1847, s 68. 
14
 The purposes which relate specifically to vehicles are considered in the remainder of this section. 
Those which relate to drivers and fares are discussed in the appropriate section later in the chapter.   
15
 Town Police Clauses Act 1847, s 68. 
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   All the byelaws used by the councils in this study are virtually identical in 
substance, with only minor organizational and textual variations. Unlike other areas of 
vehicle regulation, this means that there is little difference between the byelaws of any 
council. This is because, although byelaws are a form of delegated legislation in their 
own right, they require the approval of the Home Secretary in order to be valid.
16
 The 
Department for Transport has issued model byelaws,
17
 and it is difficult to secure the 
confirmation of a byelaw which departs from this model.
18
 Indeed, the Department for 
Transport has made it clear that it ‘would expect local authorities to base their 
byelaws on the model’.19 This thinly disguised exhortation to standardization is 
carried into practice. Sandwell Council, for example, had one of its proposed new 
byelaws deleted by the Home Office before it was approved in 1976.
20
 More recently, 
Oadby and Wigston Council experienced a long and difficult process of approval for 
its new byelaws submitted in March 2006. After a number of amendments and 
clarifications, the byelaws were approved, in substantially the same form as the model 
byelaws, on 3
rd
 September 2007.
21
  
 
   However, the current system of regulation by byelaws is not favoured by all local 
authorities. Only 19 of the 32 councils in this study have byelaws to regulate vehicles. 
Many of the byelaws are very old and have not been reviewed or updated for many 
                                                 
16
 Local Government Act 1972, s 236(3). 
17
 The most recent version of the model byelaws was issued in July 2005, but differed little in 
substance from older versions. 
18
 SH Bailey, Cross on Principles of Local Government Law (2
nd
 edn, Sweet and Maxwell, London 
1997) [6-05]. 
19
 Department for Transport, ‘Guidance Note and Model Byelaws’ (HMSO, London, July 2005) [11].   
20
 Sandwell MBC Byelaw no 2(b)(iii) was deleted by the Home office on 1
st 
 October 1976. Sadly, 
history does not record the contents of the offending byelaw. Copeland Borough Council had a similar 
experience in 1983. 
21
 Oadby and Wigston District Council, ‘Byelaws Relating to Hackney Carriages’ 3rd September 2007.  
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years.
22
 This lack of enthusiasm for using byelaws is the product of a number of 
factors. Councils feel discouraged by the restrictions created by the statutory 
provisions, the slow and cumbersome approval process, and the fact that byelaws are 
seen as somewhat outmoded. These views are reflected in the following comments 
from three respondents:  
 
Obviously [vehicles] are governed by byelaws, but you can only go so far with 
byelaws and they can’t cover everything, especially the mechanical parts, so 
we have our own conditions too.  Interview 17, Enforcement Officer.  
 
The Home Office has got these ‘modern’ byelaws, even though they go back a 
lot of years, and you just cannot get them changed. I think they need to be 
brought up to date. To try and get those changed, chances of success - plaiting 
fog, as they say. Interview 27, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
We don’t really see the need for the use of byelaws. We can get where we 
want to go, regulate more flexibly and more instantly by licence conditions. 
They’re a bit old fashioned these days, and need to get approved by the Home 
Office. [There is] more flexibility with licence conditions and [we] can tailor 
them to our own needs. Interview 20, Senior Licensing Officer. 
  
   This is not to say that byelaws are viewed as having no advantages over other 
measures of regulation, such as licence conditions. One of the main advantages is that 
a byelaw is the law and, if validly made, has the ‘force of law within the sphere of its 
legitimate operation.’23 The view of one respondent was that councils ought to retain 
byelaws for that reason alone: 
  
Some of the byelaws are fine, but the other ones need to be brought up to date 
or put into simpler language or extended or whatever. I don’t think we should 
scrap the byelaws necessarily. I want byelaws for hackney carriages only 
because you can prosecute on the byelaws. Of course, you can’t prosecute on 
the conditions; you haven’t got the power to do that, unless you bring in new 
legislation. Interview 27, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
                                                 
22
 For example, Canterbury City Council’s current hackney carriage byelaws date from 1968 and those 
of Gloucester City Council from 1972.   
23
 Kruse v Johnson [1898] 2QB 91, 96 (Lord Russell CJ). 
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   Byelaws are also seen as the archetypal local laws. One of the main justifications for 
using byelaws instead of primary legislation is their local character and their ability to 
take into account local conditions.
24
 Laws which cater for local differences and needs 
have their uses in areas of regulation where local variations are necessary. The control 
of vehicle standards is, however, not such an area of regulation. Acceptable standards 
of cleanliness and comfort for a vehicle should be the same, regardless of where in the 
country the taxi is operating. Standards of this nature could just as easily be dealt with 
as part of a national scheme as by local byelaws. Indeed, the existing system of 
byelaws, with the need for ministerial approval and adherence to a set of model 
byelaws, resembles such a centrally organized, national system administered locally. 
This is contrary to the whole idea of local authority autonomy over the trade.
25
 
Insistence on the use of standard byelaws has the advantage of uniformity
26
 but 
undermines the ‘local’ characteristic of byelaws.  
 
b) Regulation by conditions attached to vehicle licences  
 
   Local authorities have the power to attach conditions to vehicle licences under 
section 47 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976. As with 
many other areas of taxi regulation, the power to impose conditions is discretionary. 
A district council ‘may attach to the grant of a licence of a hackney carriage under the 
Act of 1847 such conditions as the district council may consider reasonably 
necessary.’27 There is no indication of what is meant by the phrase ‘reasonably 
                                                 
24
 B Jones and K Thompson, Garner’s Administrative Law (8th edn, Butterworths, London 1996) 127. 
25
 Discussed previously in chapter 2 section 4. 
26
 Bailey (n 18) [6-05]. 
27
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s 47(1). 
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necessary’ in the statute.28 Presumably any condition imposed should be ‘reasonably 
necessary’ to achieve the purpose for which the power was granted. It will be recalled 
from earlier chapters that it is difficult to identify a single aim of the legislation, but 
local authorities always claim that they are acting for the protection of the public. 
Although there have been few reported court decisions on the exercise of the powers 
under section 47, public protection is not something which appears as a priority in the 
small number that are available. In Parsons v South Kesteven DC, the court held that 
‘reasonably necessary’ necessitated a judgment to balance the interests of the public 
on the one hand and the providers of the service on the other.
29
 The decision made by 
the court, however, strongly favoured the interests of the industry by concluding that 
it could not have been reasonably necessary to impose a fare structure which was so 
unfair on the trade.
 30
 Similarly, in Durham City Council v Fets, 
31
a list of objectives 
was put forward as justifying the imposition of a condition that all vehicles be painted 
white. These objectives included public safety, the need to distinguish hackneys from 
private hires, as well as civic image and control of taxis generally. The court decided 
that it was not reasonably necessary to paint all vehicles white in order to achieve any 
of these aims. 
 
   Although the power to impose conditions is discretionary, all 32 councils attach 
conditions to their vehicle licences. In practice, this extensive discretion produces a 
wide variety of regulatory provisions attached to vehicle licences. Some conditions 
are numerous, long and detailed, others less so. Councils take the view that it would 
                                                 
28
 Discussed in chapter 1 section 3c). 
29
 Lincoln Crown Court, November 1996, [3] (HH Judge Pollard). 
30
 ibid [18]. 
31
 Newcastle Crown Court, 10
th
 October 2005 (HH Judge Carr). 
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be ‘clearly impractical not to have conditions attached to licences.’32 This view is 
supported by the following comments from three respondents: 
 
We’ve actually spent a lot of time on our conditions policy document. It’s 
difficult…impossible, I would say, to control taxis and the taxi trade without 
adding conditions to the licence, because the powers that we have are so 
vague. You have to spell it out in the licence conditions. Interview 24, Senior 
Licensing Officer. 
   
The decisions on vehicle quality are taken by the regulatory committee. We 
set quite a high vehicle standard. All our vehicles must be fully compliant with 
this new standard. You can only achieve that by imposing conditions. 
Interview 8, Senior Licensing Officer.   
 
We need to be able to impose conditions on licences, How else are we going 
to cope with all the different situations that might come up. We need the sort 
of flexibility that conditions offer us to control the trade. Interview 35, Senior 
Licensing Officer.  
 
   These comments suggest that local authorities are aware of the advantages of 
precision and flexibility that licence conditions offer. They also show that councils 
regard control of the trade as an aim of regulation in itself rather than as a means to 
achieving the aim of public protection. Councils, therefore, tend to impose conditions 
which they think are ‘reasonably necessary’ to achieve their own interests, not 
necessarily protection of the public. This approach is often supported by the courts. In 
the recent case of R(Shanks) v Northumberland County Council,
33
 for example, the 
court held that the decision to impose conditions should be left to the local authority 
as it sees fit. It is also implicit, from some of the obiter comments in the judgment, 
that the court viewed ascendancy over the trade as an aim in itself.
34
  I examine this 
point further in the discussion of specific licence conditions which follows.   
 
                                                 
32
 Tendring Borough Council, ‘Report of Head of Licensing Services to Licensing Committee’ 3rd 
September 2009 [2]  
33
 [2012] EWHC 1539 (Admin); [2012] RTR 36. 
34
 ibid [63] (Foskett J). 
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   The use of licence conditions also allows local authorities to take a deterrence 
approach to enforcing standards. Unlike the case of byelaws, section 47 does not 
create a criminal offence of breaching or failing to observe a licence condition. 
Nonetheless, six councils impose conditions which include the warning, ‘failure to 
comply with conditions may lead to prosecution’35 or words to that effect. Whilst 
prosecution for breach of a licence condition per se is simply not possible, such 
statements are, in my view, likely to create the impression in the minds of the trade 
that the licensing authority has greater powers than it actually possesses. Even those 
councils which do not threaten licence holders with criminal sanctions make it clear 
that they regard any breach of licence condition as ‘reasonable cause’36 to suspend, 
revoke or refuse to renew a vehicle licence. Such an approach enables local 
authorities to control standards by the use of administrative sanctions.    
 
   The main disadvantage of a discretionary power to impose licence conditions is that 
it is capable of producing a variety of different provisions. This is what happens in 
practice in the case of taxi licence conditions. There are some common areas covered 
by all the licence conditions, but no two sets of vehicle licence conditions are the 
same. Simply in terms of the number of conditions imposed, there is considerable 
variation between councils. Tendring Borough Council, for instance, has only ten 
basic conditions attached to vehicle licences, whereas Worcester City Council has 40. 
The remaining councils impose conditions which vary in number between these two 
extremes.  
  
                                                 
35
 Northampton Borough Council, ‘Hackney Carriages: Byelaws, Conditions, Relevant Legislation and 
Guidelines’ (3rd edn, April 2008) [1]. 
36
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s 60(1)(c). 
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   Local authorities claim that, by setting vehicle standards through licence conditions, 
they are protecting the public. However, in many cases any connection to public 
safety or protection is, in my view, tenuous at best and often non-existent. In the 
remainder of this sub-section, I examine a number of common vehicle licence 
conditions in relation to their connection to public safety issues. The first group of 
conditions include those where there is an arguable public safety connection. This 
group includes conditions relating to the provision of safety equipment, age limits on 
vehicles, vehicle specifications, livery requirements, and the use of roof lights. The 
second set of conditions involves those which present no obvious safety concerns, and 
includes insurance provisions, conditions which repeat statutory requirements and 
other miscellaneous conditions.  
 
i) Conditions connected to public protection. 
 
   One common condition, imposed by 22 of the councils in this study, requires that all 
vehicles are provided with safety equipment, more specifically serviceable fire 
extinguishers and first aid kits. Although some councils are more specific in their 
requirements than others,
37
 such a condition has a direct and obvious connection with 
protection of the public. A condition requiring such equipment to be in the vehicle 
carries with it the implication that the driver will know how to use it. Not one of the 
councils, however, has any formal requirement for drivers to undergo first-aid or fire-
fighting training.  
 
                                                 
37
 King’s Lynn and West Norfolk Council, for example, has very particular requirements about make, 
model, capacity and location of fire extinguishers. 
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   There is no statutory limit imposed on the age of a licensed vehicle. Central 
government advice to local authorities is that there should not be any such limit, as 
older vehicles can be just as safe as newer vehicles.
38
 Nevertheless, 14 of the 32 
councils impose a maximum age limit upon their vehicles by means of a licence 
condition. Such age limits range from six years
39
 to twelve years.
40
 Councils which 
impose an age limit acknowledge that this condition is not a legal requirement, but 
claim that it is justified on the grounds of promoting the public image of the area as 
well as public safety. Three of the participants justified their council’s position as 
follows:  
  
We know it’s not a legal requirement to have an upper age limit, but we feel 
there is a need to ensure suitable vehicles [are] used for promotion of comfort 
of passengers. Having newer vehicles helps to achieve that. Interview 32, 
Senior Licensing Officer.   
 
We like our vehicles to be in exceptional condition to reflect well on the area 
and to provide comfortable journey for passengers. So that’s why we limit our 
vehicle age to eight years. After that, even well looked after cars start to go 
down hill a bit. Interview 28, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
The initial limit was to establish a higher standard of vehicle across the trade. 
The older a car gets, especially with the bashing taxis get, the more it 
deteriorates. Even one or two years can make a difference in vehicle quality. 
Interview 2, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
   The other 18 councils do not impose any age restrictions on their vehicles. In 
declining to impose an age limit, or removing an existing one, some councils 
acknowledge that it is the condition of the vehicle, not its age, that is the critical factor 
from the safety point of view. This point is illustrated by the following comments: 
 
                                                 
38
 Department for Transport, ‘Taxi and Private Hire Vehicle Licensing: Best Practice Guidance’ 
(HMSO, London, March 2010) [26,27]. 
39
 Winchester City Council. 
40
 Uttlesford District Council (Recently increased from 10 years). 
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We used to have a five year age limit, but now there isn’t an age limit, but 
anything over ten years it goes more regularly for testing. And the vehicles 
have to be immaculate, we would not accept anything other than that. 
Interview 17, Enforcement Officer.   
 
If we made them all have no older than a three year old vehicle or whatever. 
We could not justify it in terms of the vehicle is now unroadworthy, it’s 
perfectly roadworthy, there’s nothing wrong with it. It would be 
disproportionate in how it would affect the trade. Interview 11, Senior 
Licensing Officer.  
 
   However, other councils which do not impose an age limit justify their position 
largely as a response to trade concerns about falling revenues and increasing costs of 
replacing vehicles. One respondent said:   
 
The desire to improve standards has to be balanced against the impact on 
individual drivers, the economic impact on them. Income levels are recognised 
to be low for taxi drivers. There aren’t as many customers out there as there 
were, so it’s harder for them to buy newer vehicles. Interview 12, Enforcement 
Officer.  
 
   Various specifications for the vehicle often appear as licence conditions. Such 
specifications can include, for example, the internal and external dimensions of the 
vehicle, minimum engine capacity and the removal of rust, dents and scratches from 
the bodywork of the vehicle. Whilst some of these specifications relate to the 
structural and mechanical condition of the vehicle, and as such have a clear 
connection to safety issues, the majority of them do not. On the whole, councils 
explain the imposition of vehicle specifications on the grounds of improving 
passenger convenience and comfort or the public image of the trade and the area.
41
 
Two respondents made the following points: 
                                                 
41
 For example, Mid-Sussex District Council’s ‘rust, dents and scratches’ policy, which had been 
suspended in October 2009 under pressure from the trade, was reinstated from 1
st
 March 2011 due to 
concerns about the deteriorating condition of vehicles and the ‘scruffy’ and ‘unroadworthy’ appearance 
of some taxis. Mid-Sussex District Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting of Licensing Committee’ 16th 
December 2010 [24]. 
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We have our own manual with specifications that the vehicles have to comply 
with. At one time we used the London taxi one. We kind of diluted that in 
conjunction with the engineers in our own garage. Part of it is mechanical, part 
of it is cosmetic. Interview 27, Senior Licensing Officer.   
 
We adopted vehicle specs to include, for saloon vehicles, a minimum size, 
engine size, internal features for comfort of the passenger. Increased 
technology [means] the equivalent can now be achieved with a much smaller 
engine and smaller vehicles. So the specs can be amended to help savings in 
fuel, cheaper initial purchase, more environmentally friendly. Interview 3, 
Enforcement Officer.  
 
   Neither of these statements, however, explains why it is ‘reasonably necessary’ for 
some areas to have vehicles with certain characteristics when other areas license taxis 
without such characteristics. Similarly, none of the detail found in many of these 
specifications is necessary to address safety concerns. 
   Seven out of 32 councils impose a condition that all licensed vehicles should be the 
same colour. These councils claim that this makes it easier for the public to 
distinguish between hackney carriages and private hire vehicles, and so improves 
public safety.
42
 However, even amongst supporters of livery requirements, it is an 
acknowledged that other factors besides safety are taken into account, as the 
following statements indicate: 
Fleet colours are a good idea. They are distinguishable from other vehicles, 
not many other vehicles of the same colour, everyone knows that’s a taxi. The 
drivers themselves might see the benefits of having them recognisable and 
differentiated to a private hire vehicle. Interview 24, Senior Licensing Officer. 
It tells you a little bit about [the area], so I think there’s a value to that from 
the tourist perspective. But tourism and that angle of how you would promote 
[the area] would never come into the regulatory framework. But I think you 
need to look a little bit wider and just see what part the taxi service can play. 
Interview 8, Senior Licensing Officer.     
                                                 
42
 Mid-Sussex District Council, ‘Report of Head of Legal and Regulatory Services to Licensing Sub-
Committee’ 21st September 2011 [4].   
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These statements suggest that livery requirements are designed to achieve more than 
one aim, and not necessarily just public safety. Clearly, no local authority should be 
acting outside its regulatory framework, whatever goals it is trying to achieve.  
   Opponents of livery obligations take the view that the imposition of such conditions 
does not help the public to distinguish one type of hire vehicle from another and only 
serves to increase the costs to the trade. Even the choice of a suitable colour is 
problematic. These points are illustrated by the following comments: 
 
The hackney carriage proprietors objected mainly on the grounds of cost, but 
they just didn’t like it. Interfering council - dictatorship, you know, all that sort 
of thing. They could never have agreed on a colour. Do you know how many 
different shades of white there are? Also the manufacturers would add on a 
couple of grand premium because it was a particular colour. Interview 16, 
Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
Well, other authorities have come a cropper on that one. There are varying 
shades of blue, if you say blue, there’s light blue, dark blue. There are varying 
shades of white, surprisingly, even black, so, no, I don’t think we would go 
down that line. Interview 27, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
 
   The imposition of a livery is difficult to justify on safety grounds. The general 
public tends not to appreciate the difference between hackney carriages and private 
hire vehicles and care even less so long as they reach their destination. Visitors to an 
area are unlikely to know the colour of local taxis. Whilst local authorities are able to 
dictate the colour of licensed vehicles, including private hire vehicles, they are unable 
to exert the same degree of control over the general public. Councils could not 
prevent a member of the public from buying a car the same colour as a taxi. This 
could cause other members of the public to mistake a private car for a taxi. It is, 
therefore, hard to verify any claimed connection between public safety and all 
vehicles being a uniform colour.   
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   The use of illuminated roof lights is, on the other hand, seen as a feature which can 
improve public safety, as it allows the customer to identify the vehicle as a bona fide 
licensed taxi. All 32 councils impose a condition that taxis are to have a roof light or 
‘top-box’ installed and operating whilst plying for hire. The safety aspect of this is 
especially important during the hours of darkness when, for example, the colour of the 
vehicle or other identifying marks may be difficult to distinguish.
43
 This feature is 
generally seen as a safety requirement by most councils. However, even on this point, 
there are some detractors, as the following conflicting views illustrate: 
 
Obviously, we like our vehicles to display the [area] signage and the top light, 
and that’s the only identifying marks they can have. It’s the top light that 
really makes a vehicle stand out as a taxi. We’ve had them putting ‘TAXI’ 
over the back window but without the top light it’s not a taxi. Interview 17, 
Enforcement Officer. 
 
Personally, I’d paint them all silver and do away with the top boxes altogether. 
I don’t see the need for roof lights. They are difficult to see at the best of 
times, and the drivers switch them off when it suits them so that it looks like 
they’re not available. Interview 42, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
   The safety advantages of roof lights can be obscured by the over-specificity of some 
councils in respect of the location, dimensions, colours and lettering of the illuminated 
box.
44
 The detail of such conditions focuses on the attributes of the roof light, such as 
its size and location. There appears to be a lack of appreciation by regulators that it is 
simply the existence of the roof light which protects the public. 
 
 
 
                                                 
43
 Uttlesford District Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting of Licensing Committee’ 19th January 2011 [LC63]. 
44
 For example, Mid-Devon District Council imposes very detailed conditions in relation to roof signs; 
Mid-Devon District Council, ‘Hackney Carriage & Private Hire Licensing Policy 2010’ (April 2010) 
[3.1-3.5]. 
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ii) Conditions with no clear public safety connection 
 
   One of the most common vehicle licence conditions, imposed by 27 councils, 
requires the taxi to be adequately insured. This is presented as a public safety 
measure
45
 but, in my view, there is no clear connection. All vehicles used on a road 
are required by the general criminal law to be adequately insured against third party 
risks.
46
 Lack of insurance does not permit a local authority to refuse a licence,
47
 yet 
insurance cover is required as a condition of the licence once granted. Insurance is a 
sensible precaution and protects the public from the consequences of seeking damages 
against an impecunious tortfeasor. Insurance cover in itself does not produce a safer 
vehicle or driver. Furthermore, insurance does not protect the public from the 
particular events against which they are considered to be in most need of protection. 
The scope of cover under taxi insurance policies does not extend to claims for loss 
and damage sustained as a result of criminal offences, such as assault or fraud, 
committed by the driver outside the ordinary use of the vehicle as a taxi.
48
  
 
   Other examples of licence conditions which address issues which have no safety 
implications at all include those which relate to advertising in and on vehicles,
49
 those 
which require vehicle proprietors to reside within or very close to the borough,
50
 and 
conditions which insist on documentation being available in the vehicle at all times.
51
   
 
                                                 
45
 Law Commission, Reforming the Law of Taxi and Private Hire Services (Law Com CP No 203, 
2012) [8.21]. 
46
 Road Traffic Act 1988, Part VI. 
47
 Cannock Chase DC v Alldritt [1993] RTR 935. 
48
 AXN v Worboys [2012] EWHC 1730 (Admin); [2013] Lloyds Rep IR 207. 
49
 18 councils in this study had such conditions attached to vehicle licences. 
50
 Southend-on-Sea Borough Council, ‘Hackney Carriage Licence Conditions’ 2007 [7]. 
51
 Twelve councils imposed such a requirement.  
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   The vehicle licence conditions considered under this heading are relied upon by 
local authorities as instruments of administrative control over the trade, rather than as 
specific safety measures. Councils acknowledge that such conditions make their task 
of regulating the trade much easier than it would otherwise be. Two respondents made 
the following points: 
 
How else are we to keep track on the trade, who owns what vehicle and 
whether their documents and what have you are up to date, if they exist at all. 
It makes my enforcement officers’ job at lot easier, as they’ve no other way of 
checking. Interview 35, Senior Licensing Officer.  
   
It means the information is easily accessible in the event of an accident or 
incident, or if someone puts in a complaint and for compliance purposes. We 
have no power to demand documents like insurance documents and such like; 
we are not the police and don’t have their powers. Interview 17, Enforcement 
Officer. 
 
However, even if easier management of the industry is accepted as a legitimate aim of 
regulation, councils do not make clear why they believe that such conditions are 
‘reasonably necessary’ to achieve that aim.  
 
c) Conclusions on effectiveness of vehicle regulation 
 
   Byelaws provide only a limited means by which vehicle standards can be regulated. 
The sphere in which byelaws operate is restricted by the words of the enabling statute, 
together with the way in which byelaws are viewed by local authorities and the need 
for central government approval before formal adoption. These restrictions mean that 
byelaws which relate to licensed vehicles lack any connection to specific public safety 
or protection concerns, either locally or nationally. Under the current regulatory 
regime, any proposed byelaw which seeks to address such concerns is likely to be 
 194 
seen as a misuse of power and, in any event, would not gain Home Office approval. 
Byelaws, within their existing limitations, are not an effective measure for controlling 
vehicle quality standards or achieving the protection of the public. 
 
   Licence conditions, on the other hand, have the advantages of a wider scope of 
regulation, flexibility, and more precision than statutory or byelaw provisions. They 
are enforceable by administrative rather than criminal sanctions. However, they are 
also capable of producing wide variation in standards expected of licence holders. 
This can create a situation where a vehicle considered safe and suitable for use as a 
taxi in one area might not be considered so in a neighbouring area, something which 
is recognised by local authorities. One respondent made the point that:  
 
As our neighbours have different standards from ours, we have to bear that in 
mind, especially if we decide to change things. You’ll see people suddenly 
moving their vehicles to a neighbouring [area] because they don’t have an 
obstacle that we are seen to have. Interview 24, Senior Licensing Officer.    
  
   The flexibility of licence conditions enables them to be amended more quickly than 
statute or byelaws in the event of any change in local authority standards. This allows 
councils to recognise that vehicle standards are fluid and capable of improvement. 
The councils are generally satisfied with the way in which vehicle standards are 
achieving the local authority’s idea of effectiveness. One respondent said: 
 
Yes, it is raising standards and achieving what we set out to achieve. We have 
developed our own standards and have seen a significant number of vehicles 
come off the road to be replaced by new ones that meet the standard. Interview 
8, Senior Licensing Officer.  
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   Overall, I think that judging the effectiveness of vehicle regulation is difficult 
because it is not clear what local authorities are seeking to achieve. Public protection 
is claimed to be the aim, but this is not fully reflected in how councils go about their 
task. If a licence condition is not ‘reasonably necessary’ to further the aim of 
regulation, it is an improper use of the local authority’s power to impose it at all. Yet 
there are many examples of licence conditions which have no connection to the 
protection of the public.
52
 Even where a tenuous link to this regulatory aim exists, the 
way in which the licence condition operates is often remote from public safety 
concerns. Ascendancy over the trade, the public image of the area and the economic 
situation of taxi proprietors and drivers are all irrelevant to the question of protection 
of the public. But these issues feature prominently in local authority decisions about 
imposing vehicle standards. 
 
   I think there should be a system of national safety standards for vehicles in view of 
the limitations of the current system of byelaws and licence conditions. National 
vehicle standards would have to be set centrally, based on safety specific standards 
and which could be imposed by licence conditions. The current system of post-entry 
control of vehicles through byelaws is unsuitable. The quality standards which can be 
covered by byelaws are too restricted and the need to obtain central government 
approval is too inflexible. As byelaws are local in nature, they would not be 
appropriate to implement and enforce a system of national uniform standards.
53
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52
 Such as those discussed in section 2) b) ii) above. 
53
 Discussed further in Chapter 8. 
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3) Regulation of driver conduct  
 
   Just like the vehicles they drive, hackney carriage drivers are subjected to local 
authority regulation as soon as they are granted a licence. However, unlike the case of 
vehicles, the extent to which councils are able to control driver conduct is not clear-
cut. Even the measures available to regulate the behaviour of licensed drivers are 
contestable. In this section, I analyse regulation of driver conduct through the 
measures utilized by local authorities, including the steps taken to address the 
limitations of those measures. 
 
a) Regulation by byelaws 
 
   The general position with regard to regulation of the trade through byelaws has 
already been considered in the context of vehicle licences. The observations regarding 
the nature and limitation of byelaws are equally applicable to driver’s licences as they 
are to vehicle licences.
54
 However, regulation of drivers by byelaw differs from the 
position of vehicles in two important respects. First, the byelaws relating to drivers set 
general standards which are wider in scope than those which apply to vehicles. 
Second, driver byelaws have to be formulated in this way because they are the only 
legitimate method of controlling driver behaviour and conduct. Under section 68 of 
the Town Police Clauses Act 1847, the only general purpose for which byelaws may 
be made in respect of drivers is to regulate  
 
                                                 
54
 These observations are discussed at length in section 2 a) of this chapter. 
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the conduct of the proprietors and drivers of hackney carriages…and 
determining whether such drivers shall wear any and what badges, and for 
regulating the hours within which they may exercise their calling.
55
  
 
   Although the extent of this provision is vague, there is a clear relationship between 
what the byelaws are intended to cover and the protection of the public against 
physical or financial misbehaviour on the part of the driver. In particular, the ability to 
regulate a driver’s ‘conduct’ is capable of a purposive interpretation to permit control 
of those aspects of a driver’s behaviour which may have an adverse affect on public 
safety. 
 
   However, the connection to public protection is somewhat mixed when this general 
purpose is implemented in practice. Some of the approved byelaws have a direct link 
to protection of the public. These are byelaws requiring the operation of taximeters on 
all journeys
56
 and carriage of the correct number of passengers. Such byelaws are 
clearly designed to prevent passengers from being taken financial advantage of and to 
avoid overloading the vehicle. All the 19 councils which have byelaws issued drivers 
with badges and had a byelaw requiring the driver to wear the badge at all times 
whilst standing or plying for hire. I think this byelaw has only a tangential connection 
to public protection in that it identifies the driver as a licensed driver and assists in 
identifying that driver in the event of an incident or complaint. The remaining model 
byelaws have no direct connection with public safety and are more related to image 
and simple control of the trade than the protection of the public. Into this category fall 
byelaws covering the conduct of drivers on ranks, punctual attendance at bookings, 
                                                 
55
 Town Police Clauses Act 1847, s 68. 
56
 This provision is considered in more detail in the section on fare regulation which is discussed later 
in this chapter. 
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the dress, appearance and manners of drivers, provision of assistance to customers 
with luggage, and prohibiting ‘touting’ for custom.57  
 
   There are no provisions in the model byelaws relating to the hours during which 
drivers may engage in their trade. Councils do not seek to control drivers’ hours, 
either by setting a maximum number of permitted driving hours or limiting driving to 
certain hours of the day. Although the issue of drivers’ hours has obvious safety 
implications, local authorities view attempts to control driving hours as unworkable, 
unenforceable and a restraint upon the drivers’ ability to trade. Three respondents 
explained their council’s position on drivers’ hours as follows: 
 
We don’t, for example, try to limit what hours the drivers can work. It would 
be useful to try to control drivers’ hours but you just can’t do it, and I don’t 
know how you would enforce it even if you could. They rely on picking up as 
many fares as possible and, if you limited their hours, some days they just 
wouldn’t earn enough to make it worth their while going out. Interview 6, 
Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
No, we don’t control drivers’ hours. [I am] not sure how you would keep an 
eye on that and monitor it short of putting a ‘tacho’ in the cab. We’re not their 
employers; we can’t say how many hours they can work. There’s nothing to 
stop them getting out of one car, then doing another eight hour shift in another 
car. Interview 32, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
What you’d get is two things; one, you’d get a flood of taxis at the ‘cream’ 
times when it was busy and none at all at the quiet times; and two, the trade 
would accuse us of preventing them from earning a living, because they could 
not make their money in the time allowed. Interview 20, Senior Licensing 
Officer. 
 
   Although this is an area where local authorities have the legal power to control 
driver behaviour in a way which would protect the public from tired drivers, they 
choose not to use it for pragmatic reasons, even though those reasons are not safety 
                                                 
57
 Department for Transport, ‘Model Byelaws’ (n 19). 
 199 
related. And yet, as other parts of this thesis illustrate, councils are not so reticent in 
controlling other aspects of a driver’s working conditions.    
 
   The decision of the High Court in Wathan v Neath and Port Talbot CBC
58
 made it 
clear that byelaws are the only legitimate method by which the conduct of a driver can 
be regulated.
59
 This decision raises particular difficulties for local authorities which 
do not have any byelaws relating to hackney carriages. Whilst control over vehicles 
can be exercised by the imposition of licence conditions, there is no power to regulate 
driver behaviour and conduct by the same method. Nor is any alternative regulatory 
mechanism for drivers provided for other than byelaws. How councils seek to control 
the behaviour of drivers without relying upon or resorting to byelaws is considered in 
the next sub-section of this chapter. An indication of the importance councils attach to 
control of the trade is given by the lengths they go to in order to circumvent the 
difficulties caused by the decision in Wathan.   
 
b) ‘Conditions’ on drivers’ licences. 
 
   In this sub-section, I consider the issue of conditions attached to drivers’ licences in 
two respects. The first is whether it is lawful to impose such conditions at all. The 
second is the contents of the conditions themselves on the assumption that they are 
legal.  
  
 
 
                                                 
58
 [2002] EWHC 1634 (Admin) 
59
 The effect of this judgment was discussed in chapter 1 section 3c) 
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i) The lawfulness of drivers’ licence conditions 
 
   Imposing conditions on a licence can only be used as a technique of regulation in 
the case of vehicles. There is no power to impose conditions upon a hackney carriage 
driver’s licence.60 Some councils recognise the difficulties that this causes for 
exercising control over driver behaviour, much to the frustration of licensing officials: 
 
You have the anomaly in the law where you can put conditions on a private 
hire driver’s badge requiring [the driver] to tell us of any convictions, but you 
can’t impose the same condition for hackney carriage drivers. And that could 
be a big issue. It’s things like that cause a problem for people. Interview 27, 
Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
I would implement a complete care package for drivers through the licence 
conditions to enhance the reputation and professionalism of the drivers as 
ambassadors for the city. But at the moment you just can’t do it. Interview 11, 
Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
   The dissatisfaction of council officials with this state of affairs is easy to 
understand. Local authorities feel they need to exercise control over the behaviour of 
the trade, and view licence conditions as the most flexible and practical measure for 
achieving such control. This point is expressed clearly with regard to vehicle 
licences,
61
 and a similar view is echoed in relation to drivers’ licences. The following 
statements from three respondents illustrate the belief councils have in the need to 
employ some method of controlling driver behaviour and conduct. 
 
We have the conditions that we consider reasonably necessary to regulate the 
hackney carriage drivers in our district. We try to keep it to what’s reasonable, 
but we have to maintain some sort of control, otherwise drivers would do what 
they liked. Interview 37, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
                                                 
60
 Wathan (n 58).  
61
 Discussed in section 2 b) of this chapter. 
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There are 18 separate conditions on our drivers’ licences relating to general 
conduct of the driver. They cover all the main statutory requirements plus 
some of our own to deal with some additional or higher standards that we may 
want to impose. Interview 32, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
Our drivers’ licences are subject to a number of conditions. [They] cover 
things like notifying the council within seven days of any conviction, caution 
or fixed penalty notices. Historically, we found that drivers were not coming 
to us with that sort of information until renewal, so we made it a condition so 
that we are informed straightaway. Interview 45, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
 
   Notwithstanding the authoritative statement of the law on this issue from the High 
Court in Wathan, central government advice to local authorities is that this decision 
has been misinterpreted and there is an implied power to impose conditions on a 
driver’s licence.62 In my view, the Department for Transport’s arguments on this point 
are unconvincing. Had Parliament intended local authorities to have the power to 
impose conditions on a driver’s licence, it could have done so in the 1976 Act, just as 
it did for private hire vehicles. However, such conflicting advice makes policy 
decisions difficult for local authorities. One respondent explained the dilemma as 
follows: 
 
What do you do? Do you go along with the ‘untested’ - probably the politest 
way to describe it - opinion of the DfT or do you follow a judgment from the 
High Court? The trade are capable of causing us enough problems as it is 
without inviting them to take us to judicial review. It would be an open goal. 
Interview 30, Senior Licensing Officer.   
 
   Despite an absence of power to impose conditions, 25 of the councils included in 
this study attempt to do so. A variety of devices is used to exercise control over 
drivers through licence ‘conditions’. The most common method of avoiding the 
difficulties caused by Wathan is for local authorities to issue ‘dual-licences’. Such 
licences permit the holder to drive both hackney carriages and private hire vehicles, 
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 Department for Transport, ‘Model Byelaws’ (n 19). 
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but the licensing authority uses its powers to attach conditions to the private hire 
driver part of the licence.
63
 15 councils
64
 issue dual licences for this purpose. One 
respondent justified the council’s approach as follows:  
 
Following Wathan, the consensus of opinion was that the cheapest and most 
practical way of ensuring continued control of the hackney carriage trade 
would be to issue dual licences to all hackney carriage drivers. That way 
conditions could be attached under the Miscellaneous Provisions Act powers 
to attach conditions to private hire driver’s licences. Interview 35, Senior 
Licensing Officer. 
 
   Councils which acknowledge their lack of power to attach conditions to drivers’ 
licences, attempt to control driver conduct by other less obvious means. They may, for 
example, call the requirements something other than ‘conditions’, such as a ‘code of 
conduct.’ Six of the 32 councils issued codes of conduct for their drivers. The content 
and detail of these codes varied between councils, but essentially they attempted to 
regulate the behaviour of drivers in their dealings with members of the public and 
with other drivers when standing at taxi ranks.
65
 Two respondents explained the scope 
of their codes of conduct as follows:  
 
There is a ‘code of conduct’ for drivers requiring them…amongst other things, 
to be courteous and polite at all times. Normally, it’s the sort thing that would 
be covered by licence conditions, but as no conditions can be attached. 
Interview 12, Enforcement Officer. 
 
All our drivers are provided with an ‘info pack’ detailing all the requirements 
of drivers. This relates to the conduct expected of a licence holder in [this 
area] and is on top of the licence conditions. So it covers standards that cannot 
be covered by byelaws or conditions, such as how a driver would ensure a 
                                                 
63
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s 51(2) 
64
 This includes two councils, Newcastle upon Tyne and Cornwall, where a dual licence is available, at 
the option of the driver, as an alternative to an ordinary hackney carriage or private hire driver’s 
licence.  
65
 It is not clear whether the codes issued by Mid-Devon or King’s Lynn and West Norfolk councils are 
attached as a purported condition to the licence or in addition to it. Lancaster’s code is not significantly 
different from the conditions imposed on drivers’ licences before the Wathan decision. 
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passenger reached their destination safely and on time in the event of a 
puncture or breakdown. Interview 2, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
   Whatever they may be called, councils regard these measures as de facto licence 
conditions, because failure to abide by the code of conduct may lead to suspension or 
revocation or refusal to renew the licence. As one respondent explained: 
 
After Wathan we realized that we could not use licence conditions for drivers 
any more. So we introduced a code of conduct as a way of keeping some sort 
of control over drivers. It might not be as enforceable as licence conditions but 
if drivers breach the code, that does call into question whether they are still a 
‘fit and proper person’ to hold a licence. Interview 16, Senior Licensing 
Officer.  
 
   Seven councils just ignore the point altogether and impose what purport to be 
conditions on the driver’s licence anyway. None of these councils suggest that they 
have implied power to impose conditions as the Department for Transport claims they 
have.
66
                 
 
   Non-statutory codes and guidelines, such as the devices used by councils to regulate 
driver behaviour, may, according to the literature, be given legal effect by making the 
grant or renewal of a licence conditional upon compliance with such a code.
67
  The 
use of such devices by local authorities to control drivers goes further than simply 
threatening to refuse future licence applications. Councils maintain regulation of the 
trade by threatening lesser administrative sanctions, such as written warnings as to 
future conduct,
68
 for non-compliance with ‘conditions’ or codes of practice. This is in 
addition to more severe administrative sanctions, such as suspension or revocation of 
                                                 
66
 Department for Transport, ‘Model Byelaws’ (n 19). 
67
 Ganz (n 12) 25. 
68
 Flintshire County Borough Council, ‘Hackney Carriage and Private Hire Drivers’ Licence 
Applications – Guidance on the Treatment of Convictions, Cautions, Criminal Charges or Other 
Recorded Sanctions’ 16th February 2011 [4.4]. 
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the licence, and even prosecution.
69
 It matters little whether such requirements are 
called conditions, guidelines or codes of conduct. Councils which issue such dire 
warnings, however, do not make clear how they could possibly prosecute a licence 
holder for breaching a measure which does not in itself create a criminal offence and 
which has a doubtful legal status. 
 
   Whatever councils may call them, in my view these devices are ultra vires local 
authority powers and, as such, legally unenforceable against licence holders. It might 
be suggested that councils’ attempts to control drivers’ behaviour and conduct are 
‘calculated to facilitate, or [are] conducive or incidental to, the discharge’ of the 
council’s functions within the meaning of section 111 of the Local Government Act 
1972. As such, they would be a lawful exercise of local authority ‘general 
competence’ powers and thereby enforceable. However, I think this is a very dubious 
argument as there is already a complete statutory scheme for regulating drivers’ 
conduct by means of byelaws and so there is no scope for implying the existence of 
additional powers outside the statutory code.
70
 It is noteworthy that neither local 
authorities nor central government attempt to rely on ‘general competence’ powers to 
justify attaching what purport to be conditions on a driver’s licence.71 
 
   Councils do not necessarily appreciate that their powers to impose conditions on 
driver licences are limited. Elected representatives in particular point out that they are 
reliant on legal advice from appointed officials and are not always aware of the extent 
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 Uttlesford District Council op cit [AI 9]. 
70
 Credit Suisse v Waltham Forest LBC [1997] QB 362 
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 After February 2012 a similar argument might be advanced for the scope of local authority powers 
under Localism Act 2011, s 1(1). However, the strength of such an argument, where there is an existing 
statutory scheme, is still in some doubt according to dicta in Manydown Company Ltd v Basingstoke 
and Deane DC [2012] EWHC 977 (Admin); [2012] JPL 1188 [145] (Lindblom J). 
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of their legal powers. In April 2010, for example, Gloucester City Council revoked all 
existing drivers’ licences and immediately replaced them with new ones incorporating 
new licence conditions. This action was taken in the belief, supported by counsel’s 
advice, that the need to impose new licence conditions was ‘reasonable cause’ to 
revoke existing licences and was within the Council’s discretion.72 A similar view 
was expressed by two of the respondents: 
 
I’m pretty new to the taxi licensing game, and we’re not lawyers of course, so 
we are pretty much in the hands of our officers for the appropriate legal 
advice. When they tell us that what we decide is within our discretionary 
powers, we have to take it that it’s right. Interview 21, Chair of Licensing 
Committee. 
 
I’m not familiar with that case [Wathan], no. We rely on our officers for legal 
advice, and they are usually pretty good, so we have to take it from them that 
we are operating within the law in everything we do. Interview 33, Chair of 
Licensing Committee.  
 
   The effectiveness of such non-statutory codes rests on the acceptance by those who 
are regulated by the code of the legitimacy of the decision maker to impose it.
73
 It is 
clear that the 32 councils believe that their ‘quasi-legislative’ measures, whatever 
form they take, are necessary to control driver behaviour, and do control the conduct 
of drivers in practice. However, this is more a resigned recognition by the trade of the 
council’s dominant position over them than any acceptance of the legitimacy of the 
measures used. This is illustrated by the views of two taxi representative respondents:  
 
Well, at the end of the day, they are the council. They have the final say over 
whether you have a business or you don’t. So it’s probably not too wise to 
upset them. I don’t always agree with what they do…I just go along with 
whatever they say to avoid any hassle. Interview 22, Taxi Representative. 
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 Gloucester City Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting of Licensing and Enforcement Committee’ 10th April 
2010 [5.7]. 
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 Ganz (n 12) 96. 
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You get a feeling that some of what [the council] decides is a bit dodgy 
legally, but what can you do? If you want to dispute it, you’ll need 
determination and deep pockets. Much as I enjoy sticking it to the council, I’d 
rather be out earning a living than fighting it out in some court room and 
lining the lawyers’ pockets. Interview 19, Taxi  Representative. 
 
   All this indicates that, whatever the legal status of drivers’ licence ‘conditions’, the 
trade generally accepts that the council uses measures to exercise de facto control 
over drivers’ conduct and behaviour. As the above quotations suggest, this acceptance 
is more by way of acquiescence on the part of the trade rather than a formal 
acknowledgment of the lawfulness of the steps taken by the authority. This can be as a 
result of ignorance, a desire not to upset the status quo, or the local authority creating 
an aura of legitimacy. Even if the lawfulness of those standards is called into question, 
identifiable and measurable standards are preferable to the alternative of arbitrary and 
unpublished standards. One respondent observed that: 
 
We’d welcome national standards across the board. All sorts of local 
interpretations are happening. That doesn’t do anybody’s reputation any good. 
If drivers are moving around, it’s good for them to know what the standards 
are and the standards are the same whichever authority they go to. Interview 
25, Enforcement Officer. 
 
This is an important comment in respect of maintaining uniformity and consistency 
across the trade. However, if the standards are set on unsure legal foundations, then it 
would only take one challenge from the trade to render those standards ineffective. 
 
ii) Specific drivers’ licence ‘conditions’. 
 
   Ignoring for the time being the issues surrounding the lawfulness or otherwise of 
drivers’ licence conditions, local authorities use their licensing powers to impose 
 207 
certain requirements upon drivers. The most prevalent of these obligations is in 
respect of training and qualifications, including mandatory training requirements as a 
condition of continuing to hold their licence. Other, more unusual conditions relate to 
dress codes, recording bookings and prohibition of sexual activity.  
 
   Twelve councils, as a ‘condition’ of the licence, require drivers to undergo formal 
training, normally within their first year of holding a licence or by a specified date. 
The training typically addresses ‘customer care’ or ‘disability awareness’ issues and 
usually leads to a nationally recognised qualification.
74
  Whilst such post-entry 
training may have advantages for the quality of service provided to the public, the 
training schemes raise issues concerning funding and measurable improvements in 
safety. The idea of compulsory post-entry training is a popular one amongst councils. 
Even councils which do not enforce training by licence conditions encourage drivers 
to undergo some form of training and would make training compulsory if the financial 
burden was not placed on the council. One respondent said of training:  
 
The NVQ qualification would help, I think, and we encourage our drivers to 
go for that. I don’t think we can make it compulsory though. Who pays for it 
all if the government suddenly pulls the plug on the funding? Interview 30, 
Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
   Some councils which impose a training condition are happy with the outcomes. It is 
believed that this form of post-entry training ‘ensures the highest standards within the 
trade’.75 The majority of councils are, however, less impressed with the results of 
training requirements. This can be because the training is not considered effective, 
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 The most common qualification was the NVQ in Transporting Passengers in Taxis and Private Hire 
Vehicles. Other councils used the BTEC equivalent qualification. 
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 Cherwell District Council, ‘Report of Head of Urban and Rural Services to Licensing Committee’ 
15
th
 December 2009 [1.21].  
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particularly when imposed on existing members of the trade. Other reasons are that 
the standard of training provided is not considered adequate, and doubts about the 
results of training schemes in terms of improvements to quality standards. These 
concerns are illustrated by the following comments: 
 
The NVQ qualification went down very poorly, well, not well anyway, with 
experienced drivers. They thought it was like teaching their grandmother to 
suck eggs. So it did not change their behaviour at all. Interview 14, Chair of 
Licensing Committee. 
 
I’m not being overly cynical but there was sufficient evidence that what was 
happening is, I’m supposed to be doing an assessment on you. You tick box, I 
tick box, I sign it, you get your certificate, I draw the funding down. Quality of 
training - rubbish.  Interview 8, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
A lot of authorities have all kinds of things on drivers, you know, the customer 
care type qualifications. The ones that have passed, when you see them. Well, 
some of them must have been cheating, that’s all I can say. I don’t think it 
serves any purpose. Interview 27, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
Such training schemes are essentially an exercise which allows councils to 
demonstrate a commitment to improving standards without having any means of 
measuring such improvement or any demonstrable benefit to the public or the trade.  
 
   Three councils impose a ‘dress-code’ for drivers. There is no obvious public safety 
issue here,
76
 particularly the requirement to wear, for example, a shirt and collar or to 
refrain from wearing shorts.
77
 Opinion is divided on the merits and effectiveness of 
operating a dress code as the two following statements illustrate: 
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 In the Restormel zone of Cornwall there was an unfortunate incident where a driver’s ‘flip- flop’ 
tangled in the pedals causing an accident. This resulted in a call for a countywide dress code for drivers 
although this was not pursued. Cornwall Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting of Miscellaneous Licensing 
Committee’ 17th September 2010 [MLC/101]. 
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We used to have a lot of complaints about dirty and scruffy looking drivers as 
well as cars. You don’t want some guy who looks like a tramp driving you 
around. It gives a poor impression. It’s really all about promoting the 
ambassadorial role of the taxi driver. Interview 20, Senior Licensing Officer.   
 
We don’t require our drivers to stick to a dress code. That would be utterly 
ridiculous, making them all dress a certain way. How does that affect their 
driving? Interview 14, Chair of Licensing Committee.  
 
   Some of the more bizarre requirements imposed by licence conditions include a 
requirement for hackney carriage driver to keep a record of all bookings.
78
 This, for 
some unexplained reason, applies to pre-bookings only and not to passengers who are 
picked up from ranks or street-hails. Another unusual ‘condition’ is a prohibition on 
any sexual activity, consensual or otherwise, in a licensed vehicle, in order to reduce 
the number of incidents of serious sexual crime.
79
 None of these requirements have 
any clear connection to public safety and are further measures controlling the conduct 
of drivers for the sake of such control. 
 
c) Conclusions on driver regulation 
 
   So far as regulation of drivers’ conduct is concerned, the only instrument of control 
provided for by the legislation is byelaws. The byelaws relating to drivers have wider 
scope for regulation than those which apply to vehicles, and could be used more 
widely if a broad interpretation of ‘conduct’ is adopted. However, there is nothing in 
the control of driver activities which has a particularly ‘local’ flavour. Safe, honest 
and competent drivers exhibit those characteristics wherever they choose to ply their 
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 Northampton Borough Council, ‘Hackney Carriages: Byelaws, Conditions, Relevant Legislation and 
Guidelines’ 3rd edition, April 2008 [23]. 
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 Cherwell District Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting of Licensing Committee’ 15th December 2009 
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trade. This calls into question whether byelaws are the most appropriate way of 
setting and enforcing driver standards. Nevertheless, as the regulatory system is 
currently framed, byelaws have to be as effective as regulators can make them as they 
are the only legitimate means of control. 
 
   Attempts to regulate drivers by other instruments, such as codes of conduct, have no 
statutory basis and are legally unenforceable. This does not prevent local authorities 
from using such instruments and, regardless of what name is given to them, they are 
effectively treated as conditions on the driver’s licence. The effectiveness of such 
measures rests on the unsure grounds of the councils’ own belief in their powers of 
control and the acceptance by the trade, reluctantly or otherwise, of the de facto 
lawfulness of those measures. Where local authorities attempt to regulate driver 
behaviour through licence ‘conditions’, there is rarely any connection between those 
conditions and the protection of the public. Moves towards national driver standards, 
to be discussed later, imposed by licence conditions would have to ensure that they 
were directed towards protection of the public, if they are to be effective. 
   
4) Regulation of Fares 
 
   This area of regulation is the one least mentioned in the literature. This is surprising 
as, in my experience, it is the main concern of the travelling public, often ahead of 
safety and availability issues. Fares are also of considerable interest to the proprietors 
and drivers as they provide an indication of their potential earning capacity. Control 
of fares is done in two stages - fare setting and the regulation of that set fare.
80
  
                                                 
80
 Discussed previously in chapter 1 section 3d) 
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a) Setting fare rates under the statutory procedure 
 
   It is paradoxical that the two general purposes for which byelaws could have been 
made under the original version of section 68 of the 1847 Act which have distinct 
local characteristics, the placing of taxi stands and the setting of fares, were removed 
from the scope of byelaws altogether and replaced by statutory schemes.
81
 In this sub-
section, I focus attention on the system created to set the rates of fares which taxi 
drivers are entitled to charge. This scheme is now found in section 65 of the 1976 Act. 
Although the setting of fares is still a matter for local authority discretion, it should be 
noted that the statutory procedure applies nationally. Section 65 only sets out a 
statutory procedure for the setting of fares. It does not provide any indication of the 
rate at which fares should be set or how that rate is to be calculated. The statutory 
procedure provides for the fixing of fare rates in the form of a fare table, publication 
of the table in local newspapers and at council offices, an opportunity for objections 
to be made, and a date upon which the table comes into force.
82
  
 
   The need to regulate fares according to the relevant literature was discussed in 
Chapter 2.
83
 It is recognised that setting prices generally for a regulated business 
requires a balance to be achieved between the desires of consumers for low prices and 
the businesses’ wish to maximize profits. For this reason, regulators are given a 
degree of discretion in setting fares.
84
 The need for balance is acknowledged by the 
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Department for Transport in its recommendation that local authorities should pay 
particular regard to what it is reasonable to expect people to pay and the need to give 
taxi drivers sufficient incentive to provide a service when it is needed.
85
  
 
   Without any statutory or other guidance, how do local authorities set rates of fares? 
It is suggested in the literature that rates should be set at a level which prevents excess 
profits, holds prices down to costs and assures administrative ease.
86
 Ogus identifies 
two principal categories of price setting methods - one which affects a fair rate of 
return for suppliers, the other which limits prices by reference to a historic base and 
permits incremental increases to take into account the extent to which suppliers can 
control their costs.
87
 In practice, there is no link between these models and the setting 
of fares. In particular, there is little correlation between actual costs to the trade of 
operating taxis and the fares permitted. There is little public participation in the fare 
setting exercise, despite the statutory scheme designed to encourage such 
involvement.
88
 Councils do not take into account customers’ ability to pay or other 
needs of the travelling public. 
 
   The predominant influence over the fixing of fares is the trade. This suggests some 
degree of regulatory capture. It is recognised by writers on capture that regulators 
might use whatever discretion is at their disposal to favour whichever group brings 
the most pressure to bear on their decision making.
89
 When it comes to fixing fares, 
all the pressure upon the council emanates from the trade. There is no countervailing 
interest from the public or the authority itself. The fact that the trade is so influential 
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when it comes to fare setting stands in contrast to the position on the other aspects of 
post-entry regulation. The preceding sections of this chapter show that, in controlling 
quality standards for both vehicles and drivers, the regulator has the ascendancy and 
benefits most from regulation. In the case of fares, however, the converse is true. The 
following statements reflect the typical position so far as local authorities are 
concerned: 
  
The trade themselves can apply for an increase in tariffs at any time, and have 
done so previously The taxi trade themselves set their fare. They obviously do 
their homework and see what is happening in [other areas], and so they set 
their fares and then the local authority have to approve the new fare regime. 
Interview 24, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
The trade come to us. We would discuss and table something. We would then 
put it out for consultation in the statutory process. We have recently increased 
our fare tariffs in [this area] by two and a half per cent in accordance with an 
application by the trade. Interview 30, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
We have an annual review. The trade put forward any proposals in writing that 
they want to be considered. If they want an increase, we put it out to advertise 
in accordance with the statutory procedure and then it’s brought in.  Interview 
45, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
The local authority actually sets it, in that we authorise it, approve it and agree 
the fare tariffs. But the impetus comes from the trade. We don’t go to them 
and say would you like to put your prices up. Interview 12, Enforcement 
Officer. 
 
   Councils justify allowing the trade to direct fare setting on the grounds that councils 
are ignorant of the costs involved in running the taxi business. Local authorities also 
claim that they face competing pressures from opposing factions of the trade. 
Regardless of how valid these justifications may be, the influence of the trade is still 
predominant, as the following statement illustrates: 
 
We consult all the taxi proprietors each year. We only know vague details 
about the costs of running their taxi. We all know the cost of petrol and diesel 
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and the cost of road tax and insurance. But there could be many other things 
that we don’t know. But it’s their business, we ask them. Interview 27, Senior 
Licensing Officer.   
 
   Two councils in the study base their setting of fares on long-standing formulae. This 
approach is closest to the historic base method described in the literature but takes 
into account external costs, all of which are beyond the control of proprietors and 
drivers. The formulae are normally linked to the Retail Prices Index for transport costs 
with the calculation of a percentage increase based on that figure. Even here the 
influence of the trade can be clearly seen, as the formulae and the weighting upon 
which the increases are calculated are agreed with taxi representatives.
90
 Other local 
authorities leave the issue of fare setting and fare increases to the trade.  
 
   I was surprised how accommodating the local authorities are in meeting the 
demands of those they regulate when it comes to the setting of fares.
91
 In the period 
studied, between April 2010 and March 2011, every request for an increase in fares 
from the trade, within the 32 councils studied, was agreed by the council. This may be 
explained in part by an acceptance by the regulators that this is how the system works 
and partly by the reasonableness of the request itself. This point is illustrated by the 
following statements:  
 
 It’s the trade that comes to us with their request for an increased tariff. What 
they ask for is generally approved by the licensing committee. Interview 12, 
Enforcement Officer. . 
 
We’re not here to ruin their business. We know they’ve got to make a living. 
Fuel and insurance don’t come cheap. We’ll try to help them as much as we 
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can, so long as they are reasonable. At the end of the day they are self-
employed. Interview 20, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
I’ve negotiated a few times with councils about fare increases and I think so 
long as you are fair and don’t go too over the top, then they are normally 
willing to approve any fare increase we ask for. I’ve never known them say 
‘no’ yet. Interview 50, Taxi Representative. 
 
   The accommodative approach taken by local authorities towards fare setting may 
also be explained by the absence of any effective objection to the proposed fare. It is 
generally the case that no objections are received to advertised fare increases. But the 
study revealed a number of instances in which fares were increased in accordance 
with trade requests, even in the face of objections. This is partly as a result of the way 
the fare setting procedure is structured. The statutory provisions mean that, even if an 
objection is made, the new fare table comes into force on whatever date is set by 
council. This is the case, regardless of any objections, and the council is not obliged to 
modify fares in response to objections, although it may do.
92
 However, in practice, the 
approved fares are rarely changed because objections either are seen to make no 
difference or originate from the trade itself. The following statements illustrate this 
point:   
 
Once the new fares are set, they are put out to advertising under the statutory 
procedure, but then they are in place regardless of any objections. We may 
consider them but at the end of the day they make no difference. The new 
fares come in anyway. I don’t recall us ever changing the fares in response to 
objections, not that we get that many. Interview 1, Chair of Licensing 
Committee. 
 
The new fares will still come in on the appointed date whether changed or not 
as a result of objections. If there are any objections come back then we would 
send it to cabinet but the new fares still come into force on the appointed day. 
Interview 8, Senior Licensing Officer.  
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The trouble is the trade can’t agree amongst itself, most objections are from 
the trade. We hardly ever - in fact I’d probably say never - get any objections 
from members of the general public. Interview 16, Senior Licensing Officer.   
 
   Given the influence which the trade has over the rate of fares set, the question must 
be asked why taxi proprietors and drivers do not try to set fares at higher rates. The 
study showed that the trade tends to seek small increases to existing fares, usually 
only a matter of extra pence per mile. The trade’s restraint may be in an effort to 
appear moderate and reasonable in its demands for fare increases. Owners and drivers 
want to avoid antagonising and alienating the public by setting fares too high, as this 
is likely to have a detrimental effect on business. This can be illustrated by the 
following statements from three taxi representative respondents:   
 
I feel that we as a trade have done our bit to be as fair as possible. We have 
appreciated that times are hard and people don’t have the disposable income 
they used to have. These are difficult times, we all know that. Things are bad 
for us just like they are for everybody else. Increasing costs, fuel costs have 
gone up enormously. We decided as a trade not to request an increased fare 
tariff this year. Interview 26, Taxi Representative. 
 
This year, although we would probably want another review in about six 
months time, we decided we don’t want it increased at all. I just don’t think 
the state of the market would support it. Interview 29, Taxi Representative. 
 
We’ve got to deal with the impact of rising fuel charges on our business. But, I 
think that the feeling is that a fare rise in the current economic climate would 
damage the taxi industry in the district. Interview 19, Taxi Representative. 
 
These statements suggest that the trade has regard to the effect on the travelling public 
of setting a fare at too high a rate than the market can stand. This is for self-interested 
purposes, as excessive demands will have a detrimental effect on their business. 
However, the setting of fares is supposed to be the function of the regulator. It is not a 
self-regulated market. The licensing authorities are required to set fares, but only do 
so by way of rubber-stamping a rate of fares already determined by the trade.  
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   Fares represent the area of regulation in which there is the greatest variation 
between councils. This is unsurprising as the operational costs of a taxi vary from one 
area of the country to another. Licence fees demanded by local authorities, together 
with the price of vehicles, insurance, fuel, and the costs of routine maintenance and 
repairs, all vary across the country. Comparisons are difficult because each council 
uses a different pricing structure, with different tariffs applying at different times of 
the day. Each council’s tariff commences at a different ‘flag fall’ distance and uses 
different mileage rates. There are variations in tariffs within each area for different 
sizes of vehicle
93
 or numbers of passengers.
94
 Such variation between areas is a source 
of confusion, even amongst regulators. One respondent commented that: 
  
I hate taxi tariffs, they’re way too complicated. And they don’t need to be. I 
don’t know many taxi drivers who would pack up and go home at midnight 
just because the taxi fares haven’t gone up. Interview 8, Senior Licensing 
Officer. 
 
   Notwithstanding these difficulties, comparison of fares across all 32 councils is 
possible. The National Private Hire Association publishes a monthly table of taxi 
fares for each licensed area based on an average day time journey of two miles. 
According to the table for January 2013, the cost of an average two mile journey 
across the 32 councils varied between £6.40
95
 and £4.40.
96
 The mean two mile 
journey fare across all 32 councils was £5.56.
97
 Further details of the relative fares for 
each of the 32 councils are set out in Table 3 below. 
 
                                                 
93
 Rhondda Cynon Taf Council, ‘Table of Hackney Carriage Fares’ September 2010. 
94
 Uttlesford District Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting of Licensing Committee’ 9th June 2010 [A/I 4]. 
95
 Bath and North-East Somerset Council and Mid-Sussex District Council. 
96
 Oadby and Wigston District Council. 
97
 Private Hire and Taxi Monthly, ‘League Table of National Average Fares by Area’ January 2013, 73. 
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Table 3: Comparative Fares for Daytime (Tariff 1) Two Mile Journey
98
 
Council Position in sample Fare  
Bath/NE Somerset 1= £6.40 
Mid-Sussex 1= £6.40 
Cornwall 3 £6.30 
Birmingham  4= £6.20 
Winchester 4= £6.20 
Solihull 4= £6.20 
Horsham  4= £6.20 
Canterbury 8= £6.00 
Southend-on-sea 8= £6.00 
West Dorset 8= £6.00 
Tendring  11 £5.95 
Bristol  12= £5.80 
Uttlesford 12= £5.80 
Gloucester 12= £5.60 
Mid-Devon 15 £5.70 
Newcastle u  Tyne 16= £5.60 
                                                 
98
 Cornwall is not listed in the publication as a separate council; each of the six zones in Cornwall is 
listed individually. The figure in Table 3 is an average (mean) value of the fares in the six zones, which 
range from £6.80 in Caradon (the second highest in the country) to £5.80 in Carrick.  
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Northampton  16= £5.60  
Carlisle  18 £5.50 
Great Yarmouth 19= £5.40 
Worcester  19= £5.40 
Kings L/W Norfolk 21 £5.36 
NE Lincolnshire 22= £5.30 
Fenland  22= £5.30 
Lichfield  22= £5.30 
Rhondda  25 £5.20 
Cherwell  26 £5.08 
Flintshire  27 £4.90 
Lancaster  28 £4.80 
Sandwell  29 £4.75 
Copeland  30= £4.60 
Amber Valley  30= £4.60 
Oadby & Wigston 32 £4.40 
AVERAGE (Sample)  £5.56 
 
   There is no obvious rationale to the variation in fares charged by each area. I have 
been unable to identify any pattern in relation to geographical location or the nature of 
the area, whether urban or rural. Some of the highest fares are set by councils which 
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retain quantitative entry restrictions, such as Bath and Mid-Sussex. This is 
contradicted by some of the lowest fares being set by other councils which also have 
quantitative restrictions, such as North-East Lincolnshire (£5.30) and Lancaster 
(£4.80). This goes against some of the evidence presented in the literature which 
claims to show a link between upward pressure on fares and quantitative regulation of 
entry.
99
 No connection can be made between the rate of fares set and the general 
affluence of an area, which could reflect the ability of the public to pay the set fares. 
Nor is there a link between the costs to the trade of providing the service or even the 
costs to the regulators of administering and supervising the scheme. Regional 
variations can be justified in terms of the cost differentials of operating a taxi in 
different areas, but this is difficult to sustain in the case of neighbouring authorities. 
For example, there is a marked difference between neighbouring authorities 
Birmingham (£6.20) and Sandwell (£4.75) without any explanation for such a 
disparity. 
 
   Although fares are supposed to be set under the statutory procedure by the local 
authority, in practice councils simply rubber-stamp fare rates set by the trade. The 
travelling public, which is supposed to benefit from the statutory consultation process, 
does not participate in the procedure and has no influence on the rate of fares. 
Because rates are effectively set by the trade, this makes variations in fares even more 
difficult to explain. Each area sets its fare on the basis of an increase on a historic rate. 
There is no direct reference to the costs of operating vehicles, for example.  
 
 
                                                 
99
 T Ҫetin and KY Eryigit, ‘The Economic Effects of Government Regulation: Evidence from the New 
York Taxicab Market (2013) 25 Transport Policy 169.  
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b) Byelaws and licence conditions and regulation of fares 
 
   The regulation of fares is enforced by specific criminal offences relating to 
overcharging.
100
 But these all are premised on the fact that the local authority has set a 
‘legal fare’ or rate of fares. Those fares then have to be regulated and monitored by 
the local authority. The set fares are regulated by byelaws and licence conditions 
attached to the vehicle licence. Regulation of fares is carried out in this way because 
the statutory scheme relates only to procedural provisions for fare setting, not 
regulation of the fares once they have been set. The Home Office approved ‘model’ 
byelaws used by 19 councils
101
 contain provisions on the regulation of fares in two 
aspects: the use of taximeters and display of table of fares. In those councils which 
have not passed byelaws, virtually identical provisions appear as part of the vehicle 
licence conditions.   
 
   Under the general provision relating to conduct of the proprietor and driver,
102
 
councils have adopted byelaws regulating the operation of taximeters on all journeys. 
Taximeters are not a legal requirement, but all 32 councils make them a regulatory 
obligation through either byelaws or conditions imposed on the vehicle licence. 
Whether they are imposed by byelaw or condition, taximeters are required to be of an 
approved type,
103
 calibrated and sealed.
104
 Taximeters are claimed to be necessary for 
two reasons. The first is because ‘members of the public usually expect to see a 
                                                 
100
 Discussed in chapter 1 section 3d). 
101
 Discussed in more detail in section 2 a) above. 
102
 Town Police Clauses Act 1847, s 68. 
103
 In order to be approved, the meters must comply with the provisions of the Measuring Instruments 
(Taximeter) Regulations 2006 SI 2006/2304. 
104
 JHT Button, Button on Taxis: Licensing Law and Practice (3
rd
 edn, Tottel, Haywards Heath 2009) 
[9.8]. 
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taximeter in a hackney carriage.’105 The second is that taximeters are seen as the only 
effective way of ensuring uniformity amongst the trade in charging only the permitted 
fares, as the following statements illustrate: 
 
We have it written into our detailed conditions on the driver licence that there 
is a specific requirement to operate the meter at all times. We like our drivers 
to operate the meter, even in the case of a negotiated fare, as it saves any 
arguments later. Interview 3, Enforcement Officer.   
 
The use of taximeters is compulsory. We found evidence of firms in [this area] 
charging pre-determined fares at more than tariff fare, and a situation whereby 
some vehicles operated on meter and others operated on manually calculated 
tariff. This caused total confusion with taxi users, so we introduced mandatory 
taximeters. Interview 37, Senior Licensing Officer.   
 
I know some people are against meters and argue that customers want to know 
what the fare will be in advance, and we should be allowed to charge booking 
and admin fees and all that. But nothing upsets customers more than being 
charged £5 for a journey that the previous day only cost them £2. Interview 51, 
Taxi Representative.    
 
   It is important to be aware that the fare set by the council is the maximum fare that 
can be charged and is open to downward negotiation. The Office of Fair Trading, in 
its influential 2003 report, recommended that councils should publicize this as much 
as possible.
106
 Of the 32 councils studied, only Mid-Sussex highlights the scope for 
downward negotiation of fares in licensing policy, and even in this case it is not clear 
how much general publicity is given to this fact.
107
 On the other hand, the Department 
for Transport advises councils against encouraging downward negotiations of fares 
for rank or on-street hailings. It is claimed that such negotiations could cause 
                                                 
105
 R v Liverpool City Council  ex p Curzon Ltd QBD 12
th
 November 1993 [12] (McCullough J). 
106
 Office of Fair Trading, ‘The Regulation of Licensed Taxi and PHV Services in UK’ (OFT 676, 
London November 2003).  
107
 Mid-Sussex District Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting of Licensing Sub-committee’ 16th December 
2010 [9]. 
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confusion and lead to disagreement and security problems in the event of the 
requested fare not being displayed on the meter.
108
     
 
   Downward negotiation of fares may also be difficult in practice, even for drivers 
willing to negotiate, because of the local authority’s byelaws or licence conditions 
relating to the use of taximeters. The fare regulations require that taximeters be 
calibrated and sealed to the council’s set tariff. Given that the customer can only be 
charged what is on the meter, and the customer will expect to pay what is on the meter 
even if this is a discounted fare,
109
 the scope for charging less than the council set fare 
is considerably reduced. Furthermore, byelaws make it an offence not to bring the 
meter into operation even in the case of an agreed or negotiated fare.
110
 Some 
councils’ licence conditions require that vehicles be fitted with a calendar control 
meter which automatically calibrates to the correct tariff. 
111
 These difficulties are 
reflected in the following comments: 
 
Because it’s on the table of fares, the table of fares is displayed, [the drivers] 
will charge that. Interview 27, Senior Licensing Officer. 
  
If that’s what the council say the fare is, then that’s what I’m going to charge. 
Why should I do it for any less than that? I’ve got to make a living. Why 
should I pass up a passenger who will pay the full fare for one that wants to 
pay less? Interview 36, Taxi Representative. 
 
Our meters set automatically to the right tariff as soon as you switch them on. 
We have to use these type of meter and you cannot vary the meter, so I could 
not do the fare for less even if I wanted to. I suppose I could, but then I’d have 
to explain the shortfall on the meter. Interview 41, Taxi Representative. 
 
                                                 
108
 Department for Transport, Best Practice Guidance’ (n 19) [53].  
109
 Curzon (n 105) [12] (McCullough J). 
110
 Stratford on Avon District Council v Dyde [2009] EWHC 3011 (Admin); [2010] RTR 13. 
111
 Newcastle City Council, ‘Hackney Carriage Licence Conditions’ [10.7], as an example. 
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   However, despite the difficulties involved in agreeing a reduction on the metered 
fare, these positions represent a minority view. Many members of the trade are still 
willing to charge less than the set fare, as the following statements illustrate: 
 
We’re all in this game to make money. I can’t see any problem in discounting 
the normal fare to do an ‘off-meter’ job. It all goes in the old ‘sky rocket’, 
doesn’t it? Interview 34, Taxi Representative. 
 
Top and bottom of it is, I’m a businessman. I don’t want to lose a fare to 
another cab. Why should he have my money? I’m happy to help anybody out 
with a negotiated fare, especially if I can see they are genuinely struggling, so 
long as they don’t take the piss. Interview 19, Taxi Representative. 
 
I think we’re all aware of giving the option of giving discounts on the meter 
price at our individual discretion, but it would help if the council weren’t quite 
so uptight about using the meter. Interview 31, Taxi Representative.      
     
   Regulation of set fares by means of byelaws or licence condition allows councils to 
monitor the fares charged to members of the public. Even in this, however, local 
authority influence only extends to creating a cap on fares rather than prescribing a 
precise fare for each journey. In some measure, the exact fare charged is still in the 
hands of the trade.  
 
c) Conclusions on fare regulation  
 
   The setting of fares is a matter upon which local knowledge and local variations are 
crucial. Despite the fact that it is a subject ideally suited to regulation by byelaws, the 
power to set fares by byelaws was removed and replaced by a statutory scheme in 
1976. Fare regulation is more suited to local control than other aspects of regulation, 
and there are bound to be some regional variations. It is difficult, however, to justify 
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large variations between neighbouring authorities, and there needs to be a closer 
correlation between the fares set and the actual costs of operating taxis as a business.  
 
   Local authorities, despite the statutory duty upon them, only set the fare in a 
nominal way. The actual rates of fares are set, and the move to increase fares is driven 
by, the trade. I think that permitting the trade to set the rates of fares cannot be in the 
interest of the public and is a complete abrogation of the local authority’s duty.  There 
is little connection between any of the bases for calculating appropriate rates of fares 
set out in the literature and the fare produced by the statutory procedure. Once the fare 
is set, although there is a degree more control in the hands of the local authority, in 
practice the price the customer pays is still largely in the hands of the driver. 
 
   This is in contrast to the other areas of post-entry regulation where the local 
authority is in the ascendancy. In the case of fare regulation, councils have ceded 
some of the balance of power to the trade. Whether this is a quid pro quo for 
proprietors and drivers declining to challenge some of the more ‘irregular’ licence 
conditions imposed by local authorities is a highly speculative notion. There is 
certainly no evidence of any explicit understanding along those lines.    
 
   
5) Journeys outside regulation. 
 
   One further point about post-entry regulation needs to be considered. In this final 
section, I examine the issue of journeys which may be outside local authority 
regulation altogether. Particular journeys may not be included in the regulatory 
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regime at all. This problem has two dimensions: journeys within or outside a local 
authority’s area which may not be regulated at all because of their place of origin and 
journeys which go outside the council’s licensed area.  
 
   According to the High Court decision in Young v Scampion,
112
 section 38 of the 
Town Police Clauses Act 1847 exhaustively defines what constitutes a ‘hackney 
carriage’ for the purposes of the Act. In order to be deemed a hackney carriage, the 
vehicle must be a ‘wheeled carriage…used in standing or plying for hire in any 
street.’113 Standing or plying for hire in a ‘street’ is as much a part of the definition of 
a hackney carriage as being a wheeled vehicle. The difficulty is that premises from 
which taxi drivers derive a substantial amount of their work, such as railway stations, 
airports and hotels, are nearly always on private land and do not necessarily constitute 
a ‘street’ within the meaning of the Act. Further uncertainty was created by the 
decision in Eastbourne Borough Council v Stirling
114
 where it was held that whether a 
railway station forecourt constitutes a ‘street’ depends on its precise location and is a 
matter of fact.
115
 This will vary depending upon which station is under consideration. 
The difficulty created for the regulator in all of this is that, if the starting point of the 
journey is not a ‘street’ for the purposes of the Act, then the vehicle is not a hackney 
carriage, and thus the journey is unregulated. The licensing authority has no 
regulatory control over the vehicle in respect of the fare, quality standards or criminal 
offences. All 32 authorities have at least one mainline railway station in their area. 
Some stations are located in places which would clearly constitute a ‘street’ for the 
purposes of the Act and others equally clearly are not in a ‘street’. There are yet 
                                                 
112
 [1989] RTR 95  
113
 Town Police Clauses Act 1847, s 38. 
114
 [2000] EWHC 410; [2001] RTR 7. 
115
ibid [18] (Pill LJ).   
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others which represent a grey area, where the status of the location is not easily 
definable. The stations are a popular source of work for taxis, but the precise extent of 
this is difficult to quantify, as the following statements illustrate:  
 
I spend most of my time during the day down here [the railway station]; most 
of the lads do. I spend most of the day here, but then if I am working nights, 
like at weekend, I’ll go on to the city ranks. If I had to put a figure on it, I’d 
say about 40 per cent of my work was from the station. Interview 9, Taxi 
Representative. 
 
I always hang around the station. It’s the only place you’re guaranteed to get 
any regular work. At least you know the trains will come and there will be 
customers even if you have to wait a while. I’d say nearly all my work comes 
from the station rank. Interview 47, Taxi Representative. 
 
   This means that there are a significant number of journeys being undertaken by taxi 
every day to which the regulatory regime does not extend. I am surprised that this is 
not seen as a problem by the local authorities which view such difficulties as ones of 
the trade. On the other hand, the trade often does not appreciate the significance of 
this rule. The following statements illustrate the respective positions of regulator and 
regulated:  
 
I don’t see airport and railway station pick ups as a problem for us as 
regulators, but for the trade it can be a problem. The taxis that are licensed by 
us still come under our jurisdiction if they’re operating in our area. Interview 
6, Enforcement Officer. 
 
No, if it’s a public rank then it comes under the council’s control, doesn’t it? I 
know [the rail company] screw us for the permit fees but they can’t tell us 
what to do once we’ve paid the fees. Only the council have the power to take 
our licences away. Interview 41, Taxi Representative. 
 
   In my view, this problem for the regulator is not appreciated as such by either the 
councils or the regulated who can easily take advantage of such a situation. The trade 
assumes that the normal regulations apply from railway stations whatever the true 
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legal position. This is another example of the regulator gaining ascendancy over the 
trade without any firm legal foundation. This problem can be ameliorated to some 
extent by the local authority adopting section 76 of the Public Health Act 1925 which 
extends the hackney carriage provisions of the 1847 Act, including any byelaws, to 
‘hackney carriages standing or plying for hire at any railway station or railway 
premises… as if such…were a stand for hackney carriages or a street.’116 Little use is 
made of this provision in practice, however, as only two of the 32 councils, 
Birmingham and Gloucester, have passed resolutions adopting section 76.    
 
   The second type of ‘unregulated’ journey is only of significance in relation to fares. 
Maximum fares set by the council apply to journeys undertaken within the regulated 
geographical boundaries of the local authority’s area. For journeys ending outside that 
area, the fare is a matter for open market negotiation between the customer and the 
driver. The relevant negotiations must take place before commencement of the 
journey; otherwise the driver may charge no more than the metered fare.
117
 However, 
this means that a negotiated fare of more than the metered fare is possible, and drivers 
could take advantage of customers on such a journey.  
 
   Some councils appreciate the potential difficulties created by out of district 
journeys, and attempt to address them. The following statements from three 
respondents illustrate the way in which local authorities are trying to protect 
passengers from being taken advantage of in such a situation, and the restrictions on 
their powers to do so:  
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 Public Health Act 1925 s 76. 
117
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 s 66 
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We make it a requirement that all fares, both within and outside the licensed 
area, are on the meter, so that there is no opportunity for overcharging. The 
out of district ones are difficult to monitor of course. We’ve no control once 
they leave our area. Interview 3, Enforcement Officer. 
 
You might have a journey outside the district and the cabbie says, ‘Right, 
that’s going to be some ridiculous price’. There’s an unofficial code of fares 
for out of district but it’s a very difficult one to control. Interview 8, Senior 
Licensing Officer.   
   
We have licence conditions about using the meter even for an outside district 
journey, but how far we can enforce that is open to debate, isn’t it. It’s not 
something official; it’s not normally within our jurisdiction as a council. 
Interview 12, Enforcement Officer. 
 
   However, the majority of local authorities do not appreciate the possibility that out 
of area journeys may undermine their public protection role and allow exploitation of 
vulnerable passengers. It is not possible to say how substantial this problem is. No 
records are kept of how many journeys involve fares which are outside the council’s 
area. Even the trade can only estimate how much of its work involves out of district 
journeys and this can fluctuate, making accurate estimates difficult.  
 
6) Conclusions on post-entry regulation.   
 
   Notwithstanding local authorities’ belief that they have complete control over the 
taxi trade once a licence is granted, councils do not possess the degree of control they 
like to believe they have. There are substantial areas of taxi work where local 
authorities have no legal power to exercise control at all. The extent of such areas is 
unquantified, and may be unquantifiable, but they exist and are significant. The 
statutory framework means that journeys from a certain point of origin may not be 
regulated at all, although this depends on the existence of certain facts; journeys to a 
destination outside the local authority area may be at unregulated fares. Fares which 
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are regulated are set by the trade, with very little influence from either the local 
authority or the public. 
 
   It is an important finding of the study, however, that, on the whole, local authorities 
are in the ascendancy in matters of post-entry regulation, even though some of the 
ways in which this is achieved are not within the boundaries of their legal powers. 
The statutory powers granted to councils for this area of regulation are very restricted 
in the scope of their operation, and so would appear to allow only limited control. 
Byelaws can only create offences in relation to certain aspects of both vehicle and 
driver regulation. Even so, what could be a useful local instrument for regulating the 
condition of vehicles and behaviour of drivers is restricted in its effect to those fields 
of operation of which central government approves. Licence conditions, which can 
provide flexibility in regulation, can only be imposed on vehicle licences. There is no 
method of controlling driver behaviour other than byelaws. Yet, despite these 
restrictions, local authority regulators maintain significant control over the trade by 
gaining a dominant position through claims to powers that they simply do not possess. 
Claims by regulators to be able to prosecute for breach of provisions which carry only 
administrative sanctions, or the power to impose licence conditions on driver’s 
licences, help to reinforce the impression of council ascendancy. For the most part, 
the trade acquiesces in the regulator’s use of its powers for these purposes. 
 
   The one exception to this general picture is in respect of fare setting. Here some 
degree of control has been ceded to the trade which uses this position to promote its 
own interests. This rather stands out as anomalous when the material and trends from 
the other aspects of regulation in this and other chapters are considered. The only real 
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explanation suggested is that local authorities have relinquished control over fares on 
the basis of the trade’s greater knowledge and expertise in such matters. However, 
this is not a convincing explanation in my view, as the trade might be said to have 
greater expertise in most other aspects of regulation, but this does not prevent councils 
from maintaining a dominant position. This area of regulation should also be under 
the direct control of local authorities to promote the interests of the travelling public. 
This is not happening under the present regime. 
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CHAPTER 7: ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATION 
 
 
   No system of regulation will achieve its objectives without effective enforcement. 
In this chapter, I use the research material to shed light on how local authorities 
enforce the taxi licensing regime and how effective that enforcement is in achieving 
the regulatory objectives. The whole area of enforcement is very complex and in this 
chapter it is only possible to look at issues surrounding enforcement which are 
relevant to the themes of the thesis. This means that only some of the key elements 
which illustrate these general themes are considered. Other topics relevant to 
enforcement, such as the tension between elected representatives and employed 
officers or the impact of human rights on enforcement action, have had to be 
disregarded.  
 
   In their public pronouncements, councils like to portray themselves as adopting a 
conciliatory-based approach to enforcement. It will be recalled from chapter 2 that the 
literature suggests that most regulators prefer and implement what I have termed a 
conciliatory approach.
1
 Recent studies in other areas of licensing have reached a 
similar conclusion.
2
 In the case of taxi licensing, I found the opposite to be the case. 
All of the measures used by local authorities, with one main exception, were used to 
inflict punitive sanctions on the licence-holder and demonstrated a deterrence-based 
approach to enforcement by the councils. This was the case, somewhat surprisingly, 
                                                 
1
 G Rhodes, Inpectorates in British Government: Law Enforcement and Efficiency (Allen and Unwin, 
London 1981) 176; K Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition 
of Pollution (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1984) 3. 
2
 P Hadfield, S Lister and P Trayner, ‘“This Town’s a Different Town Today”: Policing and Regulating 
the Night-Time Economy’ (2009) 9(4) Criminology and Criminal Justice 465, 473. 
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even when those instruments which are normally associated with more conciliatory 
approaches were used. The one important exception was routine inspection and 
testing, which I consider was a much underused strategy. Disinclination by local 
authorities to make the maximum use of such inspections is in itself an indication of 
the attitude which councils take towards enforcement. 
 
   One theme which runs through the previous chapters on pre and post-entry 
regulation is the way in which local authorities regard control of vehicles and drivers 
as an end in itself rather than as a means to achieve the claimed aim of protection of 
the public. Councils, for example, restrict vehicle entry on the grounds of quality 
when it is not clear that they have the legal power to do so,
3
 and create an impression 
that they have certain powers which they do not in fact possess.
4
 This theme, of local 
authorities operating within their own regulatory realms beyond and regardless of 
their formal legal powers, has particular resonance in the context of enforcement. It is 
in the area of enforcement that this cultural characteristic of local authority regulators 
can be most clearly seen operating in practice. The local authorities’ viewpoint is 
apparent in the following comments of two of the respondents:  
 
I would update the legislation to allow us to control all vehicles and drivers 
that are operating locally. I know that may create problems with different 
areas having different standards. But if they want to come into our area and 
work on our patch, then our officers should have jurisdiction over them. 
Interview 5, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
   
The trade are very often affronted and surprised that we have the power to tell 
them what they can and cannot do. They think they should be allowed to do 
whatever they want without interference. [They] cannot understand why they 
have been brought before the committee. Interview 18, Chair of Licensing 
Committee. 
                                                 
3
 Discussed in chapter 4, section 3a). 
4
 Discussed in chapter 6, section 3b)i). 
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   It should be borne in mind, however, that enforcement involves the exercise of 
discretionary power by local authorities. Councils have the choice whether to enforce 
the legislation and, if they decide to do so, how they go about that task. With such 
wide discretion to bring enforcement action comes the commensurate discretion not to 
do so. Licensing officers can engage in what has been termed ‘selective enforcement’, 
that is the discretion to refrain from initiating proceedings for enforcement in 
circumstances where such proceedings are clearly appropriate.
5
 This issue is 
addressed in some detail in the literature, largely in relation to prosecution, with the 
debate revolving around the relative merits of certainty and flexibility.
6
 Judicial 
decisions have acknowledged that it is not a basic principle of the rule of law that 
prosecution should be automatic wherever an offence is detected, and that 
enforcement officials should have a wide discretion to enforce the law to benefit 
consumers.
7
 In reality, not every violation of the law or licence conditions results in 
enforcement activity, nor, in my view, is it appropriate that it should be. Not all 
contraventions of the rules are detected and, even when they are, the costs of bringing 
proceedings for every breach would be prohibitive in the light of any benefit to the 
public gained as a result of the action. Nevertheless, the process by which local 
authorities decide when to take enforcement action is instructive in relation to the 
themes of the chapter. 
 
                                                 
5
 KC Davis, Discretionary Justice: a Preliminary Inquiry (Louisiana State University Press, Baton 
Rouge 1969) 162-164. 
6
 R Cranston, Regulating Business: Law and Consumer Agencies (Macmillan, London 1979) 105; G 
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 Smedleys Ltd v Breed [1974] AC 839, 856 E-G (Viscount Dilhorne).  
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   In this chapter, I consider the following questions. First, how do councils go about 
the task of enforcement as reflected in their policies and practices? Local authorities 
are a form of government and, as Dearlove points out, all governments must have 
policies in the sense of a stated pattern of resources committed to achieving certain 
goals which has an effect on those outside government.
8
 Given that enforcement 
involves the exercise of discretionary power, councils normally adopt policies in order 
to structure and confine the exercise of their discretion.
9
 I think it is a reasonable 
assumption, therefore, that local authorities will have implemented taxi licensing 
enforcement policies to guide the exercise of their powers. Such policies would also 
enable licence holders to know what is expected of them by the council and to provide 
a benchmark against which to judge the effectiveness of regulation. How far this 
assumption is mirrored in reality is considered in section 1.   
 
 Second, what powers of enforcement do councils have and are they effective? It is 
suggested in the literature that local authorities have a wide range of enforcement 
powers available to them,
10
 yet the powers prescribed by law available to councils to 
enforce the taxi licensing regime are quite limited. In section 2, I describe the 
enforcement measures which local authorities are permitted to use by the legislation 
and examine how councils use those powers and how effective they are in achieving 
the regulatory objectives. 
 
   Third, what enforcement measures do councils use in practice? The findings of this 
study reveal certain instruments of enforcement which are used regularly by councils, 
                                                 
8
 J Dearlove, The Politics of Policy in Local Government (Cambridge University Press, London 1973) 
4.  
9
 Davis (n 5) 97. 
10
 J Stewart and K Walsh, Influence or Enforcement: The Nature and Management of Inspection and 
Regulation in Local Government (The Local Government Management Board, Luton 1992) 19. 
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even though they have no legislative basis. Intuitively, I would expect such a lack of 
statutory support for the activities of the regulator to weaken the position of the local 
authority and reduce the effectiveness of enforcement. Yet, in practice, local 
authorities continue to exercise control over the trade without any apparent 
diminution in their ability to do so. In section 3, I describe the measures which 
councils use in addition to those provided for by the law and examine whether these 
methods are more effective than those considered in section 2.  
 
   The literature points out that there are no simple indicators to show how successful 
or otherwise enforcement activity has been.
11
 Thus, it is difficult to evaluate the 
effectiveness of particular enforcement measures.
12
 It will become apparent in this 
chapter that councils have different ideas on what enforcement is seeking to achieve 
and how the effectiveness of enforcement is to be assessed. However, as all councils 
assert that they regulate taxis for the protection of the public, I believe that the 
measure of effectiveness should be how far enforcement action achieves that aim. For 
the purposes of this chapter, therefore, the effectiveness of local authority 
enforcement activities will be gauged against how well they protect the public.   
 
1) Enforcement policies   
 
   The first question posed in this chapter concerns how local authorities perform the 
function of licensing enforcement through the policies they adopt. In view of the 
importance of enforcement, I find it surprising that the councils in this study have 
such a haphazard approach to the formulation of enforcement policies. Only five of 
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 BM Hutter, The Reasonable Arm of the Law?: The Law Enforcement Procedures of Environmental 
Health Officers (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1988) 183. 
12
 A difficulty discussed in more detail in chapter 2 section 6.   
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the 32 councils have a formal codified enforcement policy specifically designed for 
taxi licensing.
13
 Although the contents of these policies vary, they cover details of 
such matters as how each council defines what it means by enforcement; the resources 
that the council proposes to devote to enforcement; the frequency of enforcement 
activities; the methods to be employed and the approaches to be adopted to 
enforcement; how enforcement activities will be monitored; and the standards against 
which enforcement will be measured. These codified policies also set out procedures 
to be followed at committee meetings and the enforcement options available to 
committees which hear cases involving licence holders said to have contravened the 
rules. This is significant in the context of this chapter as the policy document is the 
only source to which a council can point for their claim to have many of these 
enforcement options.
14
  
 
   The documentary evidence and the interview data reveal three main problems 
relating to local authority enforcement policies. First, councils are not always talking 
about the same thing when discussing enforcement. Local authorities operate under 
their own definitions of what constitutes enforcement, and these do not always 
coincide. Hutter makes the point that ‘enforcement’ should not simply be equated 
with prosecution but should include the whole process of ensuring observance of 
some broadly perceived objectives of the law.
15
 Some councils echo this viewpoint, 
others take a narrower view. The conflicting opinions from two of the respondents 
illustrate the diverse views on how enforcement is defined: 
 
                                                 
13
 The councils with such a policy are those in Birmingham, Worcester, Winchester, West Dorset and 
Kings’ Lynn and West Norfolk.  
14
 The importance of this point is considered in more detail in section 3 of this chapter. 
15
 Hutter (n 11) 5. 
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We have to take a holistic approach to [enforcement]. It involves everything 
from the guys that walk around the ranks making sure everyone is doing what 
they should be doing right up to the committee and, worse case scenario, those 
cases that end up in court. Interview 14, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
We enforce the regulations through deciding which cases need to be 
prosecuted or whether the case should come before the committee. Do we 
have enough evidence to take further action? That is what enforcement is all 
about. Interview 28, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
   Working with different definitions of enforcement is bound, in my view, to have an 
adverse impact on any assessment of how effective enforcement is because it is not 
possible to compare like with like. Different understandings of what constitutes 
enforcement will lead to different conclusions on whether enforcement has been 
successful.  
 
   Second, the enforcement policies employed by some councils are inappropriate for 
taxi licensing. Three councils operate a policy which has clearly been deracinated 
from the local environmental health department.
16
 These policies lay claim to certain 
powers, such as warnings, financial penalties and deferred suspensions, which are not 
available to taxi regulators. Such measures may be used by environmental health 
officers in some circumstances,
17
 officers responsible for taxi licensing do not have 
those instruments at their disposal. Another council uses its policy under the 
Licensing Act 2003 in relation to alcohol licensing as a model for taxi enforcement.
18
 
This is also inappropriate because the alcohol licensing scheme operates under 
different legislative provisions and has its own statutory objectives.
19
 Adopting such 
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 Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, Part 1. 
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2010.  
19
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policies creates the impression that the council has powers that it simply does not 
possess in relation to taxi licences, even though it may possess those powers in other 
contexts. 
 
   Third, the formal policies do not cover all the elements of enforcement that councils 
need to in order to confine and structure the exercise of discretion properly. One study 
concluded that the influence of the putative policy makers on enforcement policy 
tends to be limited to decisions on the allocation of resources and to the occasional 
instruction to conduct a ‘purge’ against a particular category of infringement.20  This 
perception results in what has been termed the ‘bottom up’ approach21 whereby 
‘lower level actors take decisions which effectively limit hierarchical influence, pre-
empt top decision making or alter policies’.22 The enforcement policies adopted by 
the councils in my study on the whole exhibit such a ‘bottom up’ approach. 
Enforcement policy is largely driven by the full-time licensing officers. This was 
confirmed by many of the respondents in my study, two of whom made the following 
comments:      
 
Enforcement should come from the bottom going up, not the top coming 
down, because then you’ve got a sporting chance of at least getting it fifty per 
cent right. If it comes from the top down, ten per cent if you’re lucky, or 
maybe I’m just a cynic. Interview 6, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
I feel that decisions on enforcement are taken on and should be taken from the 
‘bottom up’ and not ‘top down’ and that’s a good thing. ‘Top down’ does not 
                                                                                                                                            
harm to children do not correspond directly with the taxi regulation objective of protection of the 
public. 
20
 J Rowan-Robinson et al, Crime and Regulation: A Study of the Enforcement of Regulatory Codes (T 
and T Clark, Edinburgh 1990) 213. 
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 M Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (Russell Sage 
Foundation, New York 1980). 
22
 S Barrett and C Fudge, ‘Examining the Policy-Action Relationship’ in S Barrett and C Fudge (eds), 
Policy and Action: Essays on the Implementation of Public Policy (Methuen, London 1981) 23. 
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really work. They don’t know what goes on in the real world. Interview 45, 
Senior Licensing Officer.  
   
   Although ‘bottom up’ policies are supposed to be more compatible with the 
demands of the beneficiaries of regulation,
23
 this is not necessarily the case in reality. 
According to the literature, the risk of a ‘bottom up’ approach is that enforcement 
decisions are taken without due regard to the goals of the legislation.
24
 In taxi 
licensing, where the aim of the legislation is not clear cut, this could be said for both 
‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ approaches. The findings of this study indicate that the 
real beneficiaries of ‘bottom up’ policy making are the council officials and, in some 
cases, the trade itself rather than the travelling public.   
 
   It will be recalled from chapter 2 that regulators are said to adopt either a 
conciliatory or deterrence based approach to enforcement; the former centred around 
attempts to persuade and cajole the regulated into compliance, the latter relying on 
punitive sanctions. I was not surprised that no councils admitted to adopting a 
predominantly deterrence style as this would tend to reinforce the view that the 
objective of enforcement is control of the trade. For example, some councils highlight 
in their policy documents the clear distinction they draw between the informal 
compliance (conciliatory) approach and more formal sanctioning (deterrence), and 
they have a preference for the former.
25
 Other local authorities draw attention to their 
‘educative approach to the trade’.26 Councils are often keen to emphasize that they 
adopt a conciliatory style, as the following comments from two of the respondents 
illustrate:  
                                                 
23
 CS Diver, ‘A Theory of Regulatory Enforcement’ (1980) 28 Public Policy 257. 
24
 Rowan-Robinson et al (n 20) 296. 
25
 Amber Valley Borough Council, ‘Enforcement Policy Statement’ April 2010 – as one example.  
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 Winchester City Council, ‘Statement of Licensing Policy with Respect to Hackney and Private Hire 
Vehicles, Drivers and Private Hire Operators’ April 2011 [1.4]. 
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We like to think that prevention is better than cure so we like to work with the 
trade, not against them to advise on and assist with compliance. Prosecution is 
very much the last resort. Interview 1, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
Our whole approach is based on co-operation and participation for the benefit 
of the public. We’d rather educate and persuade the trade to work with us. Of 
course, if they don’t want to co-operate…then we will take action. It’s up to 
them. Interview 5, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
   Even in these comments, the claim to a conciliatory style is accompanied by a 
veiled threat of sanctions should licence-holders fail to comply. Other councils prefer 
to regard their style as ‘rigorous’ rather than deterrence based.27 In effect, this 
amounts to the same thing, as the following statements reveal: 
  
I would say we take a fairly rigorous approach to enforcement. I know the 
trade think we are out to get them and they see [a neighbouring area] as a 
softer touch than us. But I think we are firm, but even-handed and fair. 
Interview 42, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
We like to avoid prosecutions where we can, but we’re prepared to do so if 
that’s what it takes. I like to think we take a rigorous line on enforcement, and 
sometimes you just run out of options. Prosecution is the last resort but 
sometimes it’s needed. Interview 12, Enforcement Officer. 
 
   Notwithstanding the image which local authorities like to portray of their 
conciliatory approach to regulation, the statements above indicate a contrary view. In 
reality, there may be elements of both approaches used by councils but the issue of 
where the balance lies will be considered later in this chapter.  
 
   In addition to recognising different enforcement styles, the literature draws a 
distinction between two models of enforcement strategy: the proactive model, where 
                                                 
27
 The Councils in Canterbury, Rhondda Cynon Taf, Bath and North East Somerset, Sandwell, 
Birmingham and Solihull all use this description of their enforcement style in their policy documents. 
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the licensing officer is the instigator of the method of assessing compliance, and the 
reactive model, where the licensing officer responds to an external stimulus.
28
 The 
choice of enforcement strategy can be influenced by the enforcement style adopted, 
with a tendency for proactive methods to be linked with a conciliatory approach and 
reactive methods to be associated with a deterrence style, but this is not always the 
case. In this study, all 32 councils use a mixture of proactive and reactive methods but 
to varying extents. The most significant factor in determining the choice of 
enforcement strategy is the size and nature of the area, as can be seen from the 
following quotations: 
 
Oh yes, we take a very proactive approach. I think you have to in a place the 
size of [this area]. You’d never keep on top of all the vehicles and drivers if 
you just sat back and waited for the complaints to come rolling in. Interview 
11, Senior Licensing Officer.   
 
We don’t do a huge amount of proactive work to be honest especially not in 
[this area] because it’s such a huge area. From an enforcement point of view, 
we present a completely different challenge to say [a neighbouring town] 
which is very compact and busy. So, for us, it’s mostly reactive. Interview 25, 
Enforcement Officer. 
 
   The lack of properly formulated and codified enforcement policies creates the 
impression that very little thought has been given to the way in which enforcement of 
regulation is to be implemented. The adoption and implementation of particular 
enforcement policies, approaches, styles and strategies are driven by a number of 
competing factors. The exercise of discretionary powers, the hierarchical position of 
the policy maker, and the nature of the locality all play their part in influencing local 
authority decision-making. The interplay of these different influences produces a 
haphazard and inconsistent picture of council enforcement policies. Within their 
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enforcement policies, local authorities often lay claim to powers which they do not 
possess. But this is not questioned by the trade. What has been lost, in my view, in the 
formulation of these policies is the ostensible reason for enforcing regulation; the 
protection of the public.   
 
2) Powers provided for by law 
 
   The enforcement powers available to local authorities under the statutory 
framework are limited and, for the most part, are associated with a deterrence style. 
Local authorities may prosecute for contraventions of the taxi licensing regime which 
constitute a criminal offence. Councils also have the power to remove a licence 
administratively, either temporarily by way of suspension or permanently by 
revocation or refusal to renew.
29
 The exception to this is routine inspection and testing 
which is designed to urge compliance with quality standards. In this section, I analyse 
the use of routine testing and inspection and its effectiveness before considering the 
formal sanctions of prosecution and removal. I also examine the power to ‘stop-
check’ a licensed vehicle which represents a ‘grey area’ in terms of the conciliatory or 
deterrence styles.     
 
a) Routine testing and inspection 
 
   Routine presentation of a hackney carriage for inspection and testing is a mandatory 
requirement.
30
 According to the literature, routine inspections are a traditional, 
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 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 s 60 (vehicle licences) and s 61 (driver’s 
licences). 
30
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 s 50(1). 
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proactive and highly valued mode of enforcement.
31
 The compulsory nature of testing 
and inspecting taxi vehicles means that councils have no discretion in carrying out the 
tests, although the manner and frequency of inspection and the criteria against which 
the vehicle is tested are policy decisions of the council. None of the 32 councils 
expressly point out the consequences of failure to pass an inspection but it is implicit 
that a vehicle which fails testing is deemed no longer fit for use as a hackney carriage, 
providing grounds to suspend, revoke or refuse to renew the licence.
32
 The purpose of 
routine inspection is clear enough and was neatly summarised by one of the 
respondents:   
 
We can’t really check on them 24 hours per day, but they’ll have to satisfy us 
that they are complying by bringing themselves in to show us that they are 
sticking to the rules, at least when we see them. Interview 20, Senior Licensing 
Officer.  
 
   Although the routine inspection and testing of vehicles are uncontroversial, as 
enforcement measures they are, in my view, considerably underused. The statutory 
powers permit councils to inspect and test vehicles up to three times per year.
33
 None 
of the 32 councils makes full use of this maximum number of inspections and they 
generally require vehicles to be inspected only once or twice per year. Four councils 
required vehicles to be tested three times per year, but only for older vehicles which 
are licensed, exceptionally, beyond the council’s normal maximum age limit.34 I think 
that greater use of routine inspections could be made without stepping outside the 
existing legislative framework.  
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 BM Hutter, Compliance, Regulation and Environment (Clarendon Press,, Oxford 1997) 107. 
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 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 s 60(1).  
33
 ibid  s 50(1). 
34
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   From the authorities’ point of view, the objections to more frequent testing are the 
additional administrative burden to councils and increased costs to the trade, as 
indicated by the following statement: 
 
I suppose we could test more often, but that would depend on the co-operation 
of our testers and I would imagine the trade would not be too happy about 
extra testing. Interview 39, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
   However, I think that these are unconvincing reasons not to test more frequently. 
The additional administrative burden can be overcome by the increased revenue from 
testing fees, and the extra expense to the trade represents only a small part of the 
overall costs of operating a taxi. More significantly, these objections overlook the 
obvious safety benefits of inspecting and testing vehicles more frequently, and place 
council resource and trade interests ahead of protection of the public.  
 
   The incidence of non-compliance for vehicles discovered by regular inspections is 
relatively low. An average failure rate of between seven and eight per cent is reported 
for vehicles undergoing routine testing and inspection procedures. This figure has 
remained fairly constant over the last three years.
35
 Some commentators have doubted 
the efficacy of having inspections which are announced in advance.
36
 However, others 
argue that any problems picked up on routine inspection are the more serious ones, 
including matters not understood to be non-compliant or illegal.
37
 It is certainly true 
that high rates of compliance ought to be achievable for such inspections, given that 
the licence holders are aware that such inspections are required and when they are 
going to be carried out. As one taxi representative pointed out: 
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37
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You must be pretty dozy if you can’t get through the test. You know when it’s 
going to happen, you’ve got plenty of time to prepare for it. So if your taxi 
fails, there must be something badly wrong. Interview 19, Taxi Representative. 
 
   Strangely there is no statutory provision empowering councils to carry out routine 
inspections or testing of drivers. Certain convictions recorded against a driver or 
deteriorating health of a driver are likely to cast doubt upon his or her fitness to hold a 
licence.
38
 Routine testing of a driver’s suitability can only be carried out by requesting 
a Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) certificate
39
 in respect of criminal offences or other 
misconduct and a discretionary power to request a medical report or require a driver 
to undergo medical examination.
40
 I think these provisions represent an unnecessarily 
convoluted means of testing a driver’s continued fitness. They raise two other 
substantive concerns. 
 
   First, driver testing is carried out too infrequently in my view. All 32 councils 
require licence-holders to undergo a CRB check every three years. In the case of 
medical reports, the frequency varies between the councils, but they too are generally 
required every three years, with annual examinations only once a driver reaches a 
specified age.
41
 This means that a substantial period of time can pass before 
something which affects a driver’s suitability comes to the attention of the regulator.42 
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In the meantime the driver has continued to trade. More frequent testing of drivers’ 
suitability would address public protection anxieties.         
 
   The second concern is that neither CRB checks nor medical reports are mandatory 
requirements in that the absence of either is not in itself a ground to refuse or remove 
a driver’s licence. However, all 32 local authorities interpret ‘may’ in the statutory 
provisions as ‘must’ and would not consider renewing a licence in the absence of both 
a CRB certificate and a medical report. The following statements represent typical 
views of councils on this point: 
 
We have our CRB check every three years and medical reports. We do rely 
very heavily on those as proof that the driver is a ‘fit and proper person’. If 
you don’t have those, then you don’t get in. Interview 11, Senior Licensing 
Officer. 
 
We keep a check on all our drivers by making sure they stay medically fit and 
keep out of any bother. So they have to have a medical and we do a CRB 
check on them every three years when the licence comes up for renewal. 
Without clear checks, we wouldn’t contemplate renewing their licence. 
Interview 35, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
   However, refusal to renew licences in the absence of CRB certificates and medical 
reports and refusal to accept any other evidence of a driver’s ‘fitness’ where the 
power being exercised is discretionary, would amount to an unlawful fetter on that 
discretion. Councils would, effectively, not be exercising any discretion at all.
43
 There 
would, of course, only be an unlawful fettering of discretion if councils failed to 
consider or countenance any exceptions to the policy. It is evident from the preceding 
comments that some local authorities take a stringent line on this point. I think that 
mandatory requirements to obtain a CRB certificate and medical report or some other 
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acceptable evidence of fitness before renewing a driver’s licence would place the 
exercise of the local authority’s power on a clearer footing. Currently, councils have 
no other mechanism for routinely checking drivers other than the periodic licence 
renewal process, and that is insufficient to protect the public. 
 
   During the period of the study, 63 (29 per cent) hearings which came before 
licensing committees were in respect of information received through CRB checks or 
adverse medical reports.
44
 The cases were referred to the committee because the 
information reflected unfavourably on the ‘fitness’ of the licence holder or because 
the licence holder had failed to disclose the information voluntarily. In just under half 
of these cases (31), the outcome was that no further action was taken against the 
licence holder. In the remainder, actions ranged from oral warnings to suspension of 
or refusal to renew the licence.  
 
   Although this is a very crude measure of the effectiveness of routine testing of 
drivers, it illustrates two points. First, there is no evidence to indicate that taking no 
further action in these circumstances encourages the licence holder to modify his or 
her behaviour to ensure future compliance. As such, no further action fails to achieve 
the main objective of a conciliatory approach. Second, routine testing of drivers 
results in a penalty against the driver if non-compliance is discovered, albeit not 
always the most severe penalty. This suggests that a method normally associated with 
a conciliatory style is being used for the purpose of deterring the driver, by requiring 
him or her to appear before the committee, with the stress, anxiety and stigma 
associated with such an appearance, and loss of income whilst attending the hearing.  
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delegated powers in similar circumstances, as these are not recorded in public documents.  
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   I conclude that, whilst routine testing and inspection of vehicles provide an effective 
incentive to compliance, the same cannot be said for routine testing of drivers. The 
system for checking the suitability of drivers is not a mandatory one and operates in 
such a way that challenges to the licence holder’s fitness to hold a licence are revealed 
long after the event. Drivers have no opportunity either to remedy any perceived 
defect or modify their behaviour to produce compliance. For these reasons, testing 
and inspection of drivers are much less effective than for vehicles.     
 
b) Prosecution  
 
   When non-compliance with the general law, taxi legislation or byelaws is 
discovered, the licensing authority may bring criminal proceedings by way of 
prosecution. I have already noted that the decision to prosecute is a discretionary one 
and councils are not obliged to do so even where such an action would be appropriate. 
In this sub-section, I consider the circumstances in which local authorities decide to 
prosecute and the effectiveness of formal prosecutorial action. 
 
   By the nature of a decision not to take proceedings, there is no formal record of such 
a decision, and so the frequency with which local authorities decline to take action 
when they could do so is impossible to quantify. Although they do not talk in terms of 
‘selective enforcement’, licensing officers accept that choices are made concerning 
prosecutions, and having a strong case is not sufficient on its own to result in 
prosecution. There is some recognition that, as is pointed out in the literature, councils 
are ‘vulnerable to charges of over-interference and persecution and thus the agency 
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must choose its prosecutions with care.’45 According to the interview data, there has 
to be ‘something in it’ for the council in order to justify proceeding with a 
prosecution, as the following statements illustrate:  
 
We always prosecute the plying for hire cases and always charge no insurance, 
because invalidates it if breaking the law. The rest of cases - factors I take into 
account - depends on what we would get out of the case. Is it worth our while 
prosecuting? What would council gain from prosecution? Interview 7, 
Enforcement Officer.  
 
We will nearly always prosecute for plying for hire and no insurance because 
of the implications for the travelling public of travelling whilst uninsured. 
When deciding whether to prosecute other cases we follow the Code for 
Crown Prosecutors. We wouldn’t prosecute if we didn’t think it was worth our 
while. Interview 10, Enforcement Officer. 
 
We will always prosecute drivers and owners where vehicles are caught 
unlawfully plying for hire. That’s [our] policy. In other cases, it depends on 
the case. If the offence was too trivial to justify the costs, such as not wearing 
a badge, for example, we probably wouldn’t bother. We don’t want to alienate 
the trade completely by bringing cases just for the sake of it. Interview 12, 
Enforcement Officer.   
  
   These comments provide some examples of the factors which councils take into 
account before initiating formal proceedings, even in cases where there is clear 
evidence of an offence having been committed. The reference to the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors is interesting, as this document specifically does not apply to local 
authority prosecutors,
46
 but six of the 32 councils make reference to it in their policy 
documents. 
 
   A council’s policy always to prosecute in respect of particular offences is an 
important consideration. There is nothing wrong with local authorities adopting such a 
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policy so long as it is applied flexibly and in good faith.
47
 Earlier studies found that 
other considerations might include an evaluation of the prospects of success
48
 or that 
formal proceedings should be reserved for situations where there is a blatant flouting 
of the law.
49
 These findings are reflected in further reasons suggested for bringing or 
refraining from action in particular cases in the follow statements: 
 
[T]hat would depend on the seriousness of the offence. If it was a case of 
overcharging, it may depend on how much the overcharge was or how blatant. 
It might boil down to the complainant’s word against the driver’s in which 
case we would not normally risk taking it to court. Interview 37, Senior 
Licensing Officer. 
 
The one case where we did prosecute was because we thought he was just 
taking the piss. He was already suspended and he just thought [indicates two 
fingered V gesture] to that and was still driving. Interview 20, Senior 
Licensing Officer.  
 
   What is of concern, however, is that too much unstructured and unconfined 
discretion in the hands of licensing officers may result in enforcement decisions 
which lack consistency and uniformity.
50
 I think that the reasons upon which licensing 
officers decide not to proceed against non-compliance reflect this concern. Factors 
such as the benefit to the council of bringing proceedings, triviality or blatancy of 
offence, and avoiding alienation of the trade are not appropriate grounds upon which 
to refrain from taking action. None of these factors is directly linked to public safety. 
Local authorities have the power to bring proceedings but they do not make sufficient 
use of these powers for the protection of the public.        
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   Prosecution is rarely used in practice to enforce regulation of the licensing regime. 
Only twelve prosecutions were recorded against hackney carriage drivers or 
proprietors during the period studied, and only six of those were for specific hackney 
carriage offences.
51
 The offences included defective taximeters, failure to display 
licence plates, damaged licence plates, documentary offences or breaches of hackney 
carriage byelaws. The non-taxi specific offences were defective vehicle offences. 
Such low numbers make it difficult to use the volume of prosecution as a measure of 
effectiveness. Although Birmingham City Council claims in its documentation a 98 
per cent success rate for its enforcement activities, it is clear, on further examination 
of the records, that this claim relates only to successful prosecutions before the 
magistrates’ courts for illegal plying for hire offences.52 Other councils measure their 
effectiveness in terms of numbers of successful prosecutions, but these also relate to 
private hire vehicle offences. Numbers alone are not a good indication of 
effectiveness in this context. 
 
   In my view, the low number of prosecutions is largely the result of a choice by the 
local authorities. This may be partly due to selective enforcement of cases to be 
prosecuted
53
 but, according to council officials, is largely due to a lack of faith in the 
effectiveness of prosecution in securing compliance. The prospects of being caught 
coupled with the low level of fines imposed by the courts, in their view, do not 
provide any incentive for licence-holders to comply. The following comments 
illustrate the officers’ opinions: 
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 This figure is derived from prosecutions recorded in the documents of the 32 Councils during the 
period of study between April 2010 and March 2011. During the same period, the 32 Councils between 
them record 275 prosecutions of private hire drivers and owners.  
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 Birmingham City Council, ‘Report from Director of Regulatory Services to Licensing Committee’ 
16
th
 June 2010.  
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 Discussed in the introductory section of this chapter. 
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We don’t get a lot [of prosecutions]. We used to get quite a few for not putting 
meters on and for drivers not displaying their badges, but we don’t tend to get 
many of those now. I’m not saying that because they all put their meters on 
but it may well be that the enforcement team are just not there to catch them. 
Interview 27, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
We know that they will more than likely have done it many times before 
because they know that most of the time they can get away with it. It’s like 
any other form of crime. They do it because they know that on the whole they 
won’t get caught. If they thought they would get caught every time, they 
would not do it. Interview 5, Chair of Licensing Committee.   
 
Every month there was a new prosecution to do But, as much as you’d think it 
would get the message out, and they’d stop doing it, they didn’t. The fines 
weren’t massive and the chances of getting caught they maybe saw it as a risk 
worth taking. Interview 24, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
   It is correct that, for taxi offences, the most severe sanction that may be imposed by 
a court is a monetary penalty.
54
 The level of fine is not a disincentive to non-
compliance for most taxi offences. However, the chances of being discovered 
infringing the rules and the perceived degree of recidivism reflected in the above 
statements are a strong indication of the lack of effectiveness of prosecution as an 
enforcement method.  
 
c) Suspension and revocation of licences  
  
   Whilst local authorities make little use of the power to prosecute, much more use is 
made of administrative sanctions. Powers are provided for local authorities to remove 
the licence holder’s ability to trade by suspending, revoking or refusing to renew a 
licence.
55
 Although the power to remove a licence is provided by statute, I think the 
difficulty with administrative sanctions is the way in which they are applied by 
                                                 
54
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 s 76. The current maximum for a level three 
fine is £1,000 – Criminal Justice Act 1982 s 37(2).  
55
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 s 60 and s 61. 
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regulators, rather than any inherent objection to the power itself. In this sub-section, I 
consider the circumstances in which local authorities use their powers to impose 
administrative sanctions on licence holders and the effectiveness of those sanctions.  
 
   Where the alleged non-compliance constitutes both a criminal offence and a breach 
of the regulatory code, councils generally refrain from prosecution in favour of 
administrative proceedings. Of the 216 cases of contested licence reviews or renewals 
referred to committees during the period of the study, 32 (15 per cent) involved 
allegations or admissions of criminal offences which had not been tried by the 
criminal courts prior to appearing before the committee.
 56
 It is said that regulators are 
reluctant to surrender control over disposal of cases to the courts
57
 because, once a 
prosecution is commenced, the regulator forfeits control of the proceedings and the 
outcome is more uncertain.
58
 These views are echoed in the following statement: 
  
I’ve been doing taxi licensing for 13 years now and I don’t think we’ve had to 
prosecute anybody. We’ve taken their licences away, but not prosecuted. After 
all you can never be sure of the outcome once it’s gone to court, can you? By 
taking their licences away, or threatening to, we stay in control. Interview 25, 
Enforcement Officer.  
 
   This statement, however, reflects a high degree of confidence that administrative 
proceedings will produce the outcome enforcement officials want. Licensing officers 
are more likely to resort to administrative sanctions where the chances of obtaining a 
conviction before the criminal courts are assessed to be low. This is particularly the 
case where the officer feels that the licence holder’s actions deserve some form of 
                                                 
56
 This figure is taken from the minutes of meetings of licensing committees of all 32 councils during 
the period of the study. The figures do not include the cases in which sanctions were imposed by 
licensing officers exercising delegated powers and so never came before a committee. 
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 Hawkins (n 2) 162. 
58
 Cranston (n 6) 109. 
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censure, but those actions do not constitute a criminal, or indeed any other, offence. 
One council’s documents reveal the view of a senior official that suspension may be 
appropriate where a licence-holder’s actions may fall short of affecting fit and proper 
person status but still require sanction to express disapproval or serve as a deterrent to 
others.
59
 Later, the same official asserted that he had the power to revoke a vehicle 
licence where a taxi was not being used within the district ‘in light of the Berwick 
case.’60 The following statements provide some examples of the views of other 
licensing officers on this point:  
 
We would consider whether to look at prosecution. But, if the case was not 
good enough for prosecution, we may consider putting the driver before the 
committee for a lesser offence. Interview 37, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
I think that it is good that we don’t need the same level of proof as the police 
because sometimes, when the police can’t prosecute, they can still come in 
front of us. And letting them know that is good. We don’t need to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that any offence has been committed. It keeps them 
on their toes. Interview 24, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
We can also fall back still on our condition that behaviour not consistent with 
that expected of a [district] licence holder can be dealt with as a disciplinary 
matter. That can cover just about anything, even if it’s not a criminal offence 
or a breach of the byelaws or not specifically prohibited elsewhere. Interview 
42, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
    I think that this displays an outrageous abuse of the power to impose sanctions by 
local authorities. The whole purpose of the power is to regulate the trade and, even if 
a strong deterrence approach is taken, this does not permit the regulator to impose 
severe sanctions in circumstances where the licence holder, in the eyes of the law, has 
done nothing wrong. Such an approach also makes it difficult for drivers to modify 
their own behaviour in order to comply with the law.    
                                                 
59
 Uttlesford District Council, ‘Report to Licensing Committee of Assistant Chief Executive – Exercise 
of Delegated Powers’ 9th June 2010.  
60
 Uttlesford District Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting of Licensing Committee’ 8th September 2010 
[LC38]. 
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   It has also been said that loss of livelihood, whether temporary or permanent, may 
be out of all proportion to the offence.
61
 An examination of the records of regulatory 
committee meetings from the 32 Councils reveals many instances where a decision to 
suspend or revoke a licence appears, at least on the face of the documents, to be out of 
proportion to the severity of the non-compliance. This is particularly the case where 
there is no obvious connection between the offence or breach of regulatory code and 
any danger presented to the public. Examples include licence holders suspended 
following conviction for drug possession where it was accepted that there was no 
evidence of drug use or dealing
62
 and where it was accepted there was no connection 
between the possession and the offender’s occupation;63 and the immediate revocation 
of a licence following conviction for minor motoring and insurance offences not 
connected to taxi driving.
64
 
 
   Some licensing officers agree that, particularly in the case of relatively trivial 
matters, the power to remove a licence can be draconian. This is a good example of 
what one writer called the ‘paradox of enforcement’, that is, the more damaging and 
more limited a choice of sanction a regulator has, the less that sanction will be used.
65
 
Faced with the stark choice between doing nothing and depriving an individual of a 
livelihood, most committees will do nothing. Some local authorities have alternative 
enforcement actions which they believe are open to them.
66
 However, for those 
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 Rowan-Robinson (n 20) 305. 
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 Bristol City Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting of Public Safety and Protection Committee’ 25th January 
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 Great Yarmouth Borough Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting Licensing Committee’ 17th March 2011. 
64
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councils which do not use such alternatives, the severe nature of the sanctions cause 
something of a dilemma, as the following statements illustrate: 
 
It’s quite difficult, really. You have to do something and you feel your hands 
are tied. But, on the other hand you don’t want to stop somebody’s livelihood 
even for a short time, if the offence is fairly trivial which a lot of them are. 
Interview 13, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
When you think about it, it’s quite draconian, isn’t it? You’re depriving 
somebody of a livelihood. That looks disproportionate. But what else can you 
do? You could make it just a short suspension, but even then they will lose 
money even if off the road for a short time. Interview 40, Chair of Licensing 
Committee. 
 
   There is also the possibility that a licence holder convicted of an offence which is 
unrelated to their work may suffer the ‘double punishment’ of sentencing by the court 
followed by loss of livelihood inflicted by the licensing authority. Councils always 
require licence holders convicted of a criminal offence, of whatever nature, to appear 
before the committee. The purpose is for the committee to assess how the conviction 
impacts upon the driver’s fitness to continue to hold a licence. Some councils in the 
study recognise that this gives the impression of a convicted licence holder being 
sanctioned twice for the same offence. Such councils are, however, in the minority. 
Other authorities either do not accept that there is anything inappropriate about their 
actions or justify such action in the wider public interest. The following statements 
provide examples of the range of views among council officials:  
 
We do see the problem of double punishment when the driver has already 
been dealt with by the courts. It comes up quite a few times in committee. We 
do take into account the fact that a licence holder has already been punished 
for the offence by criminal sanctions from the courts… and quite often in such 
cases we deem that no further punishment is necessary. It depends on the 
circumstances of course. Interview 44, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
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Once a driver has been convicted, they will be brought back before the 
committee for them to consider what action to take on their licence. This can 
be a bit of a problem with taxis. They don’t see it as a separate thing from the 
court case. They see it as the council punishing them again for something 
they’ve already been penalized for. We see it as the maintenance of proper 
standards, so any decision to suspend a driver is seen as more of a deterrent 
rather than as a punishment. Interview 10, Enforcement Officer. 
 
I don’t see the committee’s actions as double punishment for the offender. If 
the penalty from the committee is an additional sanction to conviction, that is a 
separate issue. Interview 35, Head of Service. 
 
   Whatever the position of councils may be, it is clear that further sanctions imposed 
by committees are designed as a punishment in the sense used by von Hirsch, in a 
criminal context, of a deprivation coupled with the censure of the decision maker.
67
 In 
my view, the use of the power of sanction in circumstances where the driver has 
already been penalized by a court, especially where the conviction is unconnected to 
the licensed activity, is excessive and an abuse of that power.  
 
    Dickens sees administrative sanctions as a ‘more limited’ form of sanction than 
prosecution.
68
 This is the overall impression given by local authorities in their 
documents. Prosecution is portrayed as a higher form of sanction than suspension or 
revocation of a licence. However, this is not a view shared by all commentators. 
Ayres and Braithwaite, for example, argue that, whilst prosecution may have the 
symbolic and instrumental higher ground, it is administrative sanctions that have the 
most severe bite.
69
 The findings of the study support the view that, in practice, 
councils prefer administrative sanctions to criminal ones because of the perceived 
greater efficacy of the former and the greater deterrent effect on the trade. These 
points are prominent in the following comments:    
                                                 
67
 A von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1993) 58. 
68
 BM Dickens, ‘Discretion and Local Authority Prosecutions’ [1970] CLR 618, 632. 
69
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If you take their licences away, even for a short time I think this is much more 
effective than taking them through the courts. They won’t want to lose money. 
Interview 25, Enforcement Officer. 
 
I think it’s the chance of losing their licence that really frightens the drivers. 
They don’t worry about the courts because they know that the worst that can 
happen is they get a fine…not very much at that. But, if they can’t work… 
Interview 38, Chair of Licensing Committee.  
 
I would be much more concerned about coming in front of the licensing 
committee. If I’m done in court, then I get a fine. That means I just have to 
work a bit harder to pay it off. If I lose my licence, I’ve had it – knackered. 
Interview 19, Taxi Representative.         
    
   There were, however, some detractors who cast doubt on the effectiveness of 
administrative sanctions in securing compliance. It was felt that a certain ‘hard-core’ 
of licence-holders would always be resistant to any form of administrative action. 
Three examples of this viewpoint are set out here: 
 
I found a taxi parked and unattended on the taxi rank. It was there most of the 
day. I think [the driver] just fancied a free car park, but the vehicle licence was 
already suspended and [the driver] knew that. Some people are just like that, 
they never learn. Interview 49, Enforcement Officer. 
 
We have one driver, on twelve points already. [She] got caught on a speed 
camera but she just ignored the letter from the police. That’s what she’s like. 
So, she’ll be back in front of the committee again, probably for another 
suspension. Then, last Friday, [an enforcement officer] caught her with bald 
tyres. You just can’t tell some people. Interview 20, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
We get quite a few of those that don’t behave themselves. They come up 
before us fairly regularly. Usually same old things. They keep getting 
suspensions, but they never learn. They’ll be back again until they finally lose 
their licence altogether. Interview 1, Chair of Licensing Committee.  
 
   Although some council officials express reservations about the effectiveness of 
administrative sanctions, the use of such measures is considerably more widespread 
than prosecutions. During the period of the study, 35 cases involving alleged 
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regulatory non-compliance brought before licensing committees resulted in 
suspension of a licence, 33 in revocation and eight in refusal to renew.
70
 These 
findings run counter to the views of Ayres and Braithwaite in their famous 
‘enforcement pyramid’.71 Ayres and Braithwaite suggest that the least amount of 
enforcement activity occurs at the apex of the pyramid where the most serious 
sanctions of administrative withdrawal of licences occur. According to my findings, 
however, more activity takes place at the level of administrative sanctions than 
prosecution. To translate the findings of this study into a similar symbolic 
representation would produce a very odd shape, more akin to an hour glass than a 
pyramid, with more activity at the administrative levels of enforcement than at the 
level of prosecution. 
 
   It was also clear from the interviews that licensing officers are frustrated that more 
action cannot be taken against non-compliant licence holders. Councils attribute their 
lack of action to public reluctance to pursue complaints and support enforcement 
activity, as the following statements illustrate:    
 
A lot of people don’t want to put in formal complaints, do they? They don’t 
want to be bothered, and don’t even want to leave their name and address. 
That’s when it becomes a bit frustrating when people won’t put in formal 
complaints. Interview 25, Enforcement Officer. 
 
We have had occasional complaints from customers about being overcharged 
but they usually come to nothing because people, especially I find the older 
people, don’t want to get involved and don’t want to give us a statement. They 
think that it’s just enough to tell us about it and somehow we will magically 
sort everything all out from there. They don’t seem to understand that we can’t 
                                                 
70
 These figures were complied from the available committee meeting minutes from all 32 councils for 
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do anything without their cooperation or without any evidence to use to take 
action. Interview 37, Senior Licensing Officer. 
  
I’ve only ever had one complaint that followed it through into court and stood 
up in the witness box. Most people if we say ‘can we take a statement off 
you…I’m not going to court, I’m not going to court’. That’s the end of it then. 
You’re kind of stuck. But they expect you to do something without actually 
them doing anything, and you can’t. Interview 27, Senior Licensing Officer.   
 
   These statements suggest that council officials would like to take a larger number of 
punitive actions against recalcitrant licence holders than they currently do, which 
indicates a preference for a deterrence-based enforcement style, but are inhibited from 
doing so by a lack of co-operation from the general public. 
 
d) Spot checks   
 
   ‘Spot checks’ involve unannounced checks and inspections carried out at random 
intervals by or on behalf of the council to assess levels of compliance. This is said to 
deter potential offenders and to remind those lacking in diligence and care of their 
responsibilities.
72
 As such, spot checks are designed to secure compliance, but the 
findings of this study show that, in practice, they are used as a sanction. Councils are 
provided with the statutory power to carry out such checks upon licensed vehicles. A 
vehicle found to be unfit for use as a hackney carriage as a result of a spot check may 
have its licence suspended pending further testing and inspection.
73
  
 
   According to the findings of this study, the frequency with which the power to carry 
out spot checks is exercised depends on a number of factors, including the desire to 
retain an element of surprise and the extent to which the council favours proactive 
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strategies and availability of resources. Oadby and Wigston Council, for example, 
used to carry out spot checks up to six times per year but, due to budget constraints, 
has now had to reduce the number to three times per year. The strain on the budget 
was caused in part by the police introducing a charge for the attendance of an officer, 
which had previously been provided free of charge, and the Vehicle and Operators 
Standards Agency being unable to guarantee the attendance of an inspector even if 
payment was offered.
74
 The following quotations illustrate the considerations taken 
into account in relation to spot checks: 
 
The enforcement team does spot checks not on any regular basis, because 
obviously they’d know we were coming if we did it on the third Thursday of 
every month. We’re not going to warn them in advance. Interview 27, Senior 
Licensing Officer. 
 
We carry out spot checks a minimum of once per month and we pull in about 
70 to 80 vehicles at random on each occasion. We don’t give them any 
advance notice, of course. We like to keep them on their toes. Interview 12, 
Enforcement Officer. 
 
We carry out one spot check across the whole of [the district] per year. That’s 
designed to take in all vehicles over the course of four or five days. Individual 
areas within [this district] carry out their own spot checks at least two or three 
times per year but that’s a manpower and resources thing. Interview 30, Senior 
Licensing Officer. 
 
   What is noticeable by its absence in both the documentary evidence and the 
interview material is any reference to the safety of the public, notwithstanding the 
obvious connection which could be made.    
 
   The use of spot checks, however, raises four main concerns. The first is the 
frequency of spot checks generally. Whilst some councils carry out fairly regular 
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checks, others are as infrequent as two or three times per year, which, in my view, is 
clearly insufficient to encourage the trade to maintain quality or conduct standards. 
Assessment of compliance is dictated mainly by availability of resources, not by the 
need to protect the public. 
 
   A second issue is the extent to which council officers act beyond their powers in 
carrying out checks. The statutory power permits the inspection and testing of ‘any 
hackney carriage…licensed by a…council, or any taximeter attached to such a 
vehicle’.75 There is no power to assess the compliance of drivers yet local authorities 
often do so under the auspices of the spot check provisions, as confirmed by the 
following statements: 
 
We make frequent use of spot checks. They give us a good opportunity to 
keep an eye on the trade, check the state of vehicles and make sure drivers are 
wearing their badges, are appropriately dressed and have all their 
documentation in order. Interview 8, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
The spot checks we carry out can find defects with vehicles and we will 
obviously deal with those. But they also reveal badge and documentary 
offences committed by drivers. Interview 12, Enforcement Officer. 
 
Our procedures for spot-checks are designed to cover vehicle standards and 
the appearance and behaviour of drivers and include the use of breath testing 
equipment for the detection of alcohol. Interview 37, Senior Licensing Officer. 
  
   I think the use of spot checks to assess the compliance of drivers in this way goes 
beyond the limits of the licensing officer’s power under section 68. It is a significant 
gap in the licensing officer’s powers that he or she may carry out spot checks of 
vehicles but not drivers. The fact that licensing officers fill this void by checking 
drivers anyway does not make it lawful. Council officials certainly have no authority 
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to use breath testing equipment, which is reserved for the police.
76
 This deficiency in 
enforcement powers needs to be addressed by Parliament.  
 
   Thirdly, it is not only the frequency of spot checks which varies between councils, 
but the consistency with which they use their powers of suspension under section 68. 
Some councils take a very strict line on compliance and make liberal use of 
suspension notices under the section. Other councils reserve suspension for cases of 
defects which have the potential to present a threat to safety. Yet others consider the 
powers under section 68 to be draconian and only use them in blatant instances of 
unfit vehicles. The following statements give a flavour of the views of the use of 
section 68 taken by different councils: 
    
We do regular inspections on [vehicles] through spot checks, and they would 
get a section 68 notice suspending the vehicle from the road if they don’t 
comply with anything that we require. Interview 17, Enforcement Officer. 
 
If we were to find a bald tyre, for example, then we would obviously take 
action, issue an immediate stop notice. The driver or owner would have seven 
days to rectify the problem and have the vehicle retested before it would be 
allowed back on the road. And the licence would be suspended in the 
meantime. Interview 10, Enforcement Officer. 
 
We don’t make very much use at all of section 68 because we’ve never found 
a case where it was so absolutely obvious that the car was dropping to bits. So 
it’s not just safe to slap a section 68 on which we wouldn’t do, unless it really 
was that obvious. Interview 27, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
   This inconsistent use of section 68 powers means that vehicles deemed unfit for use 
by the public in one area will not necessarily be considered so in another district. This 
causes concerns for both the trade and the public. Defects to vehicles which may be 
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viewed as trivial in one area may result in a vehicle being removed from the road 
elsewhere.    
 
   A final concern in relation to spot checks is that ‘fitness’ of a vehicle for these 
purposes rests entirely on the subjective opinion of the officer carrying out the check. 
There is no right of appeal against suspension of the vehicle licence under section 
68.
77
 A licence holder served with a section 68 notice has no realistic choice other 
than to rectify the alleged defect and have the vehicle re-tested if he or she wishes to 
continue to trade. This means that licence holders can be penalized by lost revenue 
and the costs of rectifying defects in circumstances where, on an objective view, such 
a penalty is unnecessary and ought not to be imposed.  
 
   Some writers consider that, as a method of assessing compliance, an occasional spot 
check is as effective as routine inspections.
78
 In practice, most local authorities find 
the power to spot check and suspend the licences of unfit vehicles to be a better 
measure of compliance than routine inspections. Licensing officials view spot checks 
as ways of dealing instantly with a problem without the necessity of further 
proceedings and a way of keeping the trade vigilant. However, not all respondents 
were in favour of spot checks, with the main objection being resource commitment. 
The following statements provide some of the views on this issue from respondents: 
 
Once the immediate danger to the public is removed and then rectified, it’s 
unlikely that any further action would result. The owner and driver will 
already have been penalized by the loss of revenue whilst the taxi was off the 
road. Any further action beyond that might just be a waste of time. Interview 
10, Enforcement Officer. 
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Much more use should be made of on the spot inspections, as that is what 
keeps people on their toes. It’s no good if they know you are coming. We need 
to make sure that standards are maintained all the time, not just at testing time. 
Interview 5, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
We do carry out on the spot inspections, but they are used fairly infrequently. 
It is very expensive in terms of officer time as it’s usually at night and out of 
office hours, so overtime payments come into it. You could be looking at over 
£1,000 for few hours’ operation for what we get out of it. Interview 7, 
Enforcement Officer. 
 
It is interesting that none of these views mentions the protection of the public as a 
justification for spot-checks.  
 
   The use of spot checks in the way in which the legislation provides leads to a much 
more deterrence style of enforcement, even though random checks are more usually 
associated with a conciliatory-based approach. The practical use of the powers beyond 
their statutory limitations, and in an inconsistent manner based on the subjective view 
of the enforcing official, detract from their effectiveness as an enforcement tool. 
Although councils on the whole regard spot checks as an effective means of ensuring 
adherence to standards, this is largely measured against notions of effectiveness which 
do not take into account the protection of the public.      
 
e) Conclusions on powers provided by law 
 
   Councils are provided with only a limited number of enforcement powers by the 
legislation; testing and inspection, prosecution, administrative withdrawal of licence 
and stop checks. Although these are powerful weapons,
79
 they are not used by 
regulators as often or as frequently as they might be, largely as a result of resource 
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allocation considerations. This is surprising in view of the fact that, according to the 
legislation, these are the only enforcement powers which local authorities possess. 
Where the statutory powers are used, they are often applied incorrectly or for 
purposes other than those for which the powers were granted. This, in itself, can 
detract from any effectiveness that they may have had in addressing public safety 
concerns.  
 
   There is a clear preference amongst local authorities for administrative sanctions 
rather than prosecution. I think, however, that this preference is based upon councils’ 
wishes to retain control over the enforcement process and to avoid the uncertainties of 
placing enforcement in the hands of the courts. Administrative sanctions are viewed 
as more effective than prosecution in securing observance of vehicle and driver 
standards. This is largely because local authorities can be reasonably certain that the 
outcome will be in their favour and the scope for challenging administrative sanctions 
is more limited than for proceedings before the criminal courts. Councils’ use of 
administrative actions relies on the concerns of licence holders about the loss of their 
livelihood that withdrawal of the licence would represent outweighing the effort 
involved in disputing the factual or legal basis of the authority’s decision.  
 
   Therefore, the general conclusion is that local authorities use the powers granted to 
them to adopt a deterrence style approach to enforcement. The notable exception to 
this is the use of routine inspection and testing of vehicles. This method represents a 
conciliatory-based style and is largely effective in ensuring that quality standards are 
met, at least at the time of testing. Because licence-holders have advance warning of 
the test, they are able to ensure compliance at the time of inspection. The incentive to 
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compliance is the renewal of the vehicle’s licence. The threat of removal of the 
licence is usually not an imminent danger because, in the event of failure, there is 
always an opportunity to re-test, and so achieve compliance.  However, even in this 
case, the power is not used as often as it could be and councils are not making the 
most of the opportunity they have to secure compliance. A more frequent testing 
regime would both encourage and ensure increased observance of vehicle quality 
standards. 
 
   I think that, in view of the shortcomings of the powers provided by the law which I 
have discussed in this section, local authorities perceive that there are certain gaps in 
their ability to enforce the law. This has led to councils assuming certain powers for 
which the law does not provide any basis. It is the use and effectiveness of these 
powers to which I now turn.  
 
3) Powers used but not provided for by law 
 
   Whatever the shortcomings of the measures and sanctions discussed in the 
preceding section may be, they all have a legal basis. In this section, I examine 
various enforcement instruments and sanctions which have no legal basis, but which 
are still used by some of the councils in this study. These measures are not used by all 
councils, although they have achieved sufficiently extensive usage to make their 
analysis instructive. They are interesting in the context of this thesis precisely because 
they have no legal basis. They are local creations of discretion which exert control 
over the taxi trade. Some councils assert the ability to use these powers in their 
enforcement policies, others rely on local customary practice. In my view, such 
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instruments are beyond the legitimate powers of the licensing authorities and should 
not form part of regulatory enforcement. However, the fact is that they are used for 
enforcement purposes and so their effectiveness needs to be assessed.  
  
   The instruments that fall into this ‘extra-legal’ category include measures such as 
test purchases, penalty points or staged warning schemes, deferred suspensions, 
warnings, changes in licence conditions, and informal actions. They are the sort of 
techniques normally associated with administrative actions falling short of suspension 
or revocation, and as such are more closely allied to a conciliatory approach. This is 
certainly the view of the literature.
80
 However, in the case of taxi licensing, the 
findings of this study suggest that these measures are used to impose sanctions on 
drivers. This indicates a deterrence based approach. It is noteworthy that where these 
instruments are mentioned in council policy documents they are, in some cases, 
referred to as ‘penalties’ or ‘sanctions’, although most councils use the more neutral 
description ‘enforcement options’. 
  
a) Test purchases 
 
   Test purchases are a controversial area of enforcement. They involve local authority 
officers posing as customers or potential customers in order to gather evidence of 
non-compliance against licence-holders. Unlike the power to carry out spot checks on 
vehicles under section 68, there is no specific statutory power for local authorities to 
perform test purchases. Other regulatory regimes, such as those applicable to the 
safety of consumer goods or retail of alcohol, permit the making of test purchases 
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under particular statutory powers,
81
 but these do not apply to the taxi licensing 
system.  
 
   Notwithstanding the absence of such a power, twelve of the 32 councils record the 
use of test purchases as part of their enforcement activities. In some cases the test 
purchase operation is carried out in response to complaints of illegal activity in a 
council’s area. Other councils take a more proactive approach, and yet others would 
like to perform test purchases but are concerned about the resource implications. The 
following statements represent the range of local authority views: 
 
We carry out test purchases every now and again. It’s usually used to target 
particular problems, such as if we’ve had a lot of complaints about 
overcharging or private hires picking up un-booked fares. It’s the easiest way 
to gather evidence, although it’s not without its problems. Interview 8, Senior 
Licensing Officer. 
 
We usually try to do two covert operations per month when we’re really 
targeting the unlicensed vehicles, which have caused us a problem in the past, 
or illegal plying for hire ones. We also check on drivers and documentary 
offences. We have pulled in ten or a dozen some nights for illegal pick ups. 
Interview 12, Enforcement Officer. 
     
We would like to do test purchases to keep an eye on the drivers and the state 
of the vehicles, but we don’t have the resources to manage it. If we did test 
purchases, we would have to pay out for out of hours working, overtime, 
weekend rates etc. Interview 37, Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
   The practice has been called into question before the courts, although the legality of 
test purchasing has never been challenged directly. When the issue has been raised in 
court proceedings, the court has proceeded on the tacit assumption that the practice is 
valid, and the argument has been about the admissibility of evidence gathered by this 
method.
82
 The whole purpose of test purchasing is to gather evidence of breach of the 
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law or regulatory regime which may be used against a licence-holder in criminal or 
administrative proceedings. There is no element of persuasion or encouragement to 
comply. However, test purchasing is a resource intensive technique, with no guarantee 
of detecting non-compliance, and as such must be regarded as ineffective. 
 
b) Penalty points and staged warnings 
 
   Six of the councils have created their own ‘penalty points’ or ‘staged warning’ 
schemes. Although they vary in detail, these schemes work in a similar way to the 
‘totting up’ procedure for penalty points under the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1984.83 
A specified number of points are allocated for particular infringements of the 
substantive law, licence conditions or codes of conduct. The accumulation of a set 
number of points results in referral to the licensing committee or, in some versions of 
this scheme, automatic suspension of a licence. There is no legal basis for such 
schemes which are operated entirely as a product of each council’s own invention.  
   
   Penalty point schemes present a number of difficulties and divide opinion on the 
merits of their adoption. Those local authorities which use penalty points justify such 
systems on the basis of administrative ease and improved fairness to the trade. Other 
councils take an opposite view of the merits of such methods. The following 
statements represent contrasting opinions about penalty point schemes: 
 
Our penalty points scheme we see as a fair and effective way of dealing with 
persistent, repeat, but low-level offenders. A lot of the complaints we get are 
pretty trivial. To bring them before the committee is a bit excessive. This is a 
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way of staging sanctions in a proportionate manner. Interview 32, Senior 
Licensing Officer. 
 
We don’t see the value of penalty points. It’s too prescriptive and inflexible, 
officers may be accused of bias or picking on drivers, and I don’t see how they 
help improve driving standards or drivers getting their paperwork in on time. 
Interview 40, Chair of Licensing Committee. 
 
   Although penalty point schemes divide opinion amongst the regulators, some clarity 
on their use has recently been received from the High Court. In R(Singh) v Cardiff 
City Council, the High Court held that a penalty points scheme was within the powers 
of the council as a policy to govern the exercise of its discretion to suspend or revoke 
a licence under the statutory provision.
84
 However, the decision was not entirely 
supportive of the scheme used by that particular council. The Court ruled that the 
terms of the scheme were unlawful because the policy fettered the Council’s 
discretion by providing for automatic revocation on the accumulation of ten points. 
Furthermore, there was no opportunity to consider the facts underlying earlier points 
leading to the accumulation of ten, no consideration whether suspension was more 
appropriate than revocation, and the scheme was capable of producing arbitrary and 
unequal treatment.  
 
I think that this ruling confuses the policy to apply the penalty point scheme to 
incidents of misconduct with the means by which the policy is implemented, the 
scheme itself. A policy can only be implemented by measures which are within the 
authority’s powers, and imposing penalty points is not. Moreover, the working of 
similar schemes rests on the judgment of the licensing officer to determine who has 
infringed the rules, in what way, and what consequences should flow from that 
infringement. Points are allocated to the driver’s licence by the same official who 
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determined ‘guilt’. With the exception of Winchester City Council’s scheme,85 there 
is no mechanism by which an aggrieved driver can challenge the imposition of points 
on his or her licence. This can lead to the penalty points systems being used where the 
evidence against a driver is insubstantial or inconclusive of guilt.  
 
Despite the legal difficulties, those councils which use penalty point schemes believe 
they are more effective than the alternatives. This is, of course, the local authority’s 
own view of effectiveness. One respondent said: 
 
We find our penalty points scheme works well. It’s used in place of 
prosecution where we have enough evidence to prosecute, but this is a more 
effective and efficient way of doing things. Interview 35, Senior Licensing 
Officer.  
 
   The effectiveness and efficiency in this example, in my view, lie in avoiding an 
independent adjudicator assessing the adequacy or veracity of the evidence. The 
council alone is the judge of whether the evidence is sufficient to support a 
prosecution. If the evidence is so strong, why not prosecute? 
 
   Penalty point schemes, assuming they are lawful per se, have to be implemented in 
a lawful manner. There is evidence that at least one council has attempted to extend 
its powers beyond the terms of the system. Winchester City Council indicates in its 
documentation that drivers who regularly accumulate just under the twelve point 
threshold for reference to the sub-committee will nonetheless be referred on the 
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grounds that they are no longer a fit and proper person.
86
 This is manifestly not within 
the terms of the scheme, and so is an abuse of the council’s powers.  
 
   Local authorities claim success for their penalty points and staged warnings 
schemes. For example, Tendring District Council asserts that only one driver was 
sanctioned for breach of licence conditions prior to the introduction of the staged 
warning scheme. After introduction of the scheme, 85 drivers have received an 
informal warning, 25 a formal warning and nine transgressed for a third time and had 
their licence suspended.
87
 Whilst this is declared a success by the Council, there could 
be any number of reasons for such a large increase in enforcement activity, such as 
previous lax enforcement procedures or simply that the warning scheme makes it 
easier to sanction drivers.  
 
   Penalty point and similar schemes are a simple way for local authorities to penalize 
the trade without any administrative or court checks on this exercise of discretionary 
power. In this way, they are used as sanctions, not as encouragement for compliance, 
and are instruments designed for administrative ease.  
 
c) Deferred suspensions 
 
   Ten of the 32 councils asserted the power to issue ‘defect’ or ‘advisory’ notices to 
vehicles. These take the form of written notices which do not suspend the licence 
immediately. Instead, the vehicle continues to trade whilst repairs are carried out 
within a stated period of time. Failure to carry out repairs within the period results in 
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automatic suspension of the licence. Councils which use these notices admit that there 
is no statutory basis for them but view them as a way of maintaining standards 
without resorting to draconian action. One respondent explained:  
 
We give the driver a ‘defect’ notice if we find anything wrong with the 
vehicle. This can be anything from a worn tyre to a dirty seat cover. The 
notice is a non-statutory one. It gives the driver a chance to remedy the 
problem. Otherwise we would go for enforcement action for not complying 
with the notice. Interview 17, Enforcement Officer.    
 
   The difficulty with such procedures, in my view, is that they look more like a means 
of gaining ascendancy over the trade than a safety issue. If the defect renders a vehicle 
unfit for use, then there are already powers in place to suspend the licence on those 
grounds.
88
 If the defect does not impact on public safety, then why is any intervention 
necessary? Although at first glance this looks like a conciliatory approach to 
enforcement, the effect on the trade is a punitive one, incurring what may be 
unnecessary expense, loss of business and inconvenience.  
 
d) Warnings 
 
   Local authorities claim they have the power to issue oral or written warnings for 
incidents of non-compliance which fall short of requiring more serious action. The 
councils which use this device acknowledge that it can only be employed as a hollow 
threat, but assert some degree of success in rectifying trivial misdemeanours or those 
more serious ones for which the evidence is scant. Two respondents gave examples of 
their use of warnings: 
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Anything that doesn’t justify committee action or a suspension we might just 
give someone a warning letter, if we thought we’ll just mark their card to let 
them know we’re watching them and they’d better be careful. There’s no real 
way we can enforce that, but at least the intention is there. Interview 46, 
Enforcement Officer.  
 
If we had a case where we felt the driver’s behaviour fell short of what was 
expected but the evidence was a bit iffy, or it was one person’s word against 
another, you don’t want to let him get off too lightly. So we might consider a 
warning or something like that to the driver for acting in a manner not 
expected of a taxi driver or something along those lines. Interview 37, Senior 
Licensing Officer. 
 
   The use of warnings demonstrates a conciliatory approach to enforcement, but as is 
clear from the above two statements, the effectiveness of such a method is difficult to 
measure. 
 
e) Changes in licence conditions 
 
   As part of their disciplinary procedures, eight councils in the sample state that they 
have the ability to add further conditions to the driver’s licence as a means of securing 
future compliance. The councils which use this device justify their action on the 
grounds of flexibility and ease of administration by avoiding formal court 
proceedings. The following statements from two respondents make the position of 
their councils clear:  
 
The emphasis of our approach is flexibility. We can play around with the 
licence conditions to suit the particular circumstances of the case. It’s got to be 
better for us and the drivers to keep these sort of things away from the courts, 
especially for what are usually quite trivial transgressions. Interview 30, 
Senior Licensing Officer. 
 
We can use our discretion to create individual conditions to suit the 
circumstances for each case on its merits as an aid to enforcement going 
beyond our statutory powers. Interview 17, Enforcement Officer. 
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   I think such measures miss two vital points. One is that councils have no powers to 
impose any conditions on drivers’ licences, let alone change them or add new ones.89 
The second is that local authorities should not be doing anything ‘beyond their 
statutory powers’ for any reason at all. Whilst this would be consistent with a 
conciliatory approach, it is entirely unenforceable, and there is no evidence as to its 
efficacy.   
 
f) Informal actions 
 
   This study came across a number of instances where very informal advice or action 
in the face of non-compliance was found to be effective. These forms of action are 
certainly not found on the statute books, but the licensing officers responsible felt that 
the outcome was more effective than any formal sanction or other course of action. 
The following are examples of such informal, but effective, steps to deal with non-
compliance: 
 
We had a problem with one chap who was unlicensed but was hanging around 
outside nightclubs trying to pick up young women. But we could never catch 
him at it. So I went round to his house when I knew he was out and said to his 
wife, ‘I just wanted a quick word with him about the taxi’ She said ‘He 
doesn’t drive a taxi’. I then told her what we had been told and left it at that. I 
thought, if I can’t get him, I’ll drop him in the shit with his missus; she can 
inflict far greater punishment than I ever could. Funny, we’ve never had any 
trouble with him since. Interview 30, Senior Licensing Officer  
 
When we hear of an unlicensed spouse driving a taxi or someone whose 
licence has expired but might continue on a few more days, just ring the 
insurance company and they’ll just cancel their insurance. I’ve found the 
insurance companies will help. Handy. Interview 24, Senior Licensing Officer.    
 
If we can’t support a complaint with evidence you can still say to the driver 
‘So and so has made a complaint about you’. But that’s just a shot across the 
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bows to say ‘Look, I know what you’ve been up to, stop it’. And it’s fair to 
say that the few complaints that we’ve had tend to end there. So I suppose 
something must work. Interview 27, Senior Licensing Officer.  
 
   Such actions are unorthodox but effective and within the spirit of a conciliatory- 
based approach. Licensing officials who used such measures found them much more 
effective in achieving their particular purpose than more formal and resource 
consuming actions. These methods are effective for certain forms of non-compliance 
but they will not work in every case. There will always be intransigent members of 
the trade who will still oppose requests to co-operate. 
 
g) Conclusions on ‘extra-legal’ powers used.  
 
   It is easy to see why ‘extra-legal’ measures might prove attractive to regulators. 
They have three main advantages over the statutory provisions. First, the exercise of 
these powers allows local authorities to deal with what they see as quite trivial 
breaches of the rules. Councils take the view that the offence was trivial, but not so 
minor that it should be allowed to pass without penalty. Formal enforcement 
instruments are considered too draconian to deal with petty infringements. Second, 
sanctions imposed by councils, rather than the courts, allow local authorities to retain 
control over enforcement. Although this can also be achieved by formal powers, in 
the case of informal measures there are no rights of appeal against the imposition of 
these sanctions. This leaves the exercise of discretion unchecked. Third, the sanctions 
provide flexibility and can be tailored to the needs of the regulator. The findings of 
this study showed that it is the very informal approaches which prove the most 
effective although, in terms of cost, benefits and efficiency some of the ‘non-
statutory’ powers, such as test purchasing, proved the most ineffective. 
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The one major drawback of these measures is their lack of a legal base. The fact that 
the instruments themselves are beyond the powers of the local authorities makes them 
susceptible to challenges from the trade. Even where there is an arguable case that the 
measure itself is lawful, often its implementation is not, and this makes the power 
equally prone to legal challenge.   
 
4) Conclusions on enforcement. 
 
According to Snider, ‘non enforcement is the most salient characteristic of regulatory 
law enforcement’.90 In the case of enforcement of taxi regulation, I found the opposite 
to be the case. All councils undertake some form of enforcement on a regular basis, 
even if the result is that no further action is taken. Some local authorities undertake 
enforcement at more or less frequent intervals than other councils, and different 
approaches and methods are used. But enforcement is always occurring.  
  
   Macrory took the view that, in practice, many regulatory agencies relied too much 
on the ‘single blunt instrument of criminal prosecution.’91 This is clearly not the case 
in respect of taxi enforcement, as there are very few prosecutions in this field. 
Licensing authorities have only limited faith in prosecution to secure compliance, and 
prefer administrative sanctions instead. However, this preference is driven as much by 
a desire to maintain control over the enforcement process as it is by any belief in the 
ability of administrative sanctions to achieve compliance. However, more effective 
                                                 
90
 L Snider, ‘Towards a Political Economy of Reform, Regulation and Corporate Crime’ (1987) 9 Law 
and Policy 37, 47. 
91
 P Macrory, ‘Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective’ (Final Report, Better Regulation 
Executive, November 2006) [E.9]. 
 280 
enforcement could be achieved if local authorities were to make better use of the 
powers which the law gives them, such as routine inspection of vehicles. An increased 
frequency of vehicle checks for all vehicles would produce a much more effective 
incentive for vehicles to comply and remain compliant in readiness for the next 
inspection. 
          
   Many of the more effective enforcement strategies rely for their efficacy on a degree 
of bluff by the licensing authorities.
92
 In some cases this relies on the ignorance or 
lack of resources of the trade by bringing formal or informal actions without any firm 
legal basis. There are many examples in this study where action has been taken 
against taxi licence-holders, who have simply accepted the local authority’s claims 
that a regulatory offence has been committed and the council’s power to take action. 
This is particularly noticeable in relation to the informal powers asserted by local 
authorities. In fact, the most effective techniques for securing adherence to standards 
were the very informal measures, such as reporting suspected breaches of the rules to 
external private bodies. However, many of these strategies are based on unreliable 
foundations, and a successful legal challenge could render them of little value to 
enforcement. The potential weakness of these informal measures could be resolved 
quite easily by placing them on a statutory footing. Local authorities already use 
minor penalties such as warnings and deferred sanctions in practice, so there is a case 
to be made, in my view, for regularizing the position and granting councils such 
powers formally. This could be achieved by a change to the legislation along the lines 
of the scaled sanctions currently used in the area of environmental regulation.
93
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   In their public pronouncements, councils like to portray themselves as adopting a 
conciliatory approach to enforcement. However, in practice, local authorities use their 
powers, both provided by the law and of their own creation, to penalize those licence 
holders who are considered to have infringed the regulatory regime and to deter others 
from breaking the rules. Enforcement activity is generally not designed to urge or 
encourage compliance, but to penalize offenders. The activities of local authorities in 
fact reveal a deterrence approach to enforcement, contrary to both the findings of 
previous studies in other fields and the councils’ own claims about their style.  
    
   Finally, the findings of this study only partly support the point that reactive 
measures tend to indicate a deterrence type approach and proactive measures suggest 
a conciliatory approach. Although the councils in this study used a combination of 
both reactive and proactive strategies, the finding that councils tended to adopt a 
deterrence approach suggests that even the proactive instruments, such as spot checks 
and test purchases, resulted in deterrence based sanctions. Other proactive measures, 
such as routine testing, did support a conciliatory approach, as I have already 
indicated, but the effect of those methods was outweighed by the sanctions which 
came about as a result of the other enforcement measures. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
 
   In this concluding chapter, I draw together all the themes from the preceding 
chapters to consider whether regulation of the trade achieves what it sets out to 
achieve. I also reflect on the practical implications of the study both for the taxi trade 
now and in the future and some suggested areas for legislative changes and further 
research. 
 
1) General findings of the study 
 
   One thing which has been clear from the outset and has been confirmed by the 
findings of this research is that regulation of the taxi trade in England and Wales is in 
a state of confusion. There is no clear idea of what it is trying to achieve or how it is 
supposed to get there. No-one knows what many of the legislative provisions mean 
because of the vagueness of the language used. Granting wide discretionary powers to 
local authorities has produced a system which has wide variations in practice across 
the country. This results in a system which lacks coherence and uniformity in key 
areas, such as the suitability of vehicles and drivers, where consistency and regularity 
would be expected.     
 
   The current Coalition Government accepts that there is a strong case for overhauling 
the legislation governing taxis.
1
 Indeed, during the course of this research the Law 
Commission has instigated a ‘root and branch’ study of taxi and private hire licensing 
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with a view to recommending reform of the existing regime.
2
 Although my research is 
not designed to complement or critique the work of the Law Commission, it would be 
remiss to overlook the fact that soon there is likely to be a new legislative framework 
for regulation of the taxi trade. There are some areas of overlap between this study 
and that of the Law Commission, particularly in relation to quantity restrictions, the 
creation of national quality standards and officers’ enforcement powers. 3 However, 
the Law Commission’s remit is much broader than the scope of my research, covering 
many aspects of regulation of private hire vehicles, drivers and operators as well as 
the hackney carriage trade. Some of the Law Commission’s recommendations are 
purely cosmetic and do not begin to tackle the root of the perceived problems. For 
example, the suggestion that the words ‘hackney carriage’ be removed from the 
legislation and replaced by the word ‘taxi’4 may be sensible, long overdue and reflect 
modern parlance, but it is not going to shake the trade to its core, nor will it make the 
task of regulating taxis any easier or more effective.                
 
   As I indicated in the opening chapter, one of the main criticisms of the current 
regime from those who have to apply and enforce it on a daily basis is that the 
legislation is ‘too old’. This was the only point upon which all the interview 
respondents held unanimous views. There is a sense of frustration at the perceived 
inadequacies of the legislative framework purely because of the age of the statutory 
provisions and the fact that they are seen as being unsuitable for the contemporary 
taxi industry. However, as I hope I have made clear, the deficiencies that exist within 
the regulatory system are as a result of the way in which the legislation is interpreted 
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and applied, not as a result of its age per se. Nevertheless, I accept that there is a clear 
need for reform of the regime to reflect modern business practices and lifestyles. 
Indeed, I argue for a number of reforms which I believe would improve the 
effectiveness of regulation of the trade. I do not advocate dramatic wholesale changes 
to the existing system and I believe that the necessary changes can be brought about 
by amendment of the current system. 
 
   The need to regulate the taxi trade is beyond question. Government rhetoric and 
economic opinions about ‘de-regulation’ of the industry are misleading in that they 
refer only to one particular aspect of regulation – quantity restrictions on entry to the 
market. No-one seriously suggests that quality standards for vehicles and drivers 
ought to be left to market forces. Licensing as a method of regulation still provides the 
best system for the taxi trade. No-one, either in the literature or during the course of 
this research, has suggested a viable alternative to licensing as the means by which the 
taxi trade should be regulated. Some of those who criticise licensing generally do so 
on the basis of economic theory, and even then do not suggest any viable practical 
substitute. Although other options exist, none of them are able to achieve the 
advantages which licensing possesses over the other means. The requirement to seek 
prior approval for vehicles and drivers, although initially more costly in terms of local 
authority resources, is more effective, and less costly in the long term, than having to 
investigate and impose financial or other sanctions after something has gone wrong. 
Alternatives to licensing, such as economic instruments or criminal or civil law 
remedies, would cause considerable difficulties in the case of taxi regulation, as they 
all involve ex post facto judgments of fitness and suitability or the causes of incidents. 
Even alternative forms of prior approval, such as registration or certification, pose 
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problems for public safety without the backing of criminal sanctions because either 
the vehicle or the driver or both may be unsuitable and unsafe. Whatever the aim of 
taxi regulation is said to be, licensing provides the best way of achieving all or any of 
those aims over any alternative regulatory measures. In this chapter, I consider how to 
make the best use of the licensing system in the light of the findings of the study.  
 
2) Specific findings of the study and their significance  
 
a) Local authority culture 
 
   One of the main findings which emerges from this study is the extent to which the 
effectiveness of the regulatory regime is reliant upon a particular local authority 
culture. The impact of local authority culture on taxi licensing has not been the 
subject of previous research. Although there are, as one might expect, local variations 
and differences in the culture of individual councils, the findings of this research 
suggest that generally all local authorities display basically similar cultural 
characteristics.
5
 In relation to taxi regulation, this culture becomes apparent in the 
belief that councils may do whatever they see fit to regulate the trade. Local 
authorities essentially run their own ‘fiefdoms’ within which they feel able to 
disregard or even break the law, create their own law and generally do as they wish in 
the knowledge that their decisions are unlikely to be challenged by the trade.  
 
   This culture manifests itself throughout the regulatory process, from councils 
creating impressions that they have powers which they do not in fact possess to 
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imposing licence conditions which are not reasonably necessary for any recognised 
aim of regulation. Council officials often equate licence holders with employees and 
believe the degree of control they are able to exercise is commensurate with that 
status. Thus local authorities dictate where and how taxis are to operate and their 
appearance, including the colours, make and age of vehicles. Councils also control the 
way drivers behave, dress and conduct themselves. But taxi owners and drivers are 
not employees and ought not to be subject to the same degree of control. Local 
authority culture has greatest resonance in the area of enforcement, where local 
authorities often act beyond the scope of the powers which Parliament has provided to 
them and create their own enforcement powers as an addition to their statutory 
powers. For the most part, the trade simply acquiesces in what councils do, largely as 
a result of ignorance of the law, lack of resources, and prioritizing the running of 
business over regulatory concerns. Indeed, the trade generally only thinks to challenge 
local authority decisions when those decisions have a direct impact on business. Even 
then, as can be seen in the example of ‘penalty point schemes’, the courts mainly 
defer to the decisions of the local authority. 
 
   Somewhat paradoxically, the findings of this research indicate that the most 
effective instruments of control, in terms of their ability to achieve the main aims of 
regulation, are those produced by councils when creating their own powers in 
disregard or even breach of the law. This is particularly noticeable in relation to 
informal enforcement procedures and is also apparent in, for example, the imposition 
of driver’s licence conditions notwithstanding the absence of any legal power to do 
so. Whilst there are inherent limitations placed on councils’ powers by the legislation, 
and some frustrations on the part of licensing officials caused by such limitations, the 
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absence of power is not a justification for licensing authorities to create and adopt 
their own measures to fill in any gaps, perceived or real, in the legislative framework. 
Placing the more contestable powers on a proper statutory basis would remove any 
doubts about their legality and would also enable proper safeguards to be put in place 
to prevent excessive or arbitrary use of such powers by licensing officials. However, 
legislative change alone would not alter the entrenched attitude of local authorities; 
only a change of culture will produce real progress towards a more uniform and 
ordered regulatory scheme.  
 
b) Use of discretion 
   
   The findings of this study provide examples of situations where the scope of local 
authority discretion is misplaced. It is the wrong way around. Decisions on which 
vehicles and drivers are of suitable quality to be admitted to the trade ought to be the 
most tightly confined. An assessment of whether a limit should be imposed on the 
number of taxis permitted to ply for hire locally ought to have the widest discretion. 
Where the exercise of discretion is currently ‘open-ended’, councils have no choice 
other than to devise their own guidelines in the absence of any direction from central 
government. The results of this study, however, illustrate that the principles 
formulated by local authorities are not always linked to specific aims, although they 
are at least based on some recognisable principles. This partly explains why the 
exercise of discretion produces inconsistent outcomes in different cases within the 
same area and between different areas. The consequence of the current approach is 
that there is an absence of consistency and uniformity in the outcomes of exercises of 
discretion. This means, for example, that vehicles and drivers considered perfectly ‘fit 
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and proper’ in one area may not be so regarded in another area. At the same time, a 
council which believes that restriction of vehicle numbers is appropriate for its area is 
prevented from imposing such a limit or can only do so at considerable expense and 
inconvenience.  
 
   Whilst I accept that some discretion within the system is both unavoidable and 
desirable, I think that where discretion is currently ‘open-ended’, it should be more 
tightly confined, structured and checked by the use of specific rules. The attitude of 
the respondents in this study to the idea of stricter legal rules to restrict discretion was 
somewhat mixed. Some felt that existing principles used to shape the exercise of 
discretion were unsatisfactory or unclear and more specific guidance on the 
interpretation and application of standards would be welcome. On the other hand, 
others would regard stricter control of discretion as an unwarranted interference with 
their autonomy. However, I think that the results of this study illustrate that too much 
discretion produces inconsistency where there ought to be uniformity and leads 
licensing officials to assume for themselves powers which they do not possess under 
the legislative framework.  
 
   Stricter rules could appear in the form of national quality standards for both vehicles 
and drivers. The Law Commission’s proposal for the introduction of such standards 
may help to confine and structure local authority discretion in this area.
6
 Indeed, many 
of the interview respondents thought that such standards were needed and should be 
welcomed. However, it is not yet clear how specific the proposed standards are going 
to be or whether they will still leave local authorities with broad based discretion over 
                                                 
6
 Law Commission (n 2) [15.5] and [16.4]. 
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issues such as livery or signage. The difficulty in establishing national standards is the 
question of who decides what the standard is going to be. I think that this must be a 
task for central government, in the shape of the Secretary of State for Transport. This 
would require views and opinions from experts on the appropriate standards of 
mechanical condition and construction for vehicles. It would also require guidance on 
suitable standards of medical fitness and how to deal with criminal convictions for 
drivers. Whilst the drawing up of standards would be complex, there is no reason why 
a set of standards which apply across the country cannot be formulated. A safe vehicle 
and a safe driver is the same wherever in the country a vehicle and driver operate. 
Quality standards should also be applied to other areas of local authority discretion, 
such as removal of licences or decisions on prosecution, which are not considered by 
the Law Commission proposals. 
 
   Once implemented, however, national standards should be precisely that; standards 
which apply in the same way across the country. Although, in my view, there are very 
good reasons for retaining local administration of the taxi regime, there should not be, 
as the Law Commission propose, the retention by local authorities of the power to 
create and impose their own ‘local’ standards in addition to the national ones.7 If there 
is one important lesson to be learnt from this research, it is that where local authorities 
are given the opportunity to impose their own requirements they will take it. This is 
likely to result in a system which suffers from the same problems of variation and 
inconsistency as the present regime. National quality standards would also require 
standardization of licensing fees and enforcement procedures to prevent ‘forum 
shopping’ by applicants for councils which are a ‘cheaper’ or ‘softer’ option.  
                                                 
7
 ibid [15.26] and [16.21]. 
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   Whilst the currently ‘open-ended’ areas of discretion ought to be subject to stricter 
rules, the findings of this study suggest that the areas of discretion which are currently 
restricted should be more open. This is particularly the case in relation to quantitative 
regulation of market entry. I think it is noteworthy that the Law Commission, which 
initially recommended removal of the power to limit numbers of taxi licences 
altogether,
8
 has recently reversed its original proposal and now suggests that councils 
should be permitted to restrict numbers if they wish to do so.
9
 As the Law 
Commission has yet to report, it is not clear from this indication what the basis for the 
exercise of this discretion is proposed to be. I think, on the basis of this study, that this 
is the correct approach. Limits on numbers should be a matter of local preference 
based on factors which extend beyond economic considerations to include the size 
and nature of the locality, the extent of the night-time economy and the local taxi 
‘culture’.   
  
c) Local or central control.  
 
   The findings of this study suggest that the ‘local’ nature of the regulator is 
significant for some aspects of regulation, but is less so for others. There are aspects 
of regulation, such as quantitative restrictions based on unmet demand and 
enforcement proceedings, for which local knowledge and choice is required and 
assists in efficient enforcement. In other areas, such as quality standards for vehicles 
and drivers, local information is less significant and regulation could just as easily be 
carried out centrally. As in the case of discretionary powers, the current emphasis on 
                                                 
8
 ibid [17.14]. 
9
 Law Commission, ‘Taxi and Private Hire: Interim Statement’ (9th April 2013) [6-7].  
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localism is the wrong way around in certain respects. Where local knowledge is most 
needed and beneficial to decision making, for example where levels of local demand 
for taxi services need to be assessed, the local authority’s powers to act are severely 
restricted by the legislation. On the other hand, standards of vehicle and driver quality 
and safety, which ought to be uniform regardless of where in the country the service is 
provided, are left to the local authority’s discretion, resulting in the wide disparity of 
quality conditions across the country.  
 
   I was not surprised to find that all respondents to the study were in favour of 
retaining local control over taxi services. There was a feeling amongst respondents 
that the quality and enforcement standards of their council were superior to those 
imposed by local authorities elsewhere. I think that there are certain aspects of 
regulation which would be more effectively dealt with by the exercise of local control 
and the balance needs to be redressed so that those areas which would benefit most 
are regulated locally. This is particularly the case for those areas of regulation which 
require local knowledge or local presence in order to ensure more effective regulation.    
 
   I suggested in an earlier chapter that one way of resolving the tension between local 
and central control might be to adopt an approach similar to the one used under the 
regime implemented for alcohol licensing under the Licensing Act 2003.
10
 This would 
enable a centrally created framework of general principles to be used as a model of 
local control. The system used for liquor licensing has been criticised as permitting 
central government still to exert influence over local decision making through the use 
                                                 
10
 Discussed in Chapter 2 section 4a). 
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of statutory guidance.
11
 The findings of this research illustrate that local authorities 
believe that central government already interferes excessively in their regulatory 
functions, such as through the need for approval of byelaws, and that such influence is 
likely to continue. Amendment to the regulatory regime would also face the challenge 
of local authority culture discussed above. Part of that culture is an embedded 
reluctance to adapt to changes in the law. Cammiss and Manchester, in their recent 
study of licensing committee proceedings under the Licensing Act 2003, found that 
‘long established practices continued largely unchanged despite a formal change in 
the law.’ 12 There may be a similar reluctance to adapt to a new taxi licensing regime, 
should one be introduced.   
 
    An alternative proposal would be to delegate a national licensing function to a 
centralized government department or agency with responsibility for enforcement 
remaining with local authorities. This would be similar to the system which currently 
operates in the case of consumer credit licences.
13
 In the case of taxi licences, 
however, the numbers of vehicles and drivers involved may result in such a system 
becoming overly complex and bureaucratic.  
 
   Notwithstanding these potential difficulties, however, there remain sound reasons 
for keeping quantitative market entry and enforcement functions for taxis local, 
                                                 
11
 A Hunt and C Manchester, ‘The Licensing Act and its Implementation: Nanny Knows the “Third 
Way” is Best’ [2007] Web Journal of Current Legal Issues. The government have recently provided 
further evidence for this view by requiring local authorities to have regard to a statutory code of 
practice when imposing licence conditions in relation to CCTV cameras – Protection of Freedoms Act 
2012 (Code of Practice for Surveillance Camera Systems and Specification of Relevant Authorities) 
Order 2013 SI 2013/1961.  
12
 S Cammiss and C Manchester, ‘“ Careering Out of Control”: Decision-making in Contested Cases 
Under the Licensing Act 2003’ (2012) 31(1) Civil Justice Quarterly 89, 110. 
13
 Consumer Credit Act 1974. 
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because of the need for and importance of local knowledge and presence, which could 
not be achieved by a more remote and centralized system.  
 
d) Some exceptions 
    
   Contrary to much of the literature and the perceptions and claims of the local 
authorities themselves, my research also suggests that councils, adopt a more 
deterrence based approach to enforcement than a conciliatory one. There was clear 
evidence that council officers are frustrated that they are unable to take more 
strenuous action due to the limitations of their enforcement powers. This was 
particularly noticeable in relation to the inability to take action against vehicles and 
drivers licensed in other areas, and also because of a lack of co-operation on the part 
of the public. However, the implications of a more deterrence based approach are 
likely to be a withdrawal of co-operation and more defensive and antagonistic 
response from the trade.  
 
   Some of the difficulties and frustrations of the licensing officials may be partly 
addressed by proposals from the Law Commission, which recommends a range of 
new enforcement powers for licensing officers, including the ability to stop licensed 
vehicles, impounding and fixed penalty schemes. Such powers are to be extended to 
include out of area vehicles.
14
 Whilst this proposal is a welcome one, it does not go 
far enough, in my view. Many of the sanctions falling short of outright removal of a 
licence, such as warnings and penalty point schemes, ought to be placed on a statutory 
footing.  
                                                 
14
 Law Commission, Interim Statement (n 9) [17]. 
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   Contrary to the general findings of the study, especially in relation to the local 
regulator’s culture of control despite and in the face of the strict legal position, I found 
that in certain respects councils did not exercise the degree of control that they 
thought they did. This was most noticeable in two areas, neither of which is 
mentioned in the relevant literature. The first area is in relation to the setting of fares. 
The general trend of local authority ascendancy in all regulatory matters is not 
followed in the case of fares, where the trade has the upper hand and maintains a 
position of dominance. It is the trade which sets the appropriate fare levels, and the 
local authorities generally acquiesce in the trade’s demands. This is, however, an 
exception to the general rule. The second area concerns journeys which are 
undertaken from a particular location or which finish outside a local authority’s area. 
The study indicates that there are a significant, but unquantifiable, number of journeys 
undertaken which are not regulated at all by councils because they do not fall within 
the scope of the legislation. 
 
3) Limitations on study and further research 
 
   I have to acknowledge that there are a number of limitations upon this study. Firstly, 
it is confined to a particular and narrow part of the public transport industry. Some of 
the issues researched are common to other parts of that industry, such as buses and 
trains, although they are not equivalent to taxis. Similarly, some matters of concern 
are shared with private hire vehicles and drivers, and some of the findings of this 
study may be applicable to that trade. However, a study of similar issues in other 
forms of transport would have to be the subject of further research.  
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   Secondly, although I tried to make the sample of 32 councils as representative as 
possible, the findings are not necessarily generalizable to all of the other 283 councils 
in England and Wales. I anticipate that a similar exercise carried out with a different 
sample of councils would produce a similar set of findings, although part of the 
interest of the study was the range of views I was able to obtain on a narrow range of 
issues. There were many areas of commonality, but each respondent had his or her 
individual take on the issues raised. The fact that there were so many views expressed 
on all the subjects made it difficult to see any likelihood of consensus on the 
controversial topics. I do not think, however, that the relatively small sample size or 
range of views detracts from the significance of the findings.  
 
   Thirdly, as I indicated in the methodology chapter, some of the source material used 
is age specific, in that it relates to particular events which occurred during a specific 
one year period, other information is not. It is possible that procedures and approaches 
may have changed at individual councils during the course of this study.  
  
   There were other potential areas of research which were revealed by my study, but 
which constraints of time, space and direct relevance prevented me from pursuing 
further in this thesis. Issues such as the relationship between appointed officers and 
elected councillors, particularly in relation to regulating entry and enforcement, and 
some of the due process concerns surrounding grant and removal of licences are 
potentially interesting and fruitful sources of future research. It would also be of 
interest to undertake further empirical research into matters such as the numbers of 
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taxi journeys which commence at railway stations, airports and seaports, or travel 
outside the licensed area, and as such are potentially unregulated.  
 
   These must remain matters for further research. I have concluded that any lack of 
effectiveness within the taxi licensing regime is a product of the way in which the 
system is applied. Where the regime is deficient, this is as a result of the approach, 
interpretation and application of the legislation by the local authority regulator. 
Effectiveness could be improved, and I hope that the conclusions I have reached will 
stimulate some debate on the direction of reform. In what is a vital part of the 
transport system, it is hoped that a more effective system can be produced than the 
contemporary one.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Councils which retain quantitative regulation 
 
Aylesbury Vale 
Barnsley 
Bolton 
Barrow in Furness 
Basingstoke and Deane 
Bath & North East Somerset 
Bedford 
Birmingham 
Blackburn with Darwen 
Blackpool 
Bournemouth 
Bradford 
Braintree 
Brighton & Hove 
Calderdale 
Cardiff 
Cheshire East (Part) 
Cheshire West & Chester (Part) 
Chorley 
Colchester 
Corby 
Cornwall (Part) 
Derbyshire Dales 
Dover 
Durham (Part) 
Exeter 
Halton 
Harrogate 
Hastings 
Havant 
High peak 
Hull  
Hyndburn 
Kirklees 
Knowsley 
Lancaster 
Leeds 
Leicester 
Lincoln 
Liverpool  
Maidstone 
Manchester 
Mid-Sussex 
Newcastle under Lyme 
Newcastle upon Tyne 
North East Lincolnshire 
North Tyneside 
Nottingham 
Oldham 
Oxford 
Pendle 
Plymouth 
Poole 
Portsmouth 
Preston 
Reading 
Ribble Valley 
Richmondshire 
Rochdale 
Rotherham 
Scarborough 
Sefton 
Sheffield 
Southampton 
Southend on Sea 
South Tyneside 
Stevenage 
St. Helens 
Stockport 
Sunderland 
Tameside 
Test Valley 
Thurrock 
Torbay 
Torridge 
Trafford 
Tunbridge Wells 
Wakefield 
Warrington 
Weymouth & Portland 
Wigan 
Windsor & Maidenhead 
Wyre 
York 
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APPENDIX  B 
 
Interview Schedule  
 
The general areas for discussion are identified in the questions set out below. These 
questions are designed to prompt conversation in the direction of the desired general 
area. Some questions may be suitable only for particular categories of respondent.  
 
1) Introductory Question - Tell me about your position as Chair of the Licensing 
Committee/Licensing Officer/Enforcement Officer/Taxi Representative? 
 
 
2) What would you say are the aims of taxi regulation? 
 
Why do you think the taxi trade is licensed?  
What are regulations trying to achieve? 
What influences your decisions on taxi licensing issues? 
Do you think taxis should be controlled locally or nationally? 
 
 
3) What do you think about controlling entry to the taxi market? 
 
Why does your council have the policy it does on limiting/not-limiting numbers of 
taxis?  
Why such detailed/lack of detailed specifications for entry? 
Why does your area have/not have these requirements when other areas do not/do? 
Should entry to the market be controlled by quality rather than quantity?  
Would you prefer more/less rules/guidelines than currently exist to assist/direct your 
decisions on licence applications? 
Why is your council’s policy on vehicle age limits/knowledge test/relevance of 
convictions etc. [as appropriate to specific councils] different from other areas?  
Should there be national standards of ‘suitability’ for vehicles and drivers? 
 
 
4) How does your council go about setting and maintaining standards of quality 
for the taxi service in your area?  
 
How are the quality of service standards set by your council? 
Why do standards set by your council go beyond the statutory minimum? (if this is 
the case).  
Would you prefer more/less rules/guidelines than currently exist to assist/direct how 
quality standards are set and maintained? 
How do you control behaviour/conduct of drivers?  
Could more/better use be made of byelaws/conditions on licences/codes of 
conduct/guidelines to set and maintain quality standards? 
Why does your council [as appropriate to specific council] impose/not impose quality 
requirements such as age limits on vehicles, livery, WAVs, length of driving 
experience, driver qualifications, DSA assessments, dress codes, advertising on 
vehicles, insurance etc?  
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Should there be national quality standards for vehicles and drivers? 
 
5) How do you decide on the fare tariff for your area? 
 
How are fare rates set in your area? 
What factors influence your decisions when setting fare rates? 
Why do your fare rates differ from those in other areas?   
What are the difficulties with regulating fares? 
How many complaints are received about fares/overcharging? 
[Drivers only]: approximately what percentage of your fares end outside the area? 
Approximately how many of your fares are from the railway station ranks? 
 
 
6) How does your council go about enforcing the taxi regulations in your area? 
  
How would you describe your council’s general enforcement policy/style/approach?  
What enforcement methods does your council use? 
Does the trade generally cooperate/prove obstructive in enforcement? 
How often are infringements overlooked, not pursued, ‘let off’ with an oral warning 
etc?  
Does the system work as you would like it to? Is it effective? Why do you say that?  
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